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Abstract 
 
During recent years the Kurdish question has reappeared, more intensely than before, on 
the international agenda. For years, this question has been of fundamental concern to the 
countries of the region, and it has led to extensive internal controversies and economic 
and social crises. The number of Kurds in the four parts of Kurdistan and within the 
borders of the four countries that have divided it up between themselves totals about 35 
million. This makes the Kurds, after the Arabs, Turks, and Persians, the fourth-largest 
nation in the Middle East 
 
The Kurds are, together with the Arabs, Persians, and Armenians, one of the most ancient 
peoples of the Near East. The country they inhabit is called Kurdistan. The Kurds have 
their own language, Kurdish. Kurdish is a member of the Indo-European family of 
languages; like Persian, Afghan, and Beluchi, it is one of the Iranian languages. Kurdish 
is unrelated to the Arabic or Turkish languages 
 
Kurds have played a significant role in the history of this region since its early epochs. A 
great deal of information on this can be found in numerous Greek, Roman, Arab, and 
Armenian sources. According to them, the Kurds founded several important states during 
the Islamic epoch between the tenth and thirteenth centuries, such as Shaddâdiden, 
Marvâniden, and Ayyûbiden - as well as in the distant past. Sultan Salahaddin (Salâh al-
Dîn), the founder of the Ayyûbid state, which included Egypt, Syria, and Kurdistan, 
played a particularly significant role in history 
 
This thesis attempts to examine the main characteristics of  Kurdish nationalism. In order 
to that, the theses will analyze the social structure of the Kurdish society. The thesis 
thoroughly explains the agitations of the Kurds against the Ottoman Empire during 
nineteenth century and beyond. This thesis examines the Kurdish reactions in the course 
of the First World War against the Empires of Ottomans and Persia, which divided the 
Kurdish land between themselves. The thesis analysis the stunning obstacles in the face 
of the Kurds in formation of their national state in aftermath of the Ottoman Empire. This 
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study can be a cornerstone to understand the inherent weakness of the Kurdish 
nationalism in integrating all social and sectarian groups within the Kurdish society.  
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Chapter One 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The Kurds are undertaking a period of significant reawakening of their national 
consciousness as a nation. Kurds have been aware of their distinctive characteristics for 
over centuries. Being linguistically and culturally different from Arabs, Turks, and 
Persians, they have had a disturbing history in the region and hence have had uneasy 
relationship with these hostile nations. In the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the 
Kurds have continuously revolted for their national rights. Faced with the combination of 
remarkable domestic and international developments, the Kurdish society has entered a 
new era of their national awakening. Their assertiveness has emerged within the context 
of the modern world of nations-states that have been shaping human life since the Treaty 
of Westappahila (1648). Today, with spread of the democratic ideals and human rights 
norms, Kurdish nationalism is surfacing as a formidable entity in the Middle Eastern 
region. The emergence of a more cohesive nationalist awareness is a political evolution 
that has been continuing with ups and downs in the last over two centuries. This thesis 
mainly will attempt in analyzing Kurdish nationalism and the reasons why Kurdish 
nationalism has not been able to be a currency of a Kurdish national state like the 
nationalisms of other peoples in this region. This thesis is made of the ten chapters and 
each chapter will deal with a distinctive context in the history of the Kurdish nationalism.  
 
Chapter two will examine the problems that have been integrative part of the theoretical 
history of nationalism as a concept. Since nationalism is a Western concept, this chapter 
explains certain aspect of the problems that have been part of the European history, 
where for the first time nationalist ideas inspired peoples to raise their voice against the 
autocratic regimes of the period. This chapter also analyses the main schools of thoughts 
on nationalism, and in this context, Kurdish nationalism will be examined. Furthermore, 
this chapter gives us a glimpse of a couple of the Kurdish-poets, Ahmedi Khani and Haji 
Qadri Koye, whose nationalist aspirations strongly motivated their intellectual work 
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dating back to seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Since their nationalist-inspired 
poems correspond to the changes occurring on the European land and since they were 
fully cognizant of the nationalist-driven revolutions of nineteenth century in Europe, 
these two poets will be a subject of our analysis in the initial stage of the Kurdish national 
awakening within the Kurdish intellectual elite from seventeen to the nineteenth century.   
 
Chapter Three attempts to analyze the myths, symbols and language which form the 
Kurdish distinctive character from that of other neighboring nations which deny the right 
of nationhood to the Kurds. This chapter will build an understanding on what is 
distinctive about the Kurds, and how historically Kurds tried to retain their particular 
characteristics. Additionally, this chapter elaborates on the heterogeneity of the Kurdish 
religious sects and dialectics. The significance of this chapter can been seen in the fact 
that Kurds historically invoke their  distinctive features to back up their claim of 
nationhood whereas  nations surrounding Kurdistan justify certain aggressive policies to 
weaken and remove those inherent features of  Kurdistan. This chapter finally explains 
how the lack of a standardized language undermined the efforts of building a cohesive 
national awakening.  
 
Chapter Four critically discusses the first Kurdish agitations against the Ottomans in the 
nineteenth century. The motivating factors that stimulated the agitations will be 
examined. Furthermore, this chapter examines the tribal structure of the Kurdish society, 
and how this structure hindered the attempts in unifying the Kurdish people during the 
nineteenth century.  Additionally, the question whether the Kurdish agitations were 
nationalist-inspired or not, will be analyzed. This chapter focuses on the Kurdish last 
revolt led by Sheikh Ubaidulla, which was a topic of heated debates among the scholars 
on Kurdish nationalism as the leadership of the revolt presented a clear manifestation of 
the movement for the first time. Furthermore, this chapter looks into the Kurdish-
Ottoman alliance during before the World War I, and the main reasons behind the 
alliance will be examined.  
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Chapter Five analyses the status of the Kurdish national movement approaching the 
World War I. This chapter is an attempt to examine the situation of Kurdish national 
movement during the war and in post-war. In addition to that, this chapter attempts to 
critically analyse the divisions within the Kurdish movement, and how this division 
weakened the Kurdish position in post-war negotiations. The stunning factors that 
contributed to the Kurdish failure in establishing a state of their own will be examined. 
The last section elaborates how the rise of Turkish Nationalism in post-war period 
dramatically changed the balance of power in Turkish favor, and also how major powers 
reacted to the emerging new political dynamics in Turkey.  
 
Chapter Six attempts to explain the creation of new state of Iraq and the inclusion of the 
Kurds in it. This chapter examines the identity crisis in the 1920s, and presents the factors 
that produced a major problem of identity for later generations of the peoples living in the 
new state. The chapter presents a coherent explanation of the Kurdish reaction to the new 
state. Furthermore, the causes that had made the Kurds fail in the 1920s will be 
thoroughly discussed. In order to be able to present the chief factors behind the Kurdish 
failure, this chapter examines the Kurdish political dynamics in Iraq. Finally, an attempt 
is made to examine the role of British which chiefly contributed the success of the central 
government over the Kurdish movement throughout 1920s.  
 
 
Chapter Seven critically analysis Attaturk’s project of nation-building along the line of 
the western civil notion of nations. In the context of the Kemalists program for building a 
new nation-state, the Kurdish reaction will be examined. The chapter mainly focuses on 
the revolution led by the Kurdish nationalist movement against the new state. 
Furthermore, this chapter explains the reasons why the Kurdish revolution failed. 
Additionally, this chapter analyses the impact of the Kurdish reaction to the successive 
governments of Turkey throughout the twenty century. Furthermore, the impact of the 
Kurdish reaction to the Turkish and Kurdish psyche will be discussed.  
 
 4
Chapter Eight examines the situation of the Kurds in the Persia during the First World 
War and after. Since the major rebellion occurred in the area of Kurdistan bordering 
Turkey, particular attention is paid to the rebellion led by Smko, chief of the largest 
Kurdish tribe. This chapter attempts to highlight and explain the main factors behind the 
rebellion. Furthermore, the situation of the Kurdish nationalist movement in that part of 
Kurdistan will be examined. In the context of that, this chapter examines the chief 
reasons which led to the failure of the Kurdish rebellion.  
 
Chapter Nine attempts to examine the situation of the Kurds in Syria. The Kurds in 
Syria unlike their ethnic brethren in Iraq and Turkey enjoyed a degree of freedom under 
the French. In particular, the secular Kurds seemed to have been content with the French 
mandate, and during the course of the mandate they were allowed to enjoy the use of 
their language and cultural practices. This certainly changed once the Arab nationalists in 
the  1950s and later Bahtists in the 1960s took power. This chapter mainly focuses on the 
situation of the Kurds in the post-French mandate. The policies of Bathists during 1960s 
and  1970s will be thoroughly examined. Furthermore, this chapter examines the question 
of the Syrian identity in the post-independence period and its impact on the Kurdish 
inhabitants. An attempt is also made to address the overall situation of the Kurdish 
nationalist movement in Syria.  
 
Chapter Ten is an overall conclusion of all the thesis. This chapter will briefly explain 
the main reasons and factors which led to the failure of the Kurdish national movement in 
post-Ottoman Kurdistan.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Two 
                                     
Methodology of   Nationalism 
                                       
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter attempts to examine theoretical definition of nationalism and the ambiguity 
associated with the concept throughout its modern history. In order to clarify the 
conceptual problem, first it is important to assign a few pages of the chapter to explain 
the term ‘nationalism’ within the context of political and sociological thought. Since 
nationalism is a currency of nation, this chapter analysis the concept of nation and its 
main forms in contemporary political literature. National consciousness which plays a 
pivotal role in arousing nationalism and building a nation is thoroughly examined. In 
order to explain the concept and nationalism coherently, a few European examples will 
be brought to  light. In the context of these elaborations, particular attention is paid to two 
Kurdish historic figures, namely Ahmed Khani and Haji Aqader Koy who was  heavily 
influenced by European ideas of nationalism and secularism in the nineteenth century. 
These two figures were the first among the Kurdish intellectual elite in raising the 
Kurdish distinctiveness from that of their neighbours, and their work became the 
cornerstones of the Kurdish national awakening. The reason, these two prominent figures 
are subject of central attention in the Kurdish national consciousness is because they 
raised the sense of Kurdish-ness as distinct different from that of the Ottoman Turks, 
Safavid Persians, and Arabs on the South at a time when the concept of nationalism and 
nation were topics of heated arguments in Europe while it was a matter of taboo in the 
eyes of  the Ottomans.  
 
                                             2.2 Definitional Confusion  
 
Nationalism is a political force that has been shaping the history of mankind over the last 
two centuries. The roots of modern nationalism dates back to the late eighteen century 
Western Europe and North America. From there it subsequently spread to the whole of 
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Europe and eventually to all parts of the world. Nationalism along with socialism is one 
of  the two dominant thoughts of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the nineteenth 
and twenty centuries, nationalism has achieved some tangible success, its importance 
growing by leaps and bounds in Europe before and after the first world war, and then 
particularly after the second world war in Asia and Africa1.  
 
The plethora of phenomenon, which is subsumed under the term ‘nationalism’, suggests 
that it is one of the most ambiguous concepts in the contemporary vocabulary of political 
and analytical thought. The program of the insurgent movements in the Balkan under the 
Ottoman and Habsburg Empires in the nineteenth century or Africa in the twentieth  
century may as easily be classified under the category of nationalism as may the 
expression of one people by another. Nationalism has been and continues to be part of the 
make-up of both imperialism and anti-imperialism. Also, it can be associated with the 
forces striving for political, social, economic and cultural emancipation, as well as with 
those whose goal is oppression2.  
 
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, large multi-national empires which had 
emerged during the course of history, such as the Ottoman or Habsburg empires, broke 
down asunder in the name of nationalism; these multinational states were succeeded by 
large number of small nation-states. In the last century and half, new nation-states such as 
Greece, Italy, the German Reich, Ireland, Poland, and nations of the Middle East were all 
proclaimed in the name of nationalism. Nationalist aspirations and interests were among 
the driving force behind the colonial expansion of the European powers as they created 
overseas empires in Asia, Africa, and other parts of the world. Nationalism which during 
the French revolution became synonymous with the freedom and liberation of the 
oppressed ,lost it’s prestigious currency and became synonymous with intolerance, 
inhumanity and violence between 1918 and 1945. In the name of nationalism, bloody 
wars were fought and heinous crimes were perpetrated3. It inspired the violent eviction of 
people form their homelands and justified campaigns of territorial conquest. For 
                                                 
1 Stuart Wolf , ‘Nationalism in Europe:1815 to the Present’, London, Essex University Press, 1996, p.3  
2 Ibid, p. 4 
3 Ibid, p .5  
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individuals and peoples alike, nationalism signaled danger, restrictions on liberty and a 
threat to humanity’s survival. The policies of expulsion and extermination by the 
National Socialists during the Second World War are the most horrifying examples 
witnessed in the recorded history of mankind. And yet at the same time, nationalism 
could just as often engender hopes for a free and just social order; for many it equated 
with liberation from political, economic and social discrimination4. It is clear that 
nationalism, so convenient a label and justification for many developments, conceals 
within itself extreme opposites and contradictions. It, therefore, can mean emancipation, 
and it can mean oppression. Therefore, nationalism is a repository of dangers as well as 
opportunities. It has many different forms and variations in space and time that it is often 
argued whether they can all be accommodated under the one roof. Only with reference to 
historical context one can say what the term actually does or should dignify.  
 
Current linguistic usage defines ‘nationalists’ as people whose actions or reasoning gives 
indiscriminate precedence to the interests of one nation over those of other nations, and 
who are prepared  to disregard those others for sacrosanct honor of their own nations5. A 
modern German encyclopedia defines nationalism as an exaggerated and intolerant form 
of thought in relation to a nation6.This is a clear hint that in modern usage, nationalism 
has  negative connotations, suggesting an extreme ideology and is judged in more or less 
moral terms. The term nationalism is used to brand forms of collective yearning and 
aggression arrogantly posturing in the name of a nation. By contrast, the pursuit of 
national interest and a sense of national pride are wholly laudable, since they are felt to 
refer to legitimate concerns which do not inevitably conflict with the nationalism or the 
interests of other peoples. Here, the underlying idea in this case is that equality exists 
between various nationalisms, and their frequently competing claims can be settled 
through compromise7.  
 
                                                 
4 Ibid, p. 7  
5 Ibid, p. 8  
6 Ibid, p. 10  
7 Edward Arnold, Nationalisms, Contemporary History Series, London, 1994, p. 4  
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The term ‘nationalism’ did not begin to enter into general linguistic usage until the mid 
nineteen century. But today the argument still rages over what nationalism is. Even the 
academic world  has failed to agree on a generally accepted definition. The same is true 
of the concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘nationality’. In essence, the range of definitions that have 
been offered reflects the multiformity that nationalism assumed in historical and political 
reality since the late nineteen century. Since new hybrids of nationalism are constantly 
being thrown up in deeds and words, in the definition and study of the phenomenon the 
depth of the student’s experience continue to be equally important as the weight he or she 
gives the components that, by rather general consensus, must be present in any given 
nationalism. These common structural components or feathers of nationalism include: 
consciousness of the uniqueness or peculiarity of a group of people, particularly with 
respect to their ethnic, linguistic or religious homogeneity; emphasizing of shared socio-
cultural attitudes and historical memories; a sense of common mission; disrespect for and 
animosity towards other peoples (racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism)8.  
 
According to American political scientist, Karl W.Duetsch who has conducted extensive 
research since 1950s, nationalism is a ‘state of mind’ that gives national messages, 
memories, and images a preferred status in social communication and a greater weight in 
the making of decisions9. Duetch believes that a nationalist devotes greater attentions to 
those messages which carry specific symbols of nationality, or which originate from a 
specific national source, or which are couched in a specific national code of language or 
culture10. This definition emphases on the massive social communication as a pre-
condition for feelings of national identity, is not entirely conclusive, for it considers only 
some, albeit important, aspects of nationalism. A definition must necessarily be more 
comprehensive if it attempts to encompass all the forms of nationalism the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries have witnessed: the nationalism of peoples which posses a state, and 
the nationalism of those which do not. According to Bohemian-born sociologist and 
historian Eugen Lemberg nationalism defines nationalism as system of ideas, values and 
                                                 
8 Ibid, p. 5  
9 Karl W.Duetch, ‘ Nation and World’, Contemporary Political Science: Towards Empirical Theory, New 
York, 1967, p.208  
10 Ibid, p. 210  
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norms, an image of the world and society which makes large social groups aware of 
where it belongs and invests this sense of belonging with a particular value11. In another 
word, it integrates the groups and demarcates its environment.  Lemberg places emphasis 
on the group’s awareness of its own location that can crystallize shared languages, 
origins, character and culture12. 
 
Lemberg’s definition of nationalism as an ideology capable of integrating large social 
groups has been refined by the historian Theodor Schieder, who believes nationalism is a 
specific integrative ideology that always makes a reference to a nation in one sense or 
another, and not merely to a social or religious type of group. This broad definition 
suggests that nationalism such as it has appeared in American and French revolutions is  
understood as both an ideology and a political movement which holds the nation and the 
sovereign nation-state to be crucial in dwelling values, and which manages to mobilize 
the political will of a people or a large section of a population. Nationalism is hence taken 
to be largely dynamic principle capable of raising hopes, emotions and actions; it is a 
vehicle for activating human beings and producing political solidarity amongst them for 
the purpose of achieving a common goal13. In accordance with this definition, 
nationalism exists whenever individuals feel they belong primarily to the nation, and 
whenever affective attachment and loyalty to that nation override all other attachments 
and loyalties. Therefore,  Schielder eventually presents his definition of nationalism as 
follows:  
 
      “It is not status group, nor religious conviction, nor a dynasty or a particularistic state, not a     
physical landscape, not genealogical roots, not even social class which determine the supra-individual 
frame of reference; the tenet of Enlightenment philosophy that the individual is principally a member of 
human race and thus a citizen of the world no longer holds: individuals perceive themselves, rather, as 
member of a particular nation”14. 
 
                                                 
11 Eugen Lemberg, Nationalisms, Rhiebek 1974, Vol.2, p .16  
12 Ibid, p.52  
13  www.eastwestcenter.org/find 
14 www.nationalismproject.org/books/ 
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 In the light of this definition, nationalism is identified  with its historical and cultural 
heritage and with the form of its political life, the nation or nation-state represents the site 
where life is led, and endows the individual’s existence with meaning both in the present 
and the future. The way in which this multi-faceted and subtle process of intellectual 
transition from humanitarian universalism of the Enlightenment to attachment to the 
nation and the nation-state affected Germany. This nationalist sentiment has affected the 
whole Europe, North America in  the nineteenth century and Africa and Asia in the 
twentieth century15. This became a milestone in the contentious history of nationalism at 
both the conceptual and practical level.  
 
2.3  Issues in nationalism theory 
The first studies of nationalism reflected the generally historical accounts of nationalist 
movements in the eighteenth and ninteenth centuries. Most sociological theories of 
nationalism emerged from the french revolution and onwards . The most recent research 
has looked into the issues that have been part of the history of nationalism. The main 
question arising is  which comes first, nation or nationalism.Accordng to prime-ordealist 
theories of nationalism, nationalists view themselves as representing a pre-existing 
nation. They (primorealists) see the nations as a historical phenonmenon, and as a social 
reality that nations have been existent in the long recorded history of mankind16.  
According to the modernist theory, the nations are the recent creations of mankind and 
their history dates back not earlier than 1800.The modernist paradgim emphasizes that 
until 1800, people had local loyalties and the broader loyalities towards nations only 
surfaced with the industrialisation of societies, when people formed massive 
communication channeles. The modernist theory believes that the European states, pre-
occupied with the process of nation-building imposed national identity and unity from 
above. They further assume that the creations of nations became an essential condition to 
modernise the economy and society. In this process, nationalist conflicts are an 
                                                 
15 Friedrich Meineck, Cosmopolitanism and the National State, Princeton (NJ), 1970, pp. 23-24 
16 Ibid, p. 24  
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unintended side-effect17.To the modernists,  nations are a socially constructed 
phenomenon. Benedict Anderson  described the nations as "imagined communities". 
Ernest Gellner reflecting Anderson’s view describes nations as a “daily plebscite”18. 
From their perspective, nationalism simply invents the nations where they do not exist. 
Additionally, the modernist theorists believe capitalism is essential for building nations. 
The features of capitalism such as free press,  expansion of markets facilitiate the proces 
of creating nations. In this process, nation and nationalism are intetwined and can not be 
independent from one another. Interestingly, Marxists agree with modernists in that 
nations are essential for expanding markets which is main feature of the capitalist system. 
In this regard, Marxists believe that nationalism justifying the existence of nations is a 
tool of the bourgoisie class to gain power. They, therefore, subscribe to the modernist 
view in that nations are the recent human creations and their history dates back not earlier 
than 200 years ago19. 
Anthony D.Smith, one of the most prominent scholars on nationalism, seeing the sea of 
differences between primeordialists (those who believe nations have a long history) and 
modernists (those believing nations are recent phenomenon in the history of mankind) 
makes an attempt to synthesize the primeordialists and modernists. Smith believes the 
preconditions for the formation of a nation are  “a fixed territory, high autonomy, hostile 
surroundings, memories of battles, scared centres, special customs, historical records and 
thinking”20. For him, nations are constructed through the inclusion of the whole 
populace,not just elites as some modernists say, constitution of legal and political 
institutions, nationalist ideology, international recognition and drawing up of borders. 
Although distinguishing himself from both schools (primeordialists and modernists), 
Smith would more lean to modernsits than to primeordialists  by refering to certain 
criteria like a constitution ,legal and political institutions and international recongnition 
since these criteria form the foundations of modern nations. 
                                                 
17 Hobsbawm, Eric J. 1992. Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. 2nd ed. 
Cambridge University Press, p. 16 
18 Ibid, p. 17 
19 Ibid, p. 21  
20 Smith, Anthony D. 1986. The Ethnic Origins of Nations London: Basil Blackwel,. Pp. 6–18. 
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2.4 Nationalism: The Currency of Nation 
 
In nationalism, the nation has a central position. The value of nation resides in its 
capacity as the sole binding agency of meaning and justification. In our world, nations are 
regarded as building blocks of humanity and national interests provide the tools of 
political thought and actions. Relgious leaning, according to Carltin Hyes, is intrerwoven 
with nationalism21. In nationalism, religion is secualarised and the national is sanctified. 
Although it it would be misleading to say that religion lost it’s sway on nationalism, yet 
natinonalism flourished while religion became more accomodative and compromising. 
This was the case with  the Hungary, the Greeks, and  Armenians who lived within the 
jurisdiction of the Ottomen Empire formed their own national movements. The clergy 
openly supported the national movements and played a leading role in the orgnaisation of 
the national movements and its agitation againt the the Ottomans and Habsburg of the 
peroid22.  
 
The central question which arisises here is what charecterisies a nation.. As was the case 
of nationalism definition, the number of definitions is enermous, and none has been 
accepted as a generally valid formulation. The most elementary answer is a nation is a 
politically mobilised people23. Employing his key notion of social communication, Karl 
Deutech conceives the nation as a body of individuals who can communicate effectively 
and quickly with each other over a vareity of themes. This communication presupposes a 
common language, religion and culture. For Deutsch, a nation is a people in possession of 
a state. This definition implies that a people who has no independent state of their own 
can not be called a nation24. Nonetheless, it is frequently the case that a nation state is the 
outcome of a national movement. For exmaple, Germans regarded themselves as a nation 
in the late nineteenth century, even though a united German state was not established 
until 1871. Likewise, Poles lived in three multinational Empires Russia, the Habsburgs 
and Prussian/ Germany, they nonetheless constituted a nation. Poles did not gain their 
                                                 
21 Baron, S. W, Modern Nationalism and Religion, New York, 1960, p. 12  
22 Ibid, p. 13   
23 Deutch, ‘Nation and World’, p. 200  
24 Ibid, p.201  
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own Polish state until 1918. Deutsch’s definntion fails to take into consideration those 
peoples whose nationhood has not been disputed since the nineteenth and  eighteen 
centurries but have nonetheless failed to establish their own state: Kurds, Scots, Tamils, 
Sikhs, Tibetians, and Basques, for instance. A further disclarity  with Duetsch’s difintion  
is that he believes that  “the number of exisiting states equals the number of nations”25. 
This is not accurate because a nation may exist without state and a state may exist 
without a unified nation26. Most of the Arab countries in the gulf created their own state, 
yet  Arab nationalism failed to unite all the Arab under a sole single Arab nation. Tamils, 
for istance, are a nation but have not gained their own independent state. Therefore, the 
Deutch’s difinition of nation is exclusive, for it narrows down nationhood merely to 
people who have a state of their own.  
 
For Max Weber, the term nation suggests that it is “proper to expect from certain groups 
a specific sentiment of solidarity in the face of other groups”27. This definition contains 
vague terminology because by refering to the ‘sentiment’, it is not clear exactly what it 
does imply. The sentiment of solidarity could apply to religious communities, trade 
unions, professional associations or political parties. But the key word in Weber’s 
definition is is the adjective ‘specific’. The sense of national solidarity revolves around, 
and is aroused by factors which as mentioned above constitute the make up of a modern 
nation: language, culture, historical consciouness, social communication, religion and 
political goals. The significance of each as an instrument of promoting national unity 
varies from case to case. For example, right up until nineteenth century it was mainly 
orthodox Christianity which defined Greeks and Serbs as social groups distinct from 
Islamic Turks and Bosnians, despite the centuries of symbiosis. When resetlement took 
place between Turks and Greeks in Asia minor in 1923, the criterion used to determine an 
individual’s nationality was not language, nor the will or personal preference of that 
individual, but simply religious convictions28. In Ireland, Roman Catholism has been a 
paramount factor in dividing the majority of Irish from the indigenous Protestant Anglo-
                                                 
25 Ibid, p. 202  
26 Ibid, p.203  
27 Max Weber, Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, ed. by Guentler Roth and 
Claus Wittich, Berkerly California, 1978, p. 922  
28 Stuart Woolf, Nationalism in Europe, 1815 to the Present, 1996, New York, Yale University Press, p .33 
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Irish ascendency and from the English as demonstrated by nineteenth century Anglo-Irish 
history. But in many other cases, language was a more powerful meduim of division and 
separation than religion. For example, the relations between Poles and Germans in upper 
Silesia and the provinces of the west and east Prussia, between Czeches and Germans in 
Bohemia, and between Finns and Swedes in Finland29.  
Common language is known to bridge even religious differences. This was true of 
Islamic, Greek Orthodox, and Romanc Caholic Albanians under the Ottoman empire. 
Language has also been the decisive factor in the Romanian’s sense of belonging together 
as a nation. It is obvious that the language has power to demonsrate fundamental 
consequences of comprehesion and  miscomprehension. This was part of every day life in 
multinational dyansic polities such as the Russian, Ottoman and Habsburg empires. In the 
case of Poles in Tsarist Russia, or early nineteenth century Walloons, Flemings and 
Dutch, when in 1830-31 the United Netherlands split into the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and the Kingdom of Belguim, religion and language together have been the 
foundations of national consciousness and the nation30.  
On the basis of this historical evidence, the Soviet dictator Jospeh Stalin believed that it 
was possible to define a nation in terms of what he regarded as objective, scientific 
crieteria. In his essay on Marxism and the National Question, he describes the nation as a 
historically evolved, stable community. It is characterised by four main features: 
community of language, of territory, of economic life, and of psychological make up 
manifested in a community of culture31. For Stalin, a nation did not exist until all four 
features were present. It is obvious that Stalin used this defintion to deny the right of 
significant populations within domains of the Soviet Uinon to their nationhood. For 
Stalin and his communists proponents,  If one was absent, then the nation ceased to be. 
For example, he demonstrated the contingency by pointing to the Baltic Germans and 
Lativians in Tsarist Russia. For Stalin, they did not constitue a nation in the nineteenth 
century despite their common territory and economic life32. By dent of his involvement in 
the theoretical problem of the nation and nationalism, Stalin in 1917 was appointed the 
                                                 
29 Ibid, p. 35 
30 Ibid, p. 41 
31 Ibid,.p.43 
32 Ibid, p.44 
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first Commissar of Nationalities, the post from which he began his rapid rise to absolute 
power.    
 
In an attempt to devise a defintion what a nation is, Hugh Seton Watson, one of the most 
prominent scholars of  modern nationalism, believes that “the number of a nation must 
feel they are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture and a national 
consciousness. For  him, a nation exists if a significant members of people in a 
community consider themselves to form a nation”33. In the light of this dinfnition the 
nineteenth century Kurdish revolts against the Ottoman Empire will be analysed.  
 
2.5 Nation: Cultural or Political ? 
 
The most contentious enquiry into a nation is the discrepency between a cultural nation 
and political nation. According to the Fredrich Meineck, the modern nation is basically 
founded upon equality or commonality. The political  nation places emphasis on the idea 
of the individual and collective self-determination. It derives from the individual’s free 
and subjective commitment to the nation. Earnest Renan, the French historian on 
nationalism, defines nation as a ‘ daily plebisite’. To him, “existence of a nation depends  
on the free will of the individuals: the population of a given, historically evolved territory 
preceives to be a nation, and citnizenship is equated with nationality”34. The concept of 
political nation has it’s historical referenc  in France, England, and the United States. In 
the nations regarded as political nations, a process of political transformation generated a 
community of politically aware citizens equal before the law irrespective of their social 
and economic status, ethnic origin and religious beliefs. Nation and state are 
synonymous, the unifying whole is created by a uniform language, a uniform judicial and 
administrative system, a central government and shared political ideals. The sovereignity 
of  the people is the foundation of state power35.  
                                                 
33 Huge Seton-Watson, Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of 
Nationalism, London, 1977,p. 5 
34 Tamir Yael, ‘ Liberal Nationalism’, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993, p. 13  
35 Ibid, p. 15  
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By contrast, with nations regarded as cultural, the main focus is placed on the objective 
criteria such as common heritage and language, a distinct area of settlement, religion, 
customs and history36. The spirit of unity is not mediated by a national state or other 
political form. The cultural nation principle which emphasizes common heritage and 
language, is the main characteristic of the emergence of nations in Cenetral Europe, Italy, 
East Central Europe, Middle East,Africa and Asia. Unlike political nations explained 
above, in the cultural nations individuals have little say as to which nation he or she 
belongs to. Hence, membership of a nation is not a matter of voluntary choice. Nature 
and history decides  a fate of individuals. Thus, western voluntrist, liberal-democratic 
concept of nation is contrasted by a deterministic one that is frequently deemed 
undemocratic and irrational37. Despite the theoratical distinctions between subjective  and 
objective criteria to define nation, the boundaries between them are crossed. For instance, 
to some people the Alsatians are Germans because their cultural, local custom, and their 
religion to an extent, assign them to the German cultural nation, while to others they are 
French because of their willingness to be citizens of the French state with which they felt 
close ties since the revolution of 1789 and the Napleonic era. The same thing is true of 
the Kurds; they regard themselves as one nation while their nieghbours regard them as 
part of the broader  nations of the states among which Kurdistan has been divided38. 
Speaking from a historic context, the concept of political nation is a long process of 
convergence taking place in a larger state framwork, and on occasion, receiving 
tremendous impetus from a state that pursues certain types of policies like the 
introduction of linguistic or judicial uniformity. This historic fact is frequently ingnored 
by those who define nations in a subjective form39. In other words, the concept of nation 
represents an interlocking of objective actualities and the circumstancs of subjective 
political will.  
 
2.6 National Awakening: Europe 
 
                                                 
36 Shil Edward, ‘ Primordial, Personal, Sacred, and Civil Ties’, 1997, British Journal of Sociology, p.7  
37Ibid, p. 13  
38 Strohmier Martin, ‘The Crucial Images in the Presentation of Kurdish National Identity’, Electronic 
Source, Waikato University Library, p. 13  
39 Shil Edward , p. 14  
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Since national awakening  forms the backbone of the modern nationalism and nation, it is 
important to understand what is meant by the concept and how to measure it. In principle, 
national awakening is independent of a national state. Without a coherent national 
consciousness, a national movement would be doomed to failure. National consciousness 
is mediated by education in the widest sense of the word, and can undergo transformation 
as much as values, objects and symbols to which it referes. In the development of 
national awakening, social groups place emphasis on the various commonalities such as 
language, culture, religion, myths, memories, political ideals and  history. Social groups 
also tend to define their national identity and national consciousness in a negative sense, 
for example, through distinction from or comparison with their neighbours. Encounters 
with  the ‘alien’- other forms of language, religion, customs, political systems- make 
people aware of the close ties, shared values and common ground that render 
communication with their own kind so much easier than with outsiders.  In some cases, 
national awakening can be openly directed against a pressumed enemy at least 
temporarily, another nation or existing multi-national states in which a social group or a 
political movement or nation lives. This is still the case for the peoples struggling to form 
their nation-state such as the Kurds throughout the past century until now, the Germans 
and Italians in the nineteenth century. For instance, Napoleonic rule perceived by many 
as oppression sparked off German political awakening in the early nineteenth century. 
The national movement in Germany matured between 1806 and 1813. The German’s anti 
French sentiments mounted to a high peak, particularly when the French embarked an 
expansionist policy eastwards, encroaching upon the Rhine border and thereby calling 
into question the German title to a part of their historic homeland. It was to predominate 
for almost a hundred years.  
National awakening can be inspired by myths and glories of the past. For instance, 
nineteenth century Italian national consciousness was mainly inspired by the glory of 
ancient Rome and by the enmity of the Habsburge monarchy40. National awakening is 
also inspired by the physical presence of an alien force or domination. For people of the 
southern Balkans and the Middle East including the Kurds, the struggle against the 
                                                 
40 Ibid, 47 
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Ottomans right up until the First World War  remained an important ingredient of their 
national awakening. Likewise, in many African and Asian, states which emerged after 
1945, their struggle against European colonialism and imperialism was the origin of their 
national awakening. Despite the national awakening the national movements posed, 
concept  of national awakening dates back to the Middle Ages. In the case of European 
peoples, prototypes of national consciousness and nationalist discourse date back as early 
as the fourteenth century and in some cases even before. Machiavelli’s Prince (1513) 
commonly mentions the works of Shakespeare, Petrache and Dante, which incite Italians 
to liberate themselves from the barbarians and become a united country41. In general, it is 
practically impossible to place an exact date on when a social group or people first 
conceives of itself as a nation. Aside from a few cases, the nation is a goal rather than an 
actuality. In another words, nations are not God’s creation, rather they are human  
constructions. They have to be constructed in a complicated educational process. In this 
sense, Ronald Barthes assumes that  nations have not been existential in history, but 
rather simply a realm of political myth42.  
National awakening is a pre-requisite of the nation building. The process of nation 
building is engineered by small minority of intelectuals and directed at the social group as 
a whole. Nation building is a drawn-out process of social and political integration. 
Nation-building is, in another word,  a  process of integrating all significant social and 
political forces within a single national framework. Even if  a nation has gained it’s own 
independent state, nation-building as a process continues. A political awakening capable 
of successfully containing internal conflicts among the social groups and in some cases 
among sectarian groups within a nation concerned does not evolve in a persistent and 
smooth way. Rather, it’s development is constantly bogged down by delays and setbacks. 
Hence, nation-building is a process of ups and downs given it’s historic context. The aim 
of nation building is to integrate and harmonise socially, regionally, politically and 
institutionally divided section of population with, perhaps in some cases, different social 
customs and even languages. In a contemporay history, nationalism as an ideology and 
political movement as an instrument of it has been a significant part of the process of 
                                                 
41 Machialeveli, ‘The Prince’. Penguin, New York Book store, 1980, p. 45  
42 Cited in  Smith’s ‘ Nations in History’, Hanover, University of New England Press, 2000, p .34 
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nation building. It’s success depends on the establishment of a cohesive  awakening that 
can bind  all social and sectarian forces to a particular national group, and define it’s 
uniqueness as the substance of a national ideology. According to Elie Kedouiri, nation 
building and nationalism are methods of teaching the right determination of will. Hence, 
they are clearly linked, and one compliments the other43.  
National awakening can be also created by a state whose main goals are centralisation, 
uniformity and efficiency. In this regard, nation-building proceeds within a framework 
identical with the state frontiers. This was the case in France, England, Portugal and 
Sweden, where state-building went hand in hand with nation building. In those nations, 
the concept of nation embraces population of varying origins, cultures and languages. 
Thus, political nation is created from the above44. National consciousness is oriented 
around real frontiers of state. Nineteenth and twentth centuries saw many instances of the 
process in which  nation-building set in before nation-states came about. It often 
transcended existing borders, rendering them obsolete, and eventually led to the 
formation of new states with new frontiers. Shared language and culture underly this 
process, the goal of which is to build up a cohesive national awakening among the 
population within a given territory. National awakening is a condition of any organised 
national movement aspiring to create a nation-state in th first stages of nation building.  
                  2.7 National Awakening: Kurdish  Case   
There are a number of schools of thoughts about  the roots of the Kurdish nationalism but 
for our purpose in analyzing Kurdish nationalism and for their prominent scholarly 
position we would draw on two schools of thoughts.  The first school of thought is led by 
Amir Hasana Pure, who believes that  “Kurdish national awakening emerged as an 
ideology long before the formation of the Kurds as a nation, not in the middle class 
milieu but in a largely agrarian society with a powerful tribal component”45. According to 
him and the proponents of this position,  from the 16th century to the mid-19th century, 
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much of Kurdistan was ruled by Kurdish  independent and autonomous principalities 
which in effect created a flourishing urban and rural way of life in the seventeenth 
century. They believe Kurdish life drastically changed when the Ottoman and the Persian 
Empires used Kurdistan as a sphere of influence which in effect resulted in the first 
division of Kurdistan in an agreement signed in 1639 between the two Empires. 
According to this paradigm, the war that was fought either between the empires over total 
control of Kurdistan or between Kurds and the Empires which destroyed the agrarian 
system, devastated the towns and urban life, and caused the mass migration of the Kurds 
and settlement of Turkish tribes in Kurdistan46. These wars fought on Kurdish lands 
destroyed Kurdish urban life which the Kurds enjoyed since the era of glory (1250-1514), 
and these wars further reinforced the tribal way of life.  
Despite the fact that  wars prevented the Kurds from building up a sustainable urban life 
which could have been a milestone in the early stage of the nation-building process, the 
devastation of Kurdish life as a consequences of the wars incited a strong political 
consciousness which had no parallel in the Middle East at the time. The first signals of 
the national awakening emerged in the realm of literature in the sixteenth century. In 
1597, the Prince of Bidlis, a powerful principality, wrote the first history of Kurdistan. 
This text, albeit written in Persia, contained two very important things: a Kurdish dynasty 
which  had the privilege of royalty, and the degree of independence the Kurdish dynasty 
enjoyed in striking the coins and reciting the Friday prayers in their names. The most 
prominent assertion of the political awakening of the time was Ahmed-e-Khani who 
wrote “Mam –o-Zin in the form of a poetic narrative romance”47. In Mam o Zin, Khani 
clearly asks “why have the Kurds been deprived, why have they all been subjugated?” 
According to Khani, the Kurdish statelessness is not because the Kurds are ignorant, 
rather because they have no powerful King to unite all Kurdish discordant principalities 
to form a United Kurdish Kingdom. Khani was modern in his classification of the Kurds 
as a nation and nationalism as their movement.  He refers to the Kurds, Arabs, Persians, 
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and Turks as ‘Milal’, a plural of Milla in the then-prevailing meaning of religious 
community but in the ethnic sense48.  
 
The proponents of this school refer to the nineteenth century as the second wave of the 
Kurdish national awakening. They often to refer to the Haji Qader’s poetry works in the 
late 19th century who attacked the Sheiks (religious figures) and Mullahs (those who 
formally get religious training) who did not care about the Kurdish language and notables 
who completely ignored the grievances of their own people49. It is worthwhile to note 
that Haji Qader lived his last years in Istanbul and was fully cognizant with the creation 
of modern nations in Europe which were preoccupied with the nation-building process. 
He relentlessly called on the Kurds to use the Kurdish language and urged his intellectual 
counterparts of the period to publish books and magazines in Kurdish.  
 
The reason this school of thought emphasizes  that the  Kurdish national awakening dates 
back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is because the intellectual elite of the 
period had a full grasp of the nationalist-inspired developments in Europe. Furthermore, 
they assume that Kurdish political conscious intellectuals were intent on emulating the 
Europeans. To a point, there is truth in it since in the first place  the whole process of 
nation-building on Western European land was stimulated by the intellectual elite. This 
process started a century earlier, when in the seventeenth century the intellectuals of 
European countries, in particular France and United States, set in motion a framework for 
creating modern nations whose main  features such as language, culture, and social 
customs were distinctive from that of their  neighboring peoples. The same thing is true 
of the Kurdish intellectuals like Khani and Haji Qader. They clearly asserted that the 
Kurds are a distinct people with a distinctive territory, language, and social customs. 
They believed that the road to freedom is only to form an independent Kurdistan. From 
ideological aspect,  Qader, and Khani were different from one another since Khani called 
for unification of Kurdish principalities under a powerful King, whereas Qader called for 
liberation of the Kurds from yokes of their hostile nations and building their own nations. 
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Qader’s ideas clearly could mean the transformation of Kurdish society in a modern 
sense50.  
 
The second school of thought draws on the argument made by Abas Wali and his 
proponents. To them, the Kurdish national awakening dates back to not earlier than the 
late nineteenth century, when for the first time the Kurdish intellectual elite began 
publishing the first Kurdish journal in 1898, namely ‘ Kurdistan’. They believe the 
Kurdish national awakening emerged within the Kurdish intelligentsia during and after 
the World War 1. Wali, in his analysis of Kurdish nationalism, describes the period of 
World War I as the beginning of the Kurdish nationalism. He and his proponents are of 
the opinion that the Kurdish national awakening emerged as a response to the emerging 
nation-states on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire51.  To them, the Kurdish national 
awakening was non-existent in the nineteenth century, and the feudal and tribal interests 
motivated the Kurdish revolts against the Ottoman encroachment in the nineteenth 
century. Given this perspective, nationalism was not an inspiring factor behind the 
Kurdish uprisings in the nineteenth century. The Kurdish national awakening emerged 
simply as reflection of other national movements during and after World War I, when 
Ottoman authority weakened under the pressure of external and internal forces. Although 
these two schools put Kurdish national awakening in different historical periods, both 
sides agree that the Kurdish intelligentsia was main vehicle of developing the Kurdish 
national awakening. Both sides subscribe to the view that the modernity that touched the 
boundaries of the Ottoman Empire during nineteenth and eighteenth centuries inspired 
the Kurdish intellectual elite to present themselves as a distinct group from that of other 
groups such as Turks, Arabs and Farses in this region52.  
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2.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that nations and nationalism are closely dependent on one 
another. They are interwoven and intertwined. It is nationalism that constructs nations 
and it is a nation that justifies nationalism in politics and the social realm. No matter 
whether nations are cultural or political, it is nationalism which is the main medium of 
communication among peoples. It is also nationalism that marks the boundaries between 
or among the distinctive groups of human beings. Given the history of the last two 
centuries, nationalism is solely responsible for breaking down the multi-national empires. 
Nationalism creates new nations while disintegrating others. Hence, it is clear that 
nationalism has a variety of forms, and each form surfaces in a totally distinctive way. 
National awakening as an instrument of fueling nationalist feelings and attachments is 
primarily an enterprise of intellectual elite.  
 
The Kurdish elite that was part of the Ottoman bureaucracy in the nineteenth and 
eighteenth centuries were intent on emulating the intellectual elite in Europe, yet the 
Kurdish national awakening remained passive for centuries, and it never became that 
coherent to integrate all Kurdish social and sectarian groups. Also, the Kurds had no 
external support from major powers to assist them in their effort in building their nation-
state. The Kurds, in this sense, should not only be ones to blame, but also the major 
powers to whom the strategic expediency took precedence over moral principle. In post- 
war period, a number of nation-states had been built, yet their creation has no thing to do 
with the national consciousness of their people. Those states were created merely to 
protect the interest of the major powers, and the boundaries never reflected the natural 
borders of these people. This mainly explains why the process of state-building is not a 
guarantee for  cohesive nation-building. This is truly the case of Middle Eastern states 
created after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Those state were the creations of the 
external projects and the boundaries of those states have always remained a matter of 
dispute which at times resulted in physical confrontation of either state-to-state conflict or 
ethnic or sectarian conflicts within the states concerned. This further reinforces the fact 
that without a national consciousness among the peoples of the concerned territory, 
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national movement, albeit enjoying a generous support from major states, is doomed to 
failure. Kurdish national consciousness during the First World War emerged as a reaction 
to the weakness of Ottoman Empire, but the division of the  Kurdish national movement 
was used by major powers merely for their strategic interest.  
  
 
 
.  
 
Chapter Three 
Myths, Memories, Symbols, Language and Religion 
                                      
3.1    Introduction 
As mentioned in chapter two, myths, memories, language, customs and shared history 
form the backbone of  modern nationalism. These social norms and values are 
normally invoked during the stage of the rise of national consciousness. In the light of 
the importance of these myths, memories and symbols which are closely associated 
with nationalist movements of the nineteenth  and twentieth centuries, this will 
chapter will cast some light on myths, memories, language, and social customs which 
demonstrate the Kurdish distinctness from that of their neighbours. Furthermore, the 
origins of the Kurds will be analysed  briefly. Additionally, this chapter will analyse  
the historic contact of the Kurds with Islam and their adoption of the new faith in the 
early waves of Islamic expansion towards Asia and the Caucasus. The significance of 
the Kurdish adoption of Islam as their new religion will be thoroughly examined. 
Fragmentation of Islam between the Sunnis and Shiites made an impact on the Kurds 
dividing across the Islamic sects: the Shiites and Sunnis. In the light of this historic 
significance, this chapter will analyse the sects of Islam among which the Kurds are 
divided. With the Turkish Ottoman gaining a foothold in the region, there had been  
competition between the Turks and Kurds over who is to be a guardian of Islam. In 
this context, the Kurdish position will be elaborated. Finally, the evolution of the term 
Kurdistan will be examined in historic phases.  
 
 
                  3.2 What does Form the Distinctness of the Kurds? 
                                    
                                    3.2.1 The Myth and Memory of Zohak  
 
The Newruz (New Day)1 and the legend of Zohak contain one of several folk myths 
of the origins of the Kurds. According to the Kurdish Folklore, Zohak was a tyrant 
                                                 
1 New Ruz means a new day. Kurds mark Newruz in the first day of spring each year and celebrate it 
by going to picnics and set large fires on the peak of mountains. Until recently, all countries in which 
Kurds live with the exception of Iran prohibited the Kurds from celebrating and the reason Iran is more 
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who had  snakes growing on his shoulders, a deformity which the physicians were not 
able to cure. Satan came to the tyrant and told him that he would be cured if he had 
fed the snakes each day with the brain of the two young people. The executioner 
appointed to the task of providing the brains took pity on his victims, and each day 
spared one of them and substituted the brains of a sheep. The survivors were 
smuggled to the safety of the mountains, where they became the founders a new 
people, the forefathers of the Kurds2. Zohak himself was overthrown when one of the 
tyrant’s intended victims rebelled against his fate and killed him3. Newruz means a 
new day, a day the tyrant Zohak was killed. Historically the Kurdish calendar dates 
from the defeat of the Assyrian Empire at Nineveh, north of Mussel, by the forces of 
the Medes. The myth of Zohak, according to the Kurdish perspective, represents their 
existence as one of the ancient people in the region. The end of Zohak tyranny 
represents  a great amount of relief4. This myth is still commemorated on 21 March of 
every year, equivalent to the first day of the Kurdish New Year .The myth of Newruz 
was used by Kurdish nationalists to rally and galvanise the Kurdish support around 
their political cause against the new national states in which Kurds are divided. New 
Ruz has always been a day of violent clashes between Kurdish nationalists who 
memorises by setting a large fire on mountains and hills of Kurdistan and security 
forces of hostile nations.  
 
3.2.2 Variant Historic Perspectives on the Kurdish Origins 
 
Because little research has been conducted on the origins of the Kurds, the question of 
where the Kurds came from and who the Kurds are has for a long time remained an 
enigma. Moreover, much of the research, which has been carried out cannot be 
considered accurate, because of racial or cultural biases for or against the Kurdish 
ethnic group. While there is no definitive answer to these questions, most of the 
                                                                                                                                            
flexible than other countries is because Persians also mark their new year in the first day of the spring 
and they similarly celebrate Newruz.  
2 Maria T. Oshia, “Between the Maps and Reality: Some Fundamental Myths of The Kurdish 
Nationalism”, Peoples Mediterrenaneens, No 68-69, July-December, 1994: p 9 
3 According to the Kurdish narrations, the victims name was Kawa and he killed Zohak by Hammer.    
This echoes in the Kurdish literature on Newruz and even these days Kurds praise the Hammer of 
Kawa and to them Hamer was sacred which was used by kawa to kill the tyrant Zohak.  
4 Mehrddad Azadi, The Kurds: A concise Handbook, Washington, Tayler and Francis International 
Publishers, 1992: p.34  
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literature suggest that an identifiable people has inhabited north of Mesopotamia for 
four millennium .The overall scholarship refers to the following perspectives: 
  
3.2.2.1 Xenophone’s  Account: 
 
The first historic reference to the forefather of the Kurds appear in Xenophone’s 
Anabis, the contemporary account of the epic journey of Greek 10,000 men as they 
fled the Persian Empire in 401 BC after the defeat of Cyprus, and of their encounters 
with barbarians. As they head north from Mesopotamia to the Black sea, Xenophon 
and his fellow Greeks enter the territory of Carduchi5, or Kardoukhoi. After twenty 
four centuries the identity of the barbarians may be still obscure, but their name and 
their location-north of modern day Musel link them to today’s Kurds. According to 
Xenophon’s account, these people lived in the mountains and they were not subject to 
the Persian King6.  The Royal army of Persia with 120,000 men invaded their territory 
but not a man of them got back because of the harsh conditions of the territory they 
had to go through. Xenophon does not explain much about the Cardouchi beyond 
their war-like qualities and their skill with catttle. The Greeks spoke with these people 
through interpreters. Xenophone’s account simply suggests that Kurds are ancient 
people in this region, and their existence on the land called Kurdistan dates back to at 
least 4,000 years ago.  
 
3.2.2.2 Linguistic Account:  
 
From a linguistic and classical historic perspective, it is generally assumed that the 
Kurds are descended from the ancient Medes, an Iranian people who moved down 
from central Asia and settled in the twelfth BC in the Zagros Mountains and around 
Lake of Orumiyah in what is now western Azerbaijan7 in modern Turkey.  Herodotus, 
a prominent historian, believes that the Kurds and Persians were mutually 
comprehensible in ancient times. The Medes conquered the Assyrian Empire and the 
great cities of Nimrud and Nineveh, near present day Mussel, but they were in turn 
defeated by Persians. The Kurds themselves have traditionally favoured the theory of 
                                                 
5 Garduchi is an old term used to describe the territory inhabited by the Kurds.  
6 No Friend But Mountains, John Buloch and Harvey Mooris, New York: Penguin USA Inc, 1993: pp 
55-60 
7 Ibid, p 50  
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their Median ancestry8. The Kurdish Median ancestry is disputed by Persian 
nationalist historians, who believe Kurds an offshoot of the ancient Persians9.  
 
3.2.2.3 Scythian Account: 
 
Another strand of the Kurdish heritage can be traced back to the Scythians, an Indo-
European people who moved down from what is now Ukraine and established a 
kingdom in Iranian Kurdistan in the eight century BC10. This account holds merits to 
some extent, Kurdish is related to Sanskrit and many of the languages of modern 
Europe including English. This relationship can be seen in many basic words: new 
(new), bru (eyebrow), rubar (river), dlop (drop of water), mara (Mary),etc  
 
3.2.2.4 Anthropological Account:  
 
Modern day Kurds are almost certainly descended from a much more complex racial 
mixture than the Indo-European origin of their language would imply 
.Anthropological theory has largely discredited the idea that ancient indigenous 
peoples were supplanted by the mass migration of more sophisticated or war-like 
newcomers. Rather, it is believed that newcomers brought their language and 
contributed to a richer racial mix. Given this context, modern Kurds probably owe 
their origins as much as to the pre-Iranian inhabitants of the region as to the Indo-
European tribes who came to dominate them. This process, whereby the ancient 
inhabitants of the region were culturally and linguistically Indo-Europeanised, 
reflects another traditional myth about the origins of the Kurds. It relates how Noah’s 
ark came to rest after the flood on the peak of the Mount Cudi in Iraq, 4490 years 
before the birth of the Prophet Mohammad, and that a great city was built there 
which was ruled by Melik Kurdim of the tribe of Noah. When Melik Kurduim 
reached the age of 600, he invented a new language which his people called 
Kurduim, the language of the Kurds11. 
                                                 
8 Their favor of Median ancestry reflects in their art and their revolutionary songs. Meda is also a name 
given to the girl children. The language of modern Kurds is closely related to Persian, and belongs the 
north-western Iranian group alongside the languages of Afhganistan, Baluchistan and Tajikistan.  
9 Cited in Bulosh and Morris, p 59  
10 Richard Bukley, Kurds: Nations Caught Between Nations, Berlin, European Schoolbook Publishing 
Ltd, 1994: p. 16 
11 Ibid, p 2-3  
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The mountain tribes became gradually Indo-Europeanised from the third millennium 
onwards as fresh waves of conquerors moved south. But it was a process which was 
not completed until the fifth century B.C, at around the time of Xenophon, when 
peoples of the mountain had been racially and culturally amalgamated into the 
identifiable forerunners of the modern Kurds. The racial mix became more complex 
over subsequent centuries as Turkish and Arab tribes pressed in on the Kurdish 
heartland. In early medieval times, some ethnically Turkish tribes became Kurdified 
while some ethnically Kurdish tribes became Turkified. As a result of this inter-
mixture, some Turkish and Arabic words entered the vocabulary of Kurdish 
dialectics12.  
 
These historic perspectives analysed above on the origins of the Kurds have their 
own different reasons to support their arguments, but all these perspectives in no way 
undermine the Kurdish claim to be a separate nation. The idea that racial purity is a 
necessary condition for nationhood or statehood has long been discredited. On the 
contrary, the argument here is that the Kurds represent a unique racial and cultural 
mix which has led to their being recognised by themselves and others as an 
identifiable nation.  
 
3.3 The Kurds and Coming of Islam 
 
Before the coming of Islam in the seventh century A.D. the people of Kurdistan pro-
dominantly followed the Zoroastrian religion. The Kurds were relatively slow in 
adopting the new religion that emerged from the Arabian Peninsula in the seventh 
century and swept into the Levant, central Asia and across North Africa to southern 
Europe. The Kurdish first contact with the army of Islam was in 637, when the 
invaders captured the city of Tikret, 100 miles north of Baghdad. By capturing 
Tikret, the Muslim army reached the fringes of the Kurdish territory and gained a 
foothold on the borders of Kurdish territory. At that time, Kurds fought on the side of 
the Persian governor of Ahwaz, as the fading Zoroastrian Empire struggled to hold 
back the tides of the new religion.Thus the Arabs established their first physical 
                                                 
12 Ibid: p 6 
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presence in Kurdistan in 643 after defeating the Kurdish armies in a bloody battle in 
what is now called the province of Suleimania in Iraqi Kurdistan13.  
 
In the early attempts of Islam to Islamise Kurdistan, Kurds offered stiff resistance 
and slowed the advance of the Islamic army. The close tribal structure of Kurdish 
society and the natural isolation of their mountain homeland may have been a factor 
in their stiff resistance to the new religion. Furthermore, the Kurds were religious 
zealots. Despite the resistance they showed to Islam, they eventually succumbed to it. 
Their submission to Islam may have more to do, as it did elsewhere, with the fact that 
Muslims escaped the tax on unbelievers than with strong adherence to the spiritual 
tenets of the new religion. Speaking generally, Islam came to the Kurds in the early 
phases of its expansion, and the few urban centres in Kurdistan — such cities as 
Cizre, Arbil and Amid (Diyarbekir) — soon were integrated into the world of Islamic 
learning and civilisation. Because of its mountainous nature, however, most of 
Kurdistan remained peripheral to the Islamic world and maintained an ambivalent 
relationship with learned, orthodox Islam. On the one hand, some centres of orthodox 
Islamic learning emerged in even the most isolated places. On the other hand, 
however, it was in this physical environment that heterodox religious communities 
could survive longest and that groups and individuals that were persecuted for 
political or religious reasons sought refuge14.Thus Kurdistan paradoxically became at 
once a centre of strict Sunni orthodoxy (adhering to the Shafi`i school of law rather 
than the more flexible Hanafi school that was adopted by most of the surrounding 
Arabs and Turks), and the home of some of the most heterodox communities of the 
Middle East. 
 
Once converted, the majority of the Kurdish tribes became the most devoted and 
rigorous defenders of the new faith. For almost twelve centuries after the coming of 
Islam, religion was the most important factor linking the peoples of Middle East 
whether ruled by Arabs or Turkish dynasties. Islam played a central in uniting the 
people of the Middle East. The Islamic domination of the region, in effect, created 
Pan-Islamism that lasted until the nineteenth century when it came gradually to be 
                                                 
13 , Boyce, Mary, Zoroastrians: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices, New York, Routledge, 2002, pp. 
18-29 
14 Ibid, p 21  
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supplanted by European ideas of nationalism. Pan-Islamism established a unity of 
purpose among the people, there was a conscious awareness among the Kurds that 
others were taking advantage of their divisions and that the Kurdish nation by 
allowing itself to be exploited as a mercenary force, was losing out15. It is worthwhile 
to note that the coming of Islam had, in a sense, a positive impact on Kurdish society 
and brought a form of civilisation to previously primitive and isolated corners of the 
Middle East16. Kurdistan due to its isolated geography and mountainous nature had a 
primitive tribal structure. The coming of Islam, to an extent, unified the Kurdish 
people in a loose dynastic and principality structure which lasted for 400 years until 
the nineteenth century, the decline of the Ottoman Empire.  
 
3.4 The Era of Glory and Prosperity 
 
The early middle ages saw the first emergence of a distinctive Kurdish culture and 
the establishment of powerful principalities and dynasties. As the power of Arabs 
after the first Islamic staunch victory declined with fragmentation of Islam across the 
Sunni and Shiites theological lines, the Kurds and Turkish tribes moved to fill the 
administrative, political and spiritual vacuum. The Kurdish and Turkish movement 
into the Levant from central Asia brought new blood and new vigour to the Islamic 
cause. Around the same time, the most glorious of Kurdish independent dynasties 
were established, and the most significant dynasty was that of Chaddaties, founded 
by Mohammad Chaddad Ben Karatan. Mohammad Chaddad belonged to the tribe of 
Rawadi that later produced Saladin who became Islamis saviour17. The other Kurdish 
dynasty was the Merwanids that lasted for a hundred years from 950, after it’s 
foundation by Kurd Bad, a former shepherd turned warrior prince. He made himself 
master of Nusieben and Diayrbakr, the main cities of what is now south western 
Turkey. The eastern half of Kurdistan was ruled in the same century by the two other 
Kurdish dynasties: the Hassan Wahid (995-1015) and the Banu Annaz (950-1016)18.  
 
                                                 
15 Ibid, p 23 
16 Ibid, p 54 
17 Phillipe Kreyenbroek & Christine Allison, Kurdish Identity and Culture, London, Zed Books Ltd, 
1996: p 88 
18 Ibid  97  
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It was in this era that Kurdistan served as a battlefield between rival empires. In the 
west the Christian Byzantine Empire was trying to extend its control towards Lake 
Van (Turkish Kurdistan), which around the same time in the south Seljuk Turks were 
emerging as the dominant military dynasty in the Muslim caliphate centred at 
Baghdad. Kurd Bad’s nephew, Abu Nasr, who ruled from 1010 to 1061, took the 
precaution of maintaining good relations with powers. Because of skilful diplomacy 
of maintaining balance among these powerful dynasties surrounding his own, he 
practised his reign over the most prosperous and splendid flowering Merwanid’s 
civilisation. He established a Kurdish court in Diyarbakir which rivalled those of 
Damascus or Cairo. Some historians believe that the era of glory and prosperity 
lasted when in the second half of eleventh century Seljuk entered Baghdad and in 
effect assumed the role of protectors of the politically powerless Caliph, the nominal 
ruler of Islamic world19.  
 
Around the same time, there began a competition between the Turks and Kurds on 
assuming the role of guarantor of the Islam .By the end of eleventh century, the 
Seljuk Turks defeated Merwainds but took precaution of suppressing the independent 
Kurdish principality on the frontier. In a more strict sense, the era of Kurdish glory 
ended by the start of the twelfth century, when the Seljuk Turks defeated the Kurds 
and in the process curtailed the power of Kurdish independent principality. For the 
first time the name of Kurdistan was used. Seljukes adopted the term to describe a 
Sanjak or a province, stretching from Hamadan and Kirmanshah from the east to 
Sinjar in the west. The province was divided into six districts, bordered by Arab Iraq 
in the south, Khuzistan in south-east and Azerbaijan in the north, area Arab 
geographers termed Jabal (mountain). The province became part of the expanding 
Seljuk Empire. Although, in practise the Turks distributed fiefs to the Kurdish 
chieftains which administered their tribal areas as semi-independent vassals of the 
Seljukes20. 
 
                                                 
19 Ibid, p 76 
20 Cited in Buloch ‘s No Friend But Mountains, pp 45-46  
 33
John Buloch and Harvey Morris, the two prominent experts in Kurdish history argue 
that Saladin21, originally Kurdish, was part of the era of the glory and prosperity of 
the Kurds. His rise illustrates the importance of Kurdish power in the early middle 
ages, an era in which the Kurds rivalled the Turks, the Arabs and the Persians in terms 
of culture and military prowess in the Muslim world. It is widely believed that the 
development and expansion of Kurdish power might have been greater had it not been 
for the next scourge which was to afflict the Middle East, and in which Kurdistan was 
once again a battlefield- Mongol invasion22. 
 
 
     3.5 The Emergence of Ottoman Foundations and Kurdish Fate  
 
While the era of Kurdish glory ended with the start of the twelfth century, the 
indications of the foundations of Ottoman Empire emerged and this became apparent 
when Emir Ossoman declared himself the Sultan of the Turks in 129023. The 
Mongols, who rivalled the Ottomans during the mid 12th century, were fading away. 
With the decline of the power of Mongols, the Ottomans expanded their reign to the 
north of the Black sea and into Southern Eastern Europe, in effect encircling the 
Byzantine Empire, which eventually fell with the capture of Constantinople in 1453 
by the Ottomans. By the fifteenth century the power of Ottomans eclipsed that of all 
it’ rivals in Middle East. As Ottomans established their institutions and consolidated 
their power, in practise Ottomans became the master of Kurds. After the collapse of 
Tamerland’s Kurdish Empire in 1404, which was centred at Samarkand, the 
                                                 
21The most famous Kurd in history is Saladin, who in all accounts emerges as the greatest military 
mind on either side of the Crusades, and the wisest and most famous Muslim ruler. Saladin was born in 
Tikrit in 1137, into a prominent Kurdish family. Saladin grew up in educated circles and distinguished 
himself militarily in his twenties by playing a significant part in keeping Egypt out of the hands of the 
First Crusade. Through his own accomplishments and with the help of his powerful family, he was 
appointed commander of the Syrian troops and vizier of Egypt at the age of 31. He subsequently 
became the sole ruler of Egypt and soon set out to unite the Muslim territories of Syria, northern 
Mesopotamia (Iraq), Kurdistan, Palestine, and the rest of Egypt. He proved to be a wise but firm ruler, 
skilled in diplomacy, free of corruption and cruelty, and dedicated to the spread of Islam. In 1187, he 
led the reconquest of Jerusalem and occupied it with compassion and courtesy. He died in 1193. 
Saladin did not accentuate his Kurdishness. He was not himself a tribal Kurdish leader, as were many 
of his generals in the army he commanded were made up of the chiefs of Turkish and Kurkish tribes. 
For him, the defense of Islam was a more important cause than the furtherance of his own race. As a 
consequence, Sadaladin is more often revered publicly as the hero of the Arab nationalists such as 
Saddam Hussein, while only his own people remember him first and foremost as a Kurd.  
22 Bulosh and Morris, p 61  
23 Ibid, p 67  
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Ottomans and Persians began to emerge as the two rival powers in the region. They 
in the process developed into something approaching modern multi-national states, 
with ill-defined frontiers running through Kurdistan24.  
 
Ottomans moved eastwards into Kurdistan Mountains, massacring the leading 
Kurdish families as a means of curbing Kurdish independent power. The Turkish 
ruler, Uzum Hassan, used Kurdistan as a base to move into Persia and Azerbaijan. 
Under Sultan Mehmed II, the Ottoman Empire expanded further, bringing it into 
open conflict with the Safavid dynasty which had been founded by Shah Ismael in 
Persia at the turn of the sixteenth century. Under the Safavidis, Shiism became the 
state religion of Persia. Shiism, being the official state religion, created a cause of 
conflict for Ottomans, whose core religious make up was Sunni, and to large extent 
for the Kurds the majority of whom were Sunni vassals25.  
 
Rivalry between the two empires led to an open warfare, which was settled on the 
Kurdish territory at the Chaldaran, north-east of Lake Van in what is now Turkish 
Kurdistan in 1514. At Chaldaran the forces of Sultan Selim defeated Ismael’s army 
and advanced to take Tabriz. With Selim’s victory, the leading Kurds pledged their 
loyalty to the Ottomans. Twenty prominent Emirs had declared their allegiance to 
Selim even before Chaldaran campaign under way. The Kurdish allegiance to 
Ottomans changed the balance in the favour of Turks. The Kurdish emirs were under 
the guidance of Idris Batlis26, a Kurdish nobleman who later became the first 
historian of the Ottoman Empire. Idris Batlis was one of the most prominent 
intellectuals of the period. He had an intellectual and spiritual authority over his 
people, and he was a central figure in rallying the Kurds around the Ottoman cause. 
Some believe that he had in mind that if Kurds were able to ally with Ottomans 
against Persians, they may have in return receive better treatment from the Ottomans. 
In a way, Kurds were better treated under Ottomans than the Persians who ruled over 
the large swath of current Turkish Kurdistan. This had a lot to do with the Ottoman’s 
leanings towards the Sunni Kurds who were largely populated on southern fringes of 
                                                 
24 Ibid, p 69 
25 Ibid, p 75 
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the Empire. They ,Kurds and Turks, united to expel Qizilbash27, who fought on the 
side of the Persians and ruled over Dyarbakir and other Kurdish enclaves. As a result 
of the Kurdish-Ottoman alliance, Qizilbash and his forces fled to Persia.  
  
The battle of Chaldaran was a turning point as it established a frontier between the 
Ottomans and Persian empires. Although, the frontier continued to be disputed ,in 
effect it remained in place for 400 years until the conclusion of World War I. Most of 
the Kurdish territory in what is now Turkey, Iraq, and Syria was in Ottoman hands, 
while several other Kurdish tribes remained under Persian domination28.  
 
The Ottomans acknowledged the importance of Kurdish support in the war against 
Persia as well as their strategic location on the edge of the empire. In order to secure 
the support of the Kurds, Ottomans appointed the loyal emirs’hereditary governors, 
an anomaly in the Ottoman political tradition. The old feudal lords were restored to 
their traditional powers and privileges and were left virtually independent to run their 
own affairs as long as they collected and transferred taxes to the Sublime Porte, the 
Ottoman court of Constantinople. Some areas, so-called Kurd “Hukumate” or 
autonomous region enjoyed complete independence with right to strike their own 
coinage and Friday prayers said in the name of their emirs, while the bulk of 
Kurdistan was divided into three governorates or Villayates29. It was a situation 
virtually unchanged until the nineteenth century, when the Ottoman Empire began to 
decay. With flood of nationalist ideas reaching the boundaries of the empire and the 
subjects who live in it, this old pattern of rule began to change simultaneously.   
 
 
3.6 The Definition of the Term Kurdistan and its Historic 
Evolution 
                                                 
27 Ismael used primitive and war-like Turkish tribes from the Asian hinterland- the so-called Qizilbash, 
or redheads to extend the power of Safavid into Kurdistan. Diyarbakir fell to Islamel’s brother-in-law, 
Mohammad Beg Ustajlu, who had the old noble families slaughtered. Qizilbash were put in charge of 
Kurdish lands. He was such a tyrant that he killed inhabitants and burned down the Christian churches. 
For the Christians there was little difference between the Qizilbash levies and Kurdish chieftains’ rule. 
It is not surprising that in the face of the Cruel Qizlibash Kurds themselves opted to seek protection 
from the Ottomans.  
28 David Mcdowel, Modern History of The Kurds, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004: pp 51-53 
29 Ibid, p 65 
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3.6.1  Old Term: 
 
In the third millennium, the ancient Sumerian people living in the modern day Iraq 
called the ancient land of the Kurds ‘Karda’, and they also called ‘Gutti’30. In the 
second millennium B.C. the Babylonians called the Kurds ‘Garda’, which means 
brave. Also, in the second and first millennium B.C. the Assyrians called the ancient 
Kurds ‘Kardak’31. In 401 B.C the Greek historian Xenophone referred to the Kurds in 
his writings as ‘Kurdock’. He wrote to the Greeks about ‘Kurdock’ when 10,000 
soldiers passed Zagros Highlands (north of present day Kurdistan) north of their 
expedition in Mesopotamia. Starting in the fourth century, the historians began 
writing the name of ‘Kurdoin when referring to the land of north Zagors highlands32. 
In the seventh century A.D. the first century of Islam, the Arab writers called Zagros 
Highland people ‘Kurd’ for the first time in their writings. In the Arabic language, 
the letter K is used in instead of G 
 
3.6.2  Modern Usage  
 
The term Kurdistan contains two words: Kurd + istan. Kurd means the name of 
people called Kurds and Istan means the land on which the Kurds live. Given the 
history of the modern use, it has evolved over the centuries:  
 
3.6.2.1 The First Usage: 
 
As mentioned above, the term for the first time entered public discourse at around 
12th century. The Seljuks, who began to dominate the region were first to adopt the 
term Kurdistan. They used the term to describe a Sanjak or province that stretched 
from Hamadan and Kirmanshah in the east to Sanjar in the west33. It is noteworthy to 
observe that the first description was the term was mainly used by the Seljuk elite.  
 
                                                 
30 www.xs4all.nl/~tank/kurdish/htdocs/his/orig.html 
31 Christian Bird, “A Thousand Sighs: A Thousand Revolts”, New York, Random House Publishing 
Group, 2004: p 12 
32 ibid, p 13  
33 John Buloch & Harvey Mooris, No Friend But Mountains, New York: Penguin Books Inc, 1993: p 
63 
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3.6.2.2 The Second Usage: 
 
The description of Kurdistan surfaced for the second time in mid-seventeenth century. 
A Turkish Traveller, Evilya Celebi, who exclusively travelled through all isolated 
regions of the empire, used the term. He described the independence of the Kurdish 
khans34, the multiplicity of their dialectics and the sophistication of their towns and 
villages. He describes a vast area to Kurdistan including a portion of Syria and Iraq. 
According to Elivya: 
        “In these vast territories, live 500,000 men carrying guns, faithful Muslims of Shafite  
            School and there are 776 fortresses, all inhabited. Pray God that these districts of  
            Kurdistan will remain for eternity as a barrier between the greatest of all dynasties,  
            The House of Ossoman and the Shah of Persia”35 
      
 The term Kurdistan surfaced in the literature by two stages: the first usage was 
largely used by the intellectual and political elite, while after seventeenth century the 
term vigorously entered the literature and public discourse. The term of a great 
Kurdistan surfaced in Kurdish intellectual discourse and hence has become integrated 
in Kurdish consciousness. The usage of the term ‘Kurdistan’ including all Kurdish 
lands seems to have been used since the seventeenth century. In the seventeenth 
century, for example, the classical poet Ahmed Khani mentioned in chapter two, in 
the epic of Mum o Zin describes the Kurds and Kurdistan as follows: 
                “I live to God’s wisdom 
                  The Kurds in this world’s state 
                  Why are they deprived of their rights? 
                  Why they all are doomed? 
                  See, from the Arabs to Georgians 
                  Every thing is Kurdish, as with a citadels, 
                  The Turks and Persians besiege them  
                  From four sides at once 
                  And they both make the Kurdish people  
                  Into a target for fate’s arrow” 36 
                                                 
34 Khan is a Kurdish term which means the chief of the tribe or a man who can practice authority over 
large  rural e area.  
35 See John Buloch and Harevy Mooris, P 72 
36 Phillip Kreyenborek & Christine Allison, The Kurdish Culture and Identity, London: Zed Books,  
1996: p 10 
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3.7 Language 
 
The Kurds speak various dialects of the Kurdish that can be divided into three main 
groups: 
3.7.1 The Northern Kurmanji called ‘Bahdini’ is spoken by around seventy five 
percent of the Kurds. Most of the Kurds in Turkey, a large portion of the Kurds in 
Iraq, Iran, and almost the entire Kurdish population in Syria speak ‘Bahdini’.  
3.7.2 The Central Kurmanji called ‘Sorani’ is spoken by a great majority in Iraqi 
and Iranian Kurdistan.  
3.7.3 The Pahlawani dialect is mainly divided into two groups: Dilimi (Zaza o    
Hawaramy) and Gorani (Kirmashani or southern Kurmanji). Pahlawani is spoken by 
the Kurds of Kirmanshah region in Iranian Kurdistan and small portion of Iraqi 
Kurdistan. All of these dialectics are further divided into the scores of sub-dialects. 
Though all dialects are comprehensible to one another and people understand each 
other’s dialects easily, yet the Kurdish language is not standardised37.  (See Map.1) 
 
The lack of a standardised or unified language has been used on argument that the 
Kurds are not a nation in a modern sense. But the Kurdish dialects are essentially as 
close as, for instance, Portuguese and Spanish, and even closer than the languages of 
modern China or nineteenth century Italy. The political circumstance that emerged in 
Kurdistan undermined all efforts to uniform and standardize the diverse Kurdish 
dialects. It is worth to note that the diverse dialects played its part in the division of 
the Kurds politically38.  
3.8 Religion 
 
At least three quarter of the Kurds (75%    ) are Sunni Muslims that belong to the 
Shafi I school of Islam, in contrast to their Arab and Turkish neighbours who are 
mostly adherents of the Hanafi School. Sunni Kurds are divided into two sub-groups: 
Tariqas, the mystical order or Naqashabani and Qadiri39. Their Azaris and Persians  
                                                 
37 Mehr Izzady, International Journal of the Kurdish Studies, NOs 1-2, pp 251-257, Also for better 
insight of the Kurdish Dialects see , Amir Hassanpour, “Nationalism and Language in Kurdistan,1918-
1985”, Sanfarncisco, Mellan Research University Press, 1992.  
38 Ibid, p 201  
39 Martin van Bruinessen, "Religion in Kurdistan," Kurdish Times 4 (Summer-Fall 1991), p. 7. 
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neighbours are the Shiites. Most of the remaining Kurds are adherents of heterodox, 
syncretistic sects with beliefs and rituals that have been, to a great extent, influenced 
by Islam, but owe much to other religions notably Old Iranian religion. Such sects 
include the Alevis with an estimated three million, the Ahl-i-Haq (People of Truth) 
and the Yazidis. In the various parts of Kurdistan, especially in the region where the 
borders of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq meet and in Armenia, there are Kurdish Yezidi 
communities. In earlier times, the Yezidi faith40 was a widely shared religious 
orientation. Its roots go back to Zoroastrianism. The Alevites are in the majority in the 
northern and western areas of Turkish Kurdistan and in the Chorasan region of Iran. 
There are also several thousands of the Christian Kurds and more than 150,000 Jewish 
Kurds mostly residing in Israel41.  
 
Although most Kurdish rebellions in the past century were led by the religious 
figures, yet these sectarian fault lines were one of the main weaknesses of the Kurdish 
nationalist movement .For instance, the Sunni groups of mystical orders Nakshabandi 
and Qadiri42 never effectively cooperated with each other in the rebellions instigated 
by either side’s leader. The Shiite Kurds in Iranian Kurdistan never actively took part 
in the Kurdish national movement, and they paid their allegiance more to the national 
                                                 
40 The main site of their religion is the tomb of Shaykh Adi just north of Al Mawsil (Northern of 
modern Iraq) in Lalish. The Yazidis call themselves the Dawasin.  The Yazidi religion has elements of 
Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, as well as some paganism.  They consider the Bible and the Quran to 
be sacred.  They are also well known as 'devil worshipers' by other people who live near them.  The 
'Peacock Angel' is their symbol for a fallen angel Malik Taus, who is their euphemism for evil or the 
devil, who they fear and seek to appease.  According them evil is part of divinity as is good.  The 
Peacock Angel is used in their festivals where they carry out strange and very secret rituals.  They also 
believe that evil is found in lettuce, and are very careful around lettuces. The Yazidis put God on  top, 
but only as a creator, he is no longer seen as an acting force.  This responsibility is taken by Shaykh 
Adi and the Malik Taus.  Malik Taus is said to have repented for his sins, and cried for 7000 years 
filling 7 jars full of tears, which were used to put out the fire in hell, thus there is no hell in Yazidism. 
41 Yona Sabar, "Jews of Kurdistan," in Encyclopedia of World Cultures, Volume IX: Africa and the 
Middle East, edited by John Middleton and Amal Rassam (Boston, MA: G.K. Hall and Co., 1995), pp. 
144-147, for better treatment of the Jewish-Kurdish deep-seated tie, see , Brinkmann, C., et al. "Human 
Y-chromosomal STR haplotypes in a Kurdish population sample." International Journal of Legal 
Medicine 112 (1999): pp,181-183 
42 The three main Sufi schools, Suharwardy, Qadri and Naqshandi, emerged from the city and spread to 
other parts of the world. Although Sufis do not like to be bracketed with any particular sect, these three 
schools belong to the Sunni sect. Other schools principally follow Sunni Islam. The Qadri school is the 
largest. Abdul Qadir was the founder of the Qadri school) 80 million disciples are affiliated to the 
Qadri school all over the world. The entire philosophy of the Sufis, especially those of the Qadri 
school, rotates around spirits and souls, which interact with the world through shrines and tombs. 
According to Salafi jurists, Sufis, especially Qadris, misinterpret and misrepresent the teachings of 
Islam with their personal ideals, while for the Qadris, the Salafis have lost the real essence of 
Islam with their extremist notions. Traditionally, the Qadri school and the Salafis have been bitter 
rivals. The Salafis oppose shrines and tombs. They believe that after death, interaction of the body and 
soul with the world ends.  
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state than to the Kurdish national movement. On other hand, the Kurdish Alevis, 
fearing the fanatism of the Sunni Kurds do not actively support the Kurdish national 
movement. This suggests that the sectarian fault lines contributed vigorously to the 
weakening of Kurdish nationalism as a cohesive and substantial movement 43(See 
Map.1). This sectarian division played a pivotal role in undermining the emergence of 
a strong national consciousness throughout the history of the Kurdish national 
movement.  
                                          
 
                        Map 1 shows the dialectical boundaries of Kurdistan44  
 
                                               3.9 Conclusion   
 
This chapter has established that the Kurds are one of the ancient people in the Middle 
East. Nonetheless, there is no definitive answer to their origins. What is clear is about 
4,000 years ago, the first vanguard of the Indo-European-speaking peoples were 
trickling into the present-day Kurdish areas in limited numbers and settling there. 
They formed the aristocracy of the Mittani and Hittite kingdoms, while the common 
peoples there remained solidly Hurrian and Hattian, respectively45. About 3,000 years 
ago, the trickle had turned into a flood, and Indo-Europeans quickly outnumbered the 
Hurrians. However, the Hurrian legacy, despite its linguistic eclipse, remains the 
                                                 
43 Martin Van Bruinessen , Religion in Kurdistan," Kurdish Times 4 (Summer-Fall 1991):pp 12-14 
44 www.kurdistanica.com/english/geography/maps/maps 
45 The Seleucid Army: Organization and Tactics in the Great Campaigns, by Bezalel Bar-Kochva, 
Cambridge University Press, 1976, ISBN 0521206677, p.50 
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single most important element of Kurdish culture today. Medes, Scythians and 
Sagarthians are the better-known clans of the Indo-European-speaking Aryans who 
settled in the area.About 2,600 years ago, the Medes had set up an empire that 
included all of the present-day Kurdish areas and vast territories far beyond. By 1200 
BCE, Medes conquered Hurrian cities and by 850 BCE, the old language of the Kurds 
(probably from a Dene-Caucasian family) had changed to Indo-European46.  
The most flourishing period of Kurdish power was probably during the 12th century, 
when Saladin, who belonged to the Rawendi branch of the Hadabani(or Adiabene) 
tribe, founded the Ayyubite (1171-1250) dynasty of Syria, and Kurdish chieftainhips 
were established, not only to the east and west of the Kurdistan mountains, but as far 
as Khorasan upon one side and Egypt and Yemen on the other47. After the Mongol 
period, Kurds established several independent states or principalities such as Ardalan, 
Badinan, Baban, Soran, Hakkari and Badlis. The battle of Chaldraran in 1914 
contstitued a turning point in the Kurdish fate as for the first time Kurdistan was 
dividied into two zones: one zone under Persia and other under Ottomans. The 
Ottomans after defeating the Persia Shah Ismail I in 1514, annexed Armenia and 
Kurdistan, he entrusted the organisation of the conquered territories to Idris, the 
historian, who was a Kurd of Bitlis. He divided the territory into sanjaks or districts, 
and, making no attempt to interfere with the principle of heredity, installed the local 
chiefs as governors. He also resettled the rich pastoral country between Erzerum and 
Erivan, which had lain waste since the passage of Timur, with Kurds from the 
Hakkari and Bohtan districts. The rest of the Kurdish tribes in the Eastern Kurdistan 
were placed under the authority of Persia. This status quo remained unchaged until the 
closing stage of the World War I48.  
The fargmentation of Islam across Sunni and Shiite traditons played a role in the 
division of Kurdish loyalty towards the Ottomans Turks , who by and large are 
Sunnis, and Persian Safavidis, largely the Shittes. These religious fault lines remained 
effective in the division of file and rank of the Kurdish national movement which  
emerged  in the aftermath of the collapse of the Ottoman and Persian empires. This 
                                                 
46 Ibid, p 52  
47 Cited in Bruinseen’s Paper on Kurdish Nationalism and Ethnic Loyalties, ,available on www. 
martinvanbruinseen.com  
48Ibid, p 2  
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chapter further analysed that  the diverse dialects the Kurds speak by and large 
hindered communication between Kurdish regions, and this contributed to reinforcing 
tribalism and regionalism among the Kurds. The standardisation of the dialects 
normally strengthens the cohesion of nations49. The lack of a standardised language 
coupled with their religious divisions undermined and still undermines the emergence 
of a coherent national movement. This trend is evident in all national states having  
significant Kurdish populations.  
 
 
 
                                             
 
                                                 
49 Ibid, p 3 
Chapter Four 
 
Stirrings in the Kurdish World: The Kurds and Decline of the 
Ottoman Empire   
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 The chapter will examine the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the Kurdish 
reactions to the fragile and weakening Empire. With the Empire being in an 
administrative, legal and management crisis, the Kurds began revolting against the 
authority of Constantinople. As mentioned in chapter two, Kurdish elite in the 
nineteenth century were part of the Ottoman beaurucracy and had been in a close 
contact with Europeans. They were fully aware of the political developments taking 
place on the European continent. This chapter analyses the slow pace of the decline of 
the Empire and the main reasons behind it. This chapter is also an attempt to explain 
the Kurdish reactions to the Ottoman centralisation project in the nineteenth century 
which resulted in numerous bloody uprising against the Sultan. Furthermore, the 
fundamental reasons behind the Kurdish failures in installing their own kingdom 
modelled on European monarchy of the period will be analysed . Most of these revolts 
were instigated by Kurdish political elite.  
 
4.2 The Signals of the Decline 
 
At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Ottoman Empire was still the most 
powerful state in the world both in wealth and military capability. The personal style 
of government, however, cultivated among the earlier Sultans had declined. In place 
of Sultanic government, the bureaucracy pretty much ran the show. Power struggles 
among the various elements of the bureaucracy: the grand vizier, the Diwan, or 
Supreme Court, and especially the military, the Janissaries, led to a constant shifting 
of government power1. According to some Muslim historians, the growth of 
bureaucratic power and the disinterest of the Sultans led to corrupt and predatory local 
                                                 
1 Lord Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries: the Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire’, 1990, p .12  
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government which eroded popular support2. Western historians point to internal 
decline in the bureaucracy along with increased military efficiency of European 
powers as the principle reason for the decline of the Empire. The decline of the 
Ottomans was a staggered affair lasting over two centuries. The Empire itself would 
exist until World War I, at which point it was finally erased from the maps by 
European powers3. 
 
Perhaps the most significant innovation in Sultanic government was the preservation 
of the brothers of the Sultan. While Sultanic succession is hotly disputed among both 
Islamic and Western historians, it seems clear that the Ottomans believed that the 
Sultan was selected primarily through divine kut, which in Turkish means "favour." 
All the members of the ruling family, according to some historians, had an equal 
claim to the throne. This explains the Ottoman practice of killing the brothers of the 
Sultan and their sons; the purpose of this practice was to obviate rebellion or rival 
claims to the throne. In the late sixteenth century, the Ottoman Sultans abandoned this 
practice, yet still distrusted filial loyalty. So the brothers of the Sultan were locked 
away in the harem in the palace. While they lived in luxury, they were still forced to 
live in small rooms and often in isolated conditions. Many of them went mad, but 
most simply became fat and lazy, addicted to alcohol and food and lying about. All of 
them made bad Sultans, completely disengaged from the government. In addition, the 
Sultans abandoned the practice of training their sons to assume the Sultanate by 
having them serve in the government and the military. In both Islamic and Western 
perspectives in respect of the Ottomans, this decline in the Sultanate is regarded as 
one of the prime causes of its decline4. 
 
As a result of the disintegration of the institution of the Sultanate, power had to go 
somewhere. It principally went to the Janissaries, the military arm of the government. 
Throughout the seventeenth, the Janissaries slowly took over the military and 
administrative posts in the government and passed these offices on to their sons, 
mainly by bribing officials. Because of this practice, Ottoman government soon began 
                                                 
2 Ibid, p .13  
3 Ibid, p. 15  
4 Ibid, p. 16  
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to be ruled by a military feudal class5. Under the early Ottomans, positions in the 
government were determined solely through merit. After the sixteenth century, 
position in government was largely determined by hereditary. The quality of the 
administration and bureaucracy declined precipitously6. According to some historians, 
the sole reason for the decline is that the empire engaged in wars with Europe7. While 
these wars were significant, Ottoman decline was more pronounced internally and 
economically in the eighteenth century. There are two overwhelming aspects of this 
decline: steep population increase and the refusal to modernize8. 
  
What is clear about Ottoman decline is  the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were 
periods of relative prosperity. As a result, however, the population of the Empire 
doubled .This eventually produced endemic unemployment and famine when the 
economic resources of the country could not support such a large population9.  
The wealth of the Ottomans was largely due to their presence on trade routes. The 
Empire stood astride the crossroads of all the continents and sub-continents: Africa, 
Asia, India, and Europe. However, European expansion created new trade routes that 
bypassed Ottoman territories. Vast amounts of revenue began to disappear from the 
economy. Because the state collected tariffs on all good passing through the 
Empire,the imperial government itself lost vast amounts of its revenue.  
 In addition, the Ottomans did not industrialize in the way Europeans were doing in 
the eighteenth century. Industrialization isn't only mechanization. It also involves a 
complete overhaul of  labour practices. The Ottomans retained old labour practices, in 
which production was concentrated among craft guilds. Increasingly, the economic 
relationships between the Ottomans and the Europeans shifted gears. Europeans 
increasingly bought only raw materials from the Ottomans, and then shipped back 
finished products manufactured in Europe. Since these finished products were 
produced with new, industrial methods, they were far cheaper than similar products 
produced in Ottoman territories. This practice effectively destroyed the Ottoman craft 
industries in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries10. 
                                                 
5 Ibid, p. 18 
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7 Ibid, p .11  
8 Ibid, p. 12  
9 Ibid, p .14  
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There is certainly evidence that the Ottoman government was losing control it had 
exerted in earlier periods. In Asia Minor from the end of the 16th century there were 
violent disturbances involving discharged soldiers, dissatisfied peasants, and 
discontented tribesmen. Later, in Anatolia, there grew up so-called valley lords who 
controlled their own regions and paid little heed to the government. Similar groups, 
notably the commanders of fortresses, came to exercise autonomous authority in 
Rumelia. Bedouin, Kurds, Albanians, and other traditionally independent groups 
became yet more resistant to authority in the 18th century. In Egypt, the Mameluke 
factions overawed the Ottoman Pasha, and in Syria and Lebanon local notables and 
officials ignored or defied the Government in Istanbul. There is also evidence that the 
registers, once so carefully maintained, were not kept up, indicating a decline in 
government control11.  
 
4.3  The First Kurdish Irritations 
 
 
Ottoman Empire had been in a relatively slow decline since 1683, when the army of 
the empire had been pushed back at the gate of Vienna. By the early years of the 
nineteenth century the empire’s decline had become apparent. The Medieval Ottoman 
was unable to cope with the tasks of administering and defending a far-flung empire. 
The Ottoman’s grip on European territory to a large extent weakened as the ideas of 
nationalism, equality and independence inspired by the French revolution spread all 
over the continent. On the military front, the imperial powers of Britain and Russia 
were pressing on the Ottoman territory12.  
Ottoman response to the decaying that emerged in the Empire was to centralise power 
and extend direct rule to regions such as Kurdistan. Thus Kurdistan constituted a 
linchpin in political power centralisation scheme by the Ottomans, for the Kurds are 
territorially the closest to the Ottoman Turks and besides that they shared the Sunni 
brand of Islam13. It is worthwhile to note that until nineteenth century, Asian subjects 
of the Sublime Porte- Turks, Arabs, Greeks, Armenians and Jews slumbered in the 
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13 Ibid, p. 65 
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Ottoman twilight. Muslims among them paid allegiance to the Sultan as caliph of 
Islam. National identity was less important than shared religion. Kurdistan had 
declined from its early glory as a result of the wars fought on Kurdistan between 
Turks and Persians: the rival Empires. Kurdish destinies changed radically around this 
time, when the Ottoman and Persian empires divided Kurdistan into spheres of 
influence, agreeing on a border in 1639. In order to protect their sovereignty, the 
principalities supported one or the other power, for most of the next three centuries a 
prevailing war economy destroyed the agrarian system, devastated villages and towns, 
precipitated massacres and led to forcible migrations of Kurds and settlement of 
Turkish tribes in parts of Kurdistan. All of this inhibited further growth of urban areas 
and settled agrarian production relations, reinforcing tribal ways of life. This is in 
addition to the constant warfare among the Kurds themselves. Towns and cities 
declined, castles were abandoned. War-like mountain tribes were preyed on the 
settled populations of the valleys and the plains14.  
 
Under the Ottomans Kurds were ruled by their own princes on the behalf of the 
Sublime Porte. From the beginning of nineteenth century, Ottomans began to reform 
their governing structure and directly began interference in Kurdish affairs. The 
reason for the intervention was to use Kurdistan as a buffer zone on one hand and on 
the other hand Kurdistan represented the source of manpower for the Sultan’s colonial 
wars in Europe and elsewhere. This direct intervention in Kurdish affairs brought on a 
challenge to the power of Kurdish feudal chiefs, who were happy to pay loyalty to the 
Sublime Porte, as long as they were left free to run their own affairs15.  
 
The first signals of decaying in the old pattern of rule emerged in the first quarter of 
the nineteenth century in areas ruled by the Ottoman Sultanate. Signals represented 
numerous uprisings that erupted within Ottoman boundaries. As a result Egypt broke 
away from Ottoman rule (1811-18), Serbia revolted (1815-17) and Greek launched 
their war of independence in (1821-31)16. Martin Van Bruinseen, a prominent expert 
on Kurdish nationalism, believes that the emergence of Kurdish nationalism received 
a firm boost from the news of Greek and Slav independence. He goes further 
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suggesting that the Kurds became more self-ware when British and Russia advanced 
militarily in the face of the Ottoman Empire. According to him, the nineteenth century 
witnessed, for obvious reasons, the emergence of ‘pro-British’ and ‘pro-Russian’ 
wings in Kurdistan’s ruling circles. By the second half of the century Russia and 
Britain had become the most significant powers in the environment. The actions of the 
leading Kurds were strongly influenced by their perception that those states were 
stronger than the Ottomans and the Iranians, and that both intended to acquire control 
of Kurdistan17. It seems that the Kurdish ruling establishment oversimplified the 
complex nature of power politics played by major powers in the region at the time.  
 
Assuming the furtherance of chaos within empire, Ottomans wanted to solidify their 
power structure and secure the integrity of the southern fringes of the empire from the 
dismemberment which was geographically close to their power seat. To counter these 
half-heart nationalist-inspired uprisings, the Ottomans forcibly raised levies from 
among Kurdish tribes. In another move, Ottomans imposed military conscription on 
the Kurds. These moves offended the Kurds and as a result numerous major rebellions 
erupted against the Ottoman rule. Before examining the nineteenth century rebellions, 
it is important to examine the tribal structure of the Kurdish society and then explain 
why all rebellions ended in failure.  
 
4.4 Tribalism and Religion in Action: Kurdish Social Structure and 
its Impact in   Undermining the Development of a Coherent   
National Consciousness 
 
In order to build up an  understanding as to what was the chief stumbling block in the 
way of developing national awakening of the Kurds, it is important  to examine the 
social structure of the Kurdish society. Traditional Kurdish society was divided into 
members of the tribes. The members of the tribe paid their absolute obedience to the 
powerful, landowning chieftains. The first duty of the members of tribe is to the chief 
of tribe and second to religion. Edward Arnold believes that national consciousness 
foremost is a pre-requisite for success of national. Given the status of the Kurdish 
rebellions, he believes that the concept of national consciousness towards fellow 
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Kurds in a nationalistic context was almost non-existent18. If a chief of tribe decreed 
that it was in the interest of the tribe to fight on the side of non-Kurdish state 
authorities, then his followers would obey. Given that kind of tribal psyche, the Kurds 
cooperated with their own existential enemies without any sense that they are 
betraying a higher national Kurdish cause19.  
 
This tribal trend was dominant in the Kurdish social and political life by the start of 
the nineteenth century and remained so over decades. Blood ties which bind the 
members of tribe are often more mythical than real and tribesmen can rarely trace 
their ancestors back more than a few generations. The tribes formed alliances of 
convenience which so often shifts according to circumstances. At times, a section of a 
tribe would break away and seek protection from a more powerful tribe and 
eventually became integrated with it. Thus some tribes would grow powerful, while 
others would decline. Tribes were generally associated with particular region, to 
which they gave their names. A number of traditions and practises were strictly 
adhered and these tribal traditions were designed to secure the integrity of the tribe. 
Among the most important social practises were marriage and the pursuit of the blood 
feuds. The tradition of blood feud set tribal loyalty above other national 
considerations. If a Kurd were killed, relatives would seek out the first member of the 
tribe responsible and kill him. It was not thought necessary to pursue the actual killer. 
This prompts cycle of revenge and counter revenge which could last for generations 
and was one of the main causes of tribal rivalry. Within the Kurdish tribal society, 
there is a tradition of marriage between cousins. A girls’ first cousin is accepted to 
have an automatic right to her hand in marriage and therefore to enjoy a theoretical 
veto on her marrying any one else. In case of a failure marriage between cousins, 
parents would always prefer to find a partner among other close rather than distant 
relatives, and any relative is considered preferable to someone else from outside the 
tribe. Given this tribal context, Kurdish society was collective-based and socially very 
inter-twined20.  
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Within Kurdish culture, the group takes precedence over the individual. Loyalty to the 
group is highly valued, and responsibility is generally considered to fall upon the 
group in its entirety rather than on any particular individual. Distant cousins, 
neighbours, and friends can develop bonds as strong as any between close family 
members. Kinship ties are sometimes fabricated, denied, and manipulated to 
accommodate these social realities. Because of the primacy of the group, obligations 
of group members to one another are wide, varied, and powerful21.Instead of asserting 
their separateness and privacy as independent individuals, the Kurds tend to interact 
as members of a group-family, clan, village, neighbourhood, tribe, etc. Group norms 
guide individual behaviour, and the Kurds display a high need for social approval. 
Shaming is the primary instrument with which the Kurdish society enforces 
conformity. The group often determines a person's identity, status, and prospects for 
success in life. As a result, the Kurds are subjected to immense family and community 
pressures 
 
The benefit of belonging to a tribe is that it provides mutual protection and security, 
for which in return the tribesman pay absolute loyalty to his tribal chief. It can be said 
that tribalism is more important in times of conflict than in times of peace. This 
became a social norm and thus has become an integrated and often repeated pattern in 
Kurdish tribal politics. Where necessary, tribes would join together in larger 
confederations out of mutual self-interest, usually warfare against rival tribes22. A 
large Kurdish tribal confederacy called a shiret (tribe) is divided into a number of 
tribes or sub-tribes called tira. The tira is the primary political and landowning group. 
Membership in it is patrilineally inherited. The genealogical depth of the tiras varies. 
Each tira is led by a hereditary raiz (leader). The leader's position is hereditary within 
the clan and a new leader must have the approval of the senior male members of the 
tira. Growth of population and internal tension may lead a branch of a tira to split and 
form a new tira. The whole tira rarely camps in one unit, but generally divides into 
several tent camps called khel (composed of a number of households.) Each khel is 
led by an older man informally elected because of his prestige, power, and 
capabilities. The sense of belonging to a larger national context was almost non-
existent. Given the nationalist perspective, this tribal system divided the Kurdish 
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nation. For the Kurdish tribes and their chieftains, the Ottomans and Persians were 
source of power and influence. Antagonism among the Kurdish tribes was therefore a 
mixed blessing for the Ottomans and Persian empires or central governments in that it 
offered an opportunity to divide and rule the Kurdish nation, but it also meant that for 
every loyal chieftain there was likely to be rebellious one23.  
 
Kurdish tribes show up such a bewildering variety in size and forms of internal 
organisation that it may seem misleading to refer to all by the same term. They share a 
common descent, endogamy (parallel cousin marriage) and segmentary alliances. These 
principles do actually operate at the level of the smaller sub-tribes, but they are 
contradicted by the political alliances and authority relations integrating these sub-tribes 
into larger wholes. In larger tribes, one often finds leading lineages that are at best 
distantly related to the commoner lineages making up the bulk of the tribe, and their 
authority is often shored up by an armed retinue and/or by recognition by the state 
apparatus, which also implies ultimately violent sanctions 24. 
 
The tribal trend continued to be an important factor in Kurdish social life and in 
Kurdish national politics. The role of the tribal chiefs towards the central governments 
could also affect the attitude of non-tribal peasants who were regarded by the 
chieftains as assets with little status, as Buloch put it “little more status than flocks of 
sheep”25. In some cases, they were even denied the right of free movement outside 
their village unless they had permission of their tribal landlord. What is more, towns-
people had chosen to align themselves to powerful tribes in their immediate vicinity 
in order to enjoy their protection. Tribal loyalties continue to dominate Kurdish 
society, and the allegiance of the majority of the Kurds has been to their extended 
families, clans, and tribes. Harvey Morris believes that Kurdish tribal leaders have 
played key roles in galvanizing and leading the Kurdish nationalist movement, but 
tribal ties undermined a more general and all-encompassing Kurdish nationalism26. 
The tribes remained the centre of authority and nationalism never took the central 
position in the Kurdish consciousness during the decades that nationalism inspired 
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many subjects of the Ottoman Empire. As Morris put it “nationalism never became 
the centre of authority and cohesion in the early days of the Kurdish rebellions”27. The 
tribal psyche which dominated Kurdish politics played a central role in undermining 
the emergence of national cohesion and solidarity in the decaying stage of the 
Ottoman Empire and its aftermath. 
  
4.5  Reactions to the Ottoman Empire 
 
The first Kurdish reactions started in the early nineteenth century when the Ottoman 
Empire began the implementation of centralisation programme. In order to do that, the 
Constanipole asked the chiefs of the Kurdish principalities to pay their tax to the 
Sultanate based in Constanipole and contribute their troops to help the Empire which 
is already preoccupied with the wars on the European front. The Kurdish 
principalities refused the Sultanate request, and as a result major uprisings occurred in 
Kurdistan. The most significant rebellions are as follows: 
 
 
4.5.1 The Baban Uprising 1806-1809 
 
The first Kurdish revolt was launched by Abdurrahman Pash from Baban tribe against 
the Sublime  Porte. He declared war on the Sublime Port in 1806, when the  Ottomans 
appointed Emir  from a rival tribe. The Ottoman appointment of Emir from a rival 
tribe was mainly aimed at weakening the Baban family which commanded a great 
deal of respect among the Kurds. Furthermore, Baban family after having been semi-
independent over decades refused to pay taxes and allegiance to the Ottomans. 
Initially, Babans liberated a large swath of Kurdish land and built up the city of 
Sulemiania in what is now Iraqi Kurdistan28. The Baban revolt lasted for three years. 
It was finally defeated by an alliance between the Turkish and Kurdish tribes who 
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were traditional rivals of the Baban29. In the first of many attempts to achieve the 
Kurdish independence, the Kurdish rebels were betrayed by fellow Kurds.  
 
4.5.2 Mir Mohammad of Rwanduz Uprising 1826-1838 
 
The second major rebellion broke out in southern Kurdistan in 1826. Mir Mohammad 
of Rawanduz, the prince of Soran, a descendent of Salahadin led the rebellion. He 
proclaimed independence from the Sublime Porte. Mir Mohammad deployed a two-
pronged strategy: on the diplomatic front he opened diplomatic relations with Egypt 
under Mohammad Ali and Persia under the Shah, while on other hand he established 
an armament industry at Rawanduz and created an army of 10,000 cavalry and 
20,000 infantry. His aim was to unite all Kurdish tribes and in effect establishes a 
Kurdish independent Kingdom30. Kandal Nazan believes that the ideas held by Mir 
Mohammad to unify Kurdistan had been parallel to the dreams of the Germans 
nationalists in 1830s and 1840s to assemble all German states in a single nation state. 
According to him, the pan-Kurdism of the time was inspired in part by the 
developments in the Europe31.  
 
Mir Mohammad sought the support of the Kurdish neighbouring prince of Botan, 
who had his own aspirations to become King. He also sent envoys to the Kurdish 
tribes in Iran to earn their support in his war of Liberation. In 1834, He successfully 
fended off the counter-offensive by the Sultan’s forces, and the following year 
conquered Iranian Kurdistan. This alarmed the Shah and he called in the Russians to 
help contain Kurdish forces. Assuming a joint offensive by Persians and Ottomans, 
Mir Mohammad withdrew his forces to his stronghold, Rawanduz. At the same time, 
he played a diplomatic trick against the Sultan by offering to recognise Persian 
sovereignty over Kurdish provinces in Iranian Kurdistan32.  
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In July 1836, Mir Mohammad’s forces once more fended off Ottoman armies but this 
time the Sultan used his most powerful weapon, religion. The Sultan resorted to 
religious solidarity to defeat the rebels. A Fatwa33 was issued which stated that all 
those who fought the armies of the Sultan-Caliph were infidels. Mir Mohammad 
refused to bow to this blackmail. But appeal to Islam lost him support among his 
followers. This time it was religion which undermined the national cause34. Mir 
Mohammad was forced to surrender and exiled to Constantinople. The Sultan II gave 
him symbolic honours and six months later he was released. On his return to 
Kurdistan, the Sultan’s men assassinated him at Trebizond35.  
 
4.5.3  Bottan Rebellion 1828- 1855 
 
The rebellion was led by Bedir Khan, who succeeded his father in 1821 as Emir of 
Bottan. Bottan was an unruly collection of nomadic and other tribes centred on the 
Jezireh, where the modern frontiers of Turkey, Syria and Iraq meet. Bedir Khan 
showed independence from Constantinople and refused to commit Kurdish troops in 
the Russo-Turkish war in 1828. It is widely believed that Bidir Khan had some of the 
attributes of a modern, though autocratic, leader. He brought security and prosperity 
to his principality by punishing lawlessness and brigandage with extreme severity36.  
 
Like Mir Mohammad, Bedir Khan organised the tribes along regimental lines and 
struck alliances with other tribal leaders, including the powerful Hakkari tribe, the 
largest tribe bordering Iraqi and Iranian Kurdistan. When the Ottomans besieged his 
capital at Cizre in 1836, his Kurdish allies sent a mixture of forces comprising of 
Kurds, Christians, Assyrians, and Armenians to relieve him. Bedir Khan survived and 
in 1840 with the defeat of the Ottomans by the Egyptian forces under leadership of 
Ibrahim Pasha, he saw an opportunity to liberate Kurdistan as a whole. He secured 
the control of all of the Ottoman Kurdistan principally through alliances with his 
                                                 
33 Fatwa is Arabic concept, which means a religious decree. People with high religious credentials have 
authority to pass it. When Fatwa is issues, it becomes the duty of all Muslim believers to follow it. 
Given the traditional meaning of the concept, any Muslim is not obedient to Fatwa, his religious beliefs 
become suspicious.  
34  Maria T. Oshia, “Between the Map and Reality: Some Fundamental Myths of Kurdish 
Nationalism”, Peoples Medeterrence, No 68-69, July-December 1994. pp .70 
35 Ibid, p .73 
36 See David McDowell, The Modern History of The Kurds, London:I.B.Tauris, 1996: P. 34 
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fellow Kurdish princess and chieftains. Again the Ottomans used their powerful 
weapon, religion. But this time the Sublime Porte changed the tack by asking  
Christian missionaries to persuade Christians not to fight on the side of the Kurds. It 
is noteworthy to note that despite the tolerance Bedir Khan showed towards the 
Christians, there had been massacre of Christians and this contributed to the decision 
of Christians to withdraw their support from Bedir Khan37. The decisions of the 
Christians simultaneously impacted on the European powers to lose the sympathy for 
the Kurds. This constituted a milestone in weakening the Kurdish position 
diplomatically.  
 
The Kurdish-Ottoman war continued until 1847, when the Ottomans persuaded Bedir 
Khan’s nephew, Yazdan Sher, to change the sides. Yazdan was a senior commander 
in Bedir Khan’s army and was in effective control of Kurdish armed forces. His u-
turn spelled out the end of Bedir Khan’s rebellion. As a result, Bedir Khan 
surrendered and died in exile. His nephew, Yazdan, was rewarded the post of 
governorship of Hakkari region containing large federation of the Kurdish tribes. In 
the long run, Yazdan did not prove a reliable ally because in 1853, when the Sublime 
Porte again went to war with Russia, he led his own rebellion again the Ottomans. It 
was apparent that he tended to take advantage of the weak position of the Ottomans 
engaged in a fateful war with the Russians. By the end of 1855, he raised an army of 
100,000 strong men which even threatened Baghdad. This time the Kurds sought the 
aid of outside powers, the Russians and the British. The Kurds were unaware that 
neither Russians nor the British had any interest in helping the emergence of an 
independent Kurdistan on the fringes of other empires. Yazdan Sher went to 
Constanipole with the promise that the British would mediate in the negotiations with 
the Sublime Porte. But he was arrested and imprisoned as soon as he arrived38. In the 
aftermath of his imprisonment the Kurdish people became leaderless and in the 
process became directionless which resulted in the Ottoman’s effective control of 
Kurdistan.  
 
The rebellions of the first half of the nineteenth century represent the first signals of 
the stirrings of Kurdish nationalism. But based on their immediate achievements,they 
                                                 
37 Ibid, p .43 
38 Ibid, p. 53 
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were a disaster. Kurdish principalities were dismantled and put under direct control 
of the Ottoman rule. The Turkish troops pillaged the country and by means of  skilful 
diplomacy Ottomans set tribe against tribe. Kurdistan entered an era of chaos, 
poverty, and lawlessness. The relationship of equality which existed between the 
Kurds and Seljukes had been totally destroyed and in general Kurdistan reduced to 
colonial status. Given the nationalist context that spans the tribal boundaries and 
loyalty as defined by Lemberge, the rebellions had been directed by the tribal nobility 
within  Kurdish society rather than a nationalist movement with a broader nationalist 
cohesion capable of integrating tribes. The rebellions were mainly aimed at 
preserving the feudal rights of the Kurdish aristocracy against the Ottoman 
encroachment. Initially, the rationale behind these uprisings was the need for feudal 
tribal rulers to maintain their own authority. To accomplish this, the tribal lords 
needed to gain popular support without appearing to be seeking autonomous power 
or independence on an ethnic basis. It is nevertheless noteworthy to mention that the 
rebellions had a passive element of nationalist tinge which appealed to a wide 
spectrum of  Kurds who shared suffering caused by warfare and Ottoman 
occupation39 
   
4.5.4 Last Major Rebellion of Nineteenth Century and the 
Emergence of  Signals the National Awakening: 
The last rebellion took place in 1880. Sheikh40 Ubaidulla directed rebellion against 
the Shah of Persia. Kurds of Iran considered the Sheikh as their spiritual leader, and 
by agreement with the Shah they paid their taxes to the Sheikh rather than the Shah. 
The Shah reneged on the deal and dispatched his army to enforce his authority over 
the Kurds. The Sheikh appealed to the Ottomans for backing. Harvey Morris and John 
Buloch believe that unrest would have remained a purely Kurdish-Persian affair if 
there had been no outbreak of Russo-Turkish war in 1877 which prompted the 
dispatch of more Turkish troops into Kurdistan41. The Kurds turned to the Sheikh to  
                                                 
39 Ibid, p. 57 
40 Sheikh is a title for the religious figure among Kurds. In the nineteenth and to large extent in the 
twentieth century, Sheikhs played a central role in the development of Kurdish national awakening and 
it is imperative that in such traditional and  conservative societies  in the absence of national leader 
Sheikhs were figures around whom masses rallied.  
41 Gerarld Gharlinad, ed, A People without Country: Kurds and Kurdistan, London: Zed Pres, 1996s, 
pp. 13-15 
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help and the Sheikh called Britain for aid which they provided with guns and 
ammunitions .Sheikh Ubaidullah used the guns first against Persia and in effect had 
achieved some tangible success in regaining control of territory that they lost to the 
Shah of Iran in the previous wars. The conflict became broader, when the Ottomans 
were alarmed at the advance the Sheikh made against the Shah. This prompted 
Ottomans to send troops to besiege him in the west. In 1882, the Sheikh abandoned 
this uneven struggle. Despite the failure, the Sheikh was credited with  intelligence to 
see guess how the Kurds had been used as pawns by their colonial masters. His 
followers urging him to order the massacre of  Christians for their lack of support to 
the Kurdish cause, he retorted “We Kurds are only useful to the Turks as a 
counterweight to the Christians”42.  
 
The distinction and significance between the rebellion led by Sheikh Ubaidullah and 
the preceding rebellions is remarkable. All the previous Kurdish uprisings in the 
nineteenth century had no manifestation of national awakening, while in the case of 
Sheikh Ubaidullah there were emerging  signals of the national awakening that could 
have seen broad national boundaries. The letter the Sheikh sent to the British Council 
at Bashkal clearly outlined the motives of Kurdish uprising:  
 
“The Kurdish nation is a nation a part. Its religion is different from that of others, also its laws 
and customs. The Chiefs of Kurdistan, whether they be Turkish or Persian subjects, the people 
of Kurdistan, whether they Muslims or Christians, are all united and agreed that things can not 
proceed as they are with two governments. It is imperative that the European governments 
should do something, once they understand the situation. We want to take matters into our own 
hands. We can no longer put up with the oppression which the Governments of Persia and  Ottoman  
Empires impose on us”43. 
         
Sheikh Ubaidullah’s uprising was defeated. But his letter represents the first ever 
clear statement of the modern Kurdish nationalism. Buloch believes that the Kurdish 
national awakening emerged with the rebellion led by Sheikh Ubaidullah as for the 
first time national awakening was invoked by the leadership. Thus the last stage of 
decay of the Ottoman Empire (1876-1915) coupled with national awakening of other 
nationalities within the Ottoman rule corresponds to the first signal of national 
awakening of the Kurds. Although led by a religious figure, rebellion was the most 
important of all in the 19th century, for it included the Kurds under both empires 
                                                 
42 Ibid, p 54 
43 Martin Van Brunseen, “The Kurds In Turkey”, MERIP Reports, 14 Feb 1984: p .7 
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Persia and Ottomans and marked a beginning of the modern Kurdish nationalism. 
Most scholars agree that the Sheikh Ubaidulla’s rebellion had marked a break from 
the past44 as for the first time the Kurdish rebellious leader had a grasp of 
distinguishing his people from others, and for the first time, nationalism was invoked 
to bind tribes of Kurdistan, Kurdish Muslims and Christians, in a single national 
movement.  
 
           4.6 Religion in Action: The Kurdish-Ottoman Marriage of  
                                              Convenience  
 
Abdul Hamid II, who succeeded to the Sultanate, introduced numerous reforms which 
were aimed at modernising the Ottoman administration. In the preceding decades the 
Ottomans, aware of the need for centralised power had begun to concentrate power on 
the centre,  while reducing the power of the periphery which included the curtailment 
powers of the Kurdish emirs. In doing that, the Ottomans put Kurdistan under their 
direct rule. Abul Hamid now surrounded by many administrative problems proceeded 
to cultivate the Kurdish elite in order to use them against their internal and external 
enemies. When Abdul Hamid took over the Sultanate, the Empire had been in chaos 
due to the resurgence of nationalist minorities such as Armenians, Albanians, and 
Arabs in south. All those insurgent nationalists threatened the security of the empire. 
It is noteworthy to mention that Kurds loyal to the Empire were used against Kurds 
who rebelled against the Empire’s centralisation scheme as happened in the preceding 
decades. Ottomans awarded titles and honours on the successors of the old Kurdish 
elite. They even made the son of Bedir Khan, Bahir Bey, and the Sultan’s personal 
aided-de -camp. The Sultan, aware of chaos within the empire, ordered the formation 
of Kurdish cavalry modelled on Russian Cossack. The force was awarded the honour 
of bearing his name ‘ Hamidiyia'45.  
 
                                                 
44 See Paul White, “Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers? The Kurdish National Movement 
in Turkey”, London, Zed Books, 1999: p. 21 
 
45 Pranger, Robert J. "The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and  
Community in the Late Ottoman State (review)" 
Mediterranean Quarterly - Volume 13, Number 3, Summer 2002, Duke University Pres: pp. 135-138 
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Ottomans nevertheless utilised the Hamidiyia against all their rival forces, but the 
chief reason for the Hamiidiyias’ formation was to confront the Tsarist offensive 
which was the most threatening physical force nearby the Empire. The ostensible duty 
of the Hamidiye was to guard the frontier against foreign (i.e., Russian) incursions and to 
keep the Armenian population of the Empire's eastern provinces in check. For the sultan 
they represented a parallel system of control of the East, independent of the regular 
bureaucracy and army, which he did not fully trust46. The Hamidiyia proved effective 
against the Armenians whose nationalist sentiment had been incited and fuelled by the 
Russians47. The Hamidiyia generally looked like a regular army force, and but it’s 
loyalty among the Kurds was mainly based on tribal connection. The members of the 
Hamidiyia had a license from the Sublime Porte to raid other tribes disloyal to them 
and in effect widened the hostility among the Kurds. The Hamidiye enjoyed a high 
degree of legal immunity — neither the civilian administration nor even the regular 
military hierarchy had any authority over them, and no court had the competence to 
adjudicate crimes committed by members of the Hamidiye — and the regiments turned 
into virtually independent chiefdoms. Having full immunity from sublime Porte, the 
force suppressed the peasantry in exchange for absolute loyalty to the Sultanate. 
However, the force itself was under direct Ottoman command48.  
 
With the growing of Armenian nationalist sentiments, Hamidiya was more effective 
and useful. The force originally comprising of the Sunni Muslims was employed in 
crushing the Armenian revolt against the double taxation by Kurdish and Ottoman 
warlords in 1984-5. Tens of thousands of Armenians were slaughtered on direct 
orders of the Sublime Porte. It is argued that the mass slaughter was a foretaste of the 
massacre of 1915-16, in which Kurdish units played a part in the killings and mass 
deportations of Armenians49. Though Kurdish historians vehemently counter the 
claim and assert that Kurds were simultaneously part of people being massacred and 
in the process 700,000 Kurds lost their lives50. In the absence of historical records, it 
is uneasy to affirm either claim. Though, the fact that has been well-documented is 
                                                 
46 See Bruinessen 1992, Ch. 2: "Tribes, chieftains and non-tribal groups" for a more detailed survey of the 
range of forms of tribal organisation in Kurdistan 
47 Ibid,P. 140 
 
48 Ibid, p. 142 
49 G.S Gaber, “Caravans to Oblivion: The Armenian Genocide,1915”, Wiley, 1996, pp. 23-25  
50 Ibid, P. 54 
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that the Hamidyia in later engagements waged a ferocious fight against their fellow 
Kurds and Arabs on the southern fringes of the Empire51.   
 
It is believed that the Kurdish-Christian antagonism grew more intensive and coherent 
in the late nineteenth century. Armenians and Jews dominated the manufacturing and 
craft industries of Kurdistan. In the preceding decades both peoples, Armenians and 
Kurds, enjoyed a symbiotic relationship as they shared a relatively common territory 
and traditions, a side from religion. In addition to that, they had decided by the same 
international frontiers. The introduction of the cash economy to Kurdistan boosted the 
importance of the Christians as money-lenders to the tribes. This led to ill-feeling on 
the part of the money debtors. In effect, the historic relationship they enjoyed as the 
peoples with common characteristics had become tenous. The Ottomans this time 
around again employed religious impulses by appealing to the Muslim solidarity of 
the Kurds against what they called ‘unbelievers52. As a consequence, the Kurds 
looked towards the Ottoman Caliphate, while the Armenians leaned towards the 
Christian west as a model and for political support as well. Hence, this contributed to 
growing hostility between these two communities.  
 
The Kurdish Hamidyia remained useful until and even after the  emergence of the 
Young Turks, a group of Turkish Nationalists in early 1900s53. The Hamidiyia was 
officially disbanded in 1908, when the Young Turks took power in a military coup in 
1908. This suggests that the emergence of Turkish Nationalism under the name the 
Young Turks, to a great extent, reduced the significance of the Kurdish-Hamiidyai 
closely affiliated to the Sublime Porte. And in effect this led to their official 
disabandonment. The Hamidiye regiments were disbanded by the Young Turk regime 
                                                 
51 Ibid, P.165 
52 Ibid, pp .172-175 
53 The decay of the Ottoman Empire was already quite advanced in the nineteenth century. There had 
been a limited capitalist development since the beginning of the century, but industry was hardly 
established. On the one hand, the Sultans feared the growth of a working class, on the other; they relied 
on high tariff restrictions to prevent English and French industry from conquering the markets of the 
Ottoman Empire and ruining domestic craft production. The exploitation of the peasantry by the feudal 
lords and the moneylenders (not infrequently one and the same person) rose enormously. A 1858 law 
permitting private ownership of land meant they were able to acquire large land holdings and to 
strengthen their position against the Sultan. The money they squeezed out of the peasants was often 
"invested" in buying posts in the state apparatus, the army or clergy. There was practically no 
significant productive bourgeois layer opposed to the old feudal system. For this reason, the leadership 
of the first revolution in 1908 was composed of army officers, the so-called Young Turks--"Yeni 
osmanhlar, Quoted in E.H. Carr's The Bolshevik Revolution, vol. 3, Penguin, 1973, p. 296 
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that deposed Sultan Abdulhamid in 1909, but within a few years they were revived 
under another name. The revival of the Hamidya-style militia was used by the Turks 
against the allied troops in the early stage of the World War I .Kurdish tribal regiments 
took part in the World War and, along with the Ottoman Empire itself, disappeared once 
the war  over. 
 
The Young Turks were mainly a composite of the nationalist officers who had been 
upset by the Empire’s dependence on the whims of European power. They 
represented the Turkish and Muslim bourgeoisie which felt suppressed by the 
Christian merchant class and their domination over the economy through its links with 
the affluent Christian Europe. Furthermore, the mismanagement of Ottoman 
administration and incompetence and corrupt officials of the Sublime Porte 
contributed to further frustration of Young Turks54.  
 
4.7  Conclusion 
 
The modernisation and centralisation of the Ottoman Empire occurred at a time when 
it was too late to save the Empire from internal unrest and external threats. Already, 
the Empire loses its robust administrative cohesion to be able to maintain the integrity 
of empire. By the time the Empire took measures to centralise its political structure, 
the national movements made remarkable advance in rallying support behind their 
nationalist causes. Basically, lack of internal administrative cohesion and the staunch 
military defeats on the European front contributed to placing the empire in a 
vulnerable position in the face of internal disturbances.  
 
The Ottomans heavily relied on the Kurds to help retain the integrity of the Ottoman 
Empire. Kurds had major characteristics which proved useful for the Ottoman’s 
                                                 
54The main motivating factor in the ever-widening discontent, however, was an agony and concern over 
the independence of the Turkish State and how best to ensure its continuance.  Added to this, and of 
equal concern, was the problem having to do with the welfare and perpetuation of the Muslim 
populations living among the many other ethnicities within the Empire. The conspiratorial leadership, 
who came to be known as the Young Turks, expressed their dissatisfaction with the status quo, 
throwing all of the blame on the Sultan, Abdul Hamid, who they proclaimed to be too dictatorial. They 
demanded his exile -- though not the abolishment of the Sultanate -- together with the restoration of the 
constitution of 1876. For better insight about the origins of the Young Turks, see Young Turks." 
Britannica Concise Encyclopaedia from Encyclopædia Britannica Premium Service. 
http://www.britannica.com/ebc/article-9383216>. 
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survival: Their Sunni brand of Islam and their geographic position. In the course of 
nineteenth century, both characteristics were of paramount significance in terms of 
allying with the Ottoman Turks. The tribal structure of the Kurdish society, 
furthermore, undermined the emergence of a Kurdish national awakening. Aside from 
Ubaidullah’s rebellion, the preceding rebellions were led by a feudal leadership with 
little national consciousness.  This weakness played a central in the failure of Kurdish 
rebellions in the nineteenth century. Kurds were used as pawns in the strategic interest 
of major powers, and Ottomans and Persia skilfully took advantage of their positions 
in suppressing Kurdish rebellions. The tribal interests and heavy religious leanings 
towards the Ottomans undermined the emergence of an integrative national 
consciousness that could bind significant social groups within the Kurdish society.  
 
Chapter Five 
                                                 
 
The Early Stage of the First World War and  Beyond 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter will examine the status of the Kurdish nationalist movement approaching 
the first World War . In order to gain a full grasp of the events leading to the first  
World War, it is important to analyse the Ottoman-Kurdish relationship in the pre-war  
and post-war era. In addition to that, this chapter is an attempt to explain the root 
causes that produced the Sever Treaty in which a vague promise was made to create a 
nation-state for the Kurds. Furthermore, this chapter will elaborate a fundamental 
reason behind the creation of Turkish national state in 1923, and the reneging of the 
promises already made  to the Kurds in the post-war treaty at Paris 1920.  
 
                                                   
5.2 Ottoman Nationalism 
 
The doctrine of the Ottoman nationalism is composite and inclusive in the sense that it 
could encompass various ethnic and religious communities already co-existing within 
the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire, whether it be Kurds, Arabs, Armenians or 
Albanians. The doctrine meant that the mosaic would unite and create a modern state. 
Nevertheless this lofty concept seemed to have failed to gain attention at both levels 
practical and theoretical as the elements of Turkish nationalism dominated other 
ethnic groups hoping to be part of the Ottoman state in making. With further 
disintegration of the Empire, Albanian and Bulgarian nationalism became more 
assertive which later led to liberation of their countries in early stages of first World 
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War. With growing nationalist aspirations on the part of other people, the idea of 
Ottoman nationalism gave way to Turkish nationalism1.  
 
5.3   Conceptual Transition from Ottoman Doctrine of Nationalism 
To the Ethnic Turkish Nationalism 
 
With Ottoman authority increasingly waning on the periphery of the Empire, the idea 
of Ottoman nationalism seemed to have lost its attraction and appeal. In early stages 
of the first World War, national awakening of the people living within Empire became 
more coherent and surfaced as a dynamic force which refused anything less than a 
national state of their own2. Turkish nationalists came to realise that the Ottoman 
doctrine of nationalism would not hold the mosaic of the Empire together as a whole. 
This set the way for surging the Turkish nationalist doctrine- a doctrine that could 
embrace all Turkish speaking peoples from Anatolia to central Asia . Though the 
geographic location seemed to have been stumbling block in the face of the creation 
of such a Turkish empire3. The heartland of what would become the Turkish 
nationalist Empire was occupied with non-speaking Turkish peoples, Kurds and 
Armenians. Hagan believes that this idea may have prompted the Turks to join 
Germany and Austria in the First World War  against allied forces.  
 
The Kurdish nationalism at the time was an amalgamation of religious and nationalist 
elements. However, religious fervour traditionally overrode nationalist thought. 
Perhaps, this was the most effective tool in Ottoman diplomacy to galvanise Kurdish 
support against their non-Muslim rivals in Anatolia. Given the perspective of the 
Ottomans, with eradication of non-Muslims in Anatolia, they would create bi-national 
state with the Kurds. Assuming that the Kurds would lean more to religion than 
nationalism, Jihad was decreed by Ottomans against Armenians. Some Kurds 
positively responded to Jihad, while others under Ottoman domination leaned to side 
with Russia. It seems that in the early days of  first World War, Kurdish nationalism 
                                                 
1 Julie Marcus, “Islam, Kurds, and Turkish Nation State, The Australian Journal of Anthropology, Vol 
14, Sept 2003: pp. 4-7  
2. Hagan Ozuglu , ‘Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman Stat: Evolving Identities, Competing Loyalties, 
and Shifting Boundaries’, New York, State University New York Press, 2004, p. 6  
3 Ibid, p. 7 
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did still not constitute a dynamic force as religious instincts and tribal leanings 
surfaced to override other broader national consideration.  
 
                              5.4 Divided Movement 
 
Kurdish society approaching the First World War was divided, decapitated, without a 
collective plan for its future. In 1915, the Franco-British agreements known as the 
Sykes-Picot predicted the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. Unfortunately,  the 
Kurds were in conflict over the destiny of their country. 
 
Some elements in the Kurdish national movement, open to the "pan-Islamist ideology 
of the Sultan-Caliph, saw the salvation of the Kurdish people in a status of cultural 
and administrative autonomy within the framework of the Ottoman Empire. For its 
part, the traditional wing of the Kurdish movement, which was deeply rooted in 
Kurdish society and which was mainly dominated by religious leaders, tried to ‘avoid 
Christian peril in the East and West’ and to create ‘a state of Turks and Kurds’ in the 
Muslim territories liberated from foreign occupation. The idea was generous and 
fraternal. Thus, an alliance was concluded with the Turkish nationalist leader, Mustafa 
Kemal4. During the First World War, the  Pan-Islamic movement was closely linked 
to the Ottoman state or more precisely to the Sultan or Caliph. It became influential in 
Kurdistan at least for three reasons: first the European powers and their perceived 
support of the Christians in Kurdistan excited Kurdish anxieties. The Christian threat 
made Muslim solidarity appear necessary for defensive reasons. Moreover, Pan-
Islamism gave some of the Kurdish tribesmen a license to loot Christian property; 
second, it was in the interest of the Shyekes, the most influential leaders in Kurdistan, 
to strengthen the Islamic movement. They were its most fervent propagandists. 
Thirdly, the Sultan Abudllhamid II, the initiator of the movement, was perceived by 
the Kurdish chieftains as their protector against the state beaurucracy that desired to 
break their powers. The Pan-Islamic propaganda was so effective in Kurdistan that 
many Kurds including Kurds of Iran positively responded to the call for Jihad. For 
                                                 
4 Ibid, p .10  
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these reasons, one wing of Kurdish leadership did not support the idea of a Kurdish 
independent state5. 
 
The more visionary and sophisticated Kurdish leadership of the time began to realise 
that they would gain more from the defeat of the Ottoman Empire. They claimed to 
take inspiration from the principle of nationalities, from the ideas of the French 
Revolution and from Wilson’s vision, then president of the United States, and fought 
for the total independence of Kurdistan. This prompted them to actively seek the 
support of the Allies. In order to secure their support, Kamil Beg of Botton went to 
Tiflis in 1916 to persuade Grande Duke Nicholas, the Viceroy of the Caucasus and 
Russian commander of the Turkish front to aid the Kurdish cause6. Though, Beg’s 
meeting with Russians did not seem to have produced a favourable outcome for the 
Kurds. It became clear that major powers in the region especially Russians and Britain 
did not take the Kurds seriously. In a more strict sense, the major powers tended to 
pursue their strategic interests which in effect lied with Arabs in South, Persians in the 
east and Russians further north.  
5.5   Sykes-Picot Agreement: 1916 
 
Assuming an overall collapse of the Ottoman Empire under the Allies’ military and 
diplomatic pressure, Russians, British and French had begun secret meetings in the 
second year of the war. Their high-profiled secret diplomatic meetings were aimed at 
dividing the spoils of the Ottoman Empire as soon as the war was over. Sir Mark 
Sykes, the senior British representative, and Georges Picot, a seasoned French 
diplomat, were the principal protagonists of the idea of the division of the Ottoman 
territory. Following months of deliberations, they had a meeting at Petrograd with 
Russians to secure Russia’s support for their plan. Their meeting with Russians 
produced an accord under terms of which Armenia and most of the Ottoman Empire 
were to become a sphere of Russian influence. Agreement was later expanded to 
include Italy which would get Aegean Islands and a sphere of influence around Izmir 
in Southwest Anatolia.  The Ottoman villayat (province) of Musel in modern Iraqi 
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Kurdistan was assigned to France, while Arab territories of the Empire were divided 
between France and Britain7.  See map 2. .  
 
Subsequent events that had occurred following the Sykes-Picot accord tipped the 
balance of power in British favour. Albeny’s forces took Damascus and Jerusalem 
and on the Mesopotamian front, the British forces defeated the Turks and captured 
Mussel, the stronghold of the Ottomans in southern Kurdistan. The following year, 
the Bolshevik revolution succeeded and Russian under the Bolshevik leadership 
became pro-occupied with domestic ills and in effect abandoned the grand imperial 
greediness. Nonetheless, it is widely believed that Russians, being in a weak position, 
had been denied to have influence in the Ottoman Empire which incited Lenin to 
release a copy of confidential Sykes-Picot agreement and other treaties causing 
embarrassment among allies and growing distrust among Arabs. Speaking broadly, 
these events placed Britain in a much more favourable position. Thus, the British 
which had almost no role in Kurdistan under the terms of Sykes-Picot accord emerged 
as the most powerful broker once the war was over8.  
 
5.6    The Aftermath of Sykes-Picot Treaty 
 
By the end of 1917 and early 1918, the Ottoman empire was in ruin and the allied 
forces occupied most of the Anatolia. The Indian Army Expeditionary was tasked to 
pacify southern Kurdistan. It is noteworthy to observe that when the British forces 
entered Mussel, the townspeople welcomed  the arrival of the British, though the 
tribes in the city’s outskirts were hostile to foreign troops as they assumed their 
personal or tribal interests would be in jeopardy. This prompted tribesmen to ambush 
British troops which had resulted in killing a number of British troops in the spring of 
1918. This violent encounter placed Kurdish-British relationship on an uneasy 
footing. The British responded by occupying tribal areas and forcing the rebels into 
the mountains9.  
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The Kurdish nationalist movement which had emerged from the First World War was 
divided on the issue whether they place their trust in the allies or in Ottomans. In 
other word, the Kurdish nationalist movement would not constitute a dynamic force 
with a single national mission10. Rather their ranks and files were critically depleted. 
On one hand, they assumed that Kurds and Turks would form a bi-national state on 
the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, while on other hand they had a high stake to be part 
of the allies’ platform which physically dominated Anatolia and most of the Southern 
Kurdistan11. Once the war was over, the Kurdish organisations based in the 
Constantinople and in exile approached the British and French. A part of the Kurdish 
leadership sought the Allies support for an outright independence of Kurdistan. Two 
of three organisations involved in talks with the allies were dominated by members of 
Bedir Khan family while the third called ‘ Istikhlas i Kurdistan’ or Kurdish Liberation 
was led by Shekh Abul Qader, son of Shekh Ubaidullah, was honoured by the Sultan 
,and as a consequence he was vehemently opposing to the concept of a Kurdish 
National state12. 
 
The Kurds were also in contact with the King-Craine US Commission- a Commission 
US dispatched to assess the post-war situation in the Ottoman Empire. The King-
Crane Commission reported that a Kurdish national state that covers a quarter of 
Kurdistan should be established, as well as an Armenian state in that area which was 
to have gone to Tsarist Russia13. The Commissioner further recommended that three 
states, Kurdish, Turkish, and Armenian, should be created in Anatolia and be placed 
under US mandate. The King-Crane’s recommendations echoed US concern and 
interest in the region, and their concern about the future of that region has further been 
asserted in Woodrow Wilson’s fourteen point’s declaration to a joint session of 
Congress on Jan 8, 1918 in which he clearly presented his vision:  
                  “ The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured  a  
                      secure sovereignty, but other nationalities which are under Turkish rule should be 
                     an undoubted security of life and an absolute unmolested opportunity of autonom- 
                     ous development”14.  
 
                                                 
10 Ibid, p. 42  
11 David Mc Dowel, A Modern History of Kurds, London, I.B.Tauris, 1996: p. 13 
12 Ibid, p. 21 
13 Ibid, p. 23  
14 www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1918wilson.html 
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                                                 Map 2. Shows Skyes- Picot Plan15.  
 
 
                                                 
15 www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ pathways/firstworldwar/maps/maps 
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Despite Wilson’s aspirations for creating a new international order, US interest in 
Kurdistan was not more high minded than that of French and the British. Meanwhile, 
all those three states were aware of the oil potential of Mussel Villayat and each was 
curious not to let oil resources fall into the hands of others16. The Turks, albeit 
defeated, had not been idle either. In order to counter the Allied’ plans to dismember 
the Empire; they promised the Kurds autonomy- a promise Abul Qader Organisation 
actively supported17. The idea of autonomy by Ottomans further divided the Kurdish 
national movement and in effect diminished prospects of formulating a unified 
national strategy on the part of the Kurdish leadership.  
 
In May 1919, the British committed an error of judgment by persuading the Sultan to 
send a representative to Kurdistan to counter the activities of the Bolshevik 
organisations in the region. The man chosen was an Ottoman hero Mustafa Kamal, 
who was later to be nicknamed Attaturk Mustafa Kamal seized the opportunity to 
launch his war of liberation by appealing Muslim solidarity to the cause of the 
Sultan-Caliph, who was imprisoned at Constantinople by the infidel allies18. He 
persuaded  the Kurds that the Armenians were about to annex Kurdish lands for their 
own state. On the other hand, he skilfully capitalised on the division of the Kurdish 
national movement and in effect was able to get Kurdish support on his side, which 
was a significant factor in tipping the military balance of power in Turkish favour in 
Anatolia. Hence, Turkish war of independence that led to radical secularisation of 
Turkey and cultural and linguistic repression of Kurds was waged in Kurdistan under 
the banner of Islam.  
 
     5.7 Kurds   from Paris Conference to Treaty of Sever (1919-1920) 
 
The preliminaries of the Paris Conference began in Jan 1919 and it was Britain which 
held the most powerful cards. The British forces were in a possession of the disputed 
lands and British diplomats had tried to establish contacts with the Kurds. Sir Percy 
                                                 
16 William Stivers, Supremacy and Oil: Iraq, Turkey, and the Anglo-American 
World Order, 1918–1930 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982, Also see Helmerich Paul.C, From 
Paris to Severs: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920, 
Colombus, State Ohio University, 1974: pp .35-52 
 
17 David Mc Dowel, A Modern History of Kurds, London, I.B.Tauris, 1996: p. 91 
18 Ibid, p. 96 
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Cox, the architect of the modern Iraq, had been to Merssalies the previous year (1918) 
to discuss the future of the region with the man, who was to be the Kurdish 
representative at Paris, General Sharif Pasha19. In Paris, Sharif Pasha, a former 
ambassador of the Sublime Porte, had been chosen by pro-independence wing of the 
Kurdish nationalist movement to put the Kurdish case. He faced a complicated 
situation as he found himself representing a deeply divided movement across a 
mixture of tribal-religious-nationalist lines, and also he himself had little influence 
among the Kurdish inhabitants of Kurdistan. Lack of a cohesively unified movement 
under sophisticated leadership gravely placed Pasha in a complicated negotiating 
position. The negotiating brief was further complicated by the fact that he had no real 
mandate from the Kurdish nation.  
 
What also contributed to the complexity of the issues at Paris was that the British and 
French made it clear from the outset that they were not willing to surrender those 
parts of Kurdistan which had been under the French and Britain mandates in Syria 
and Iraq. Thus, an independent Kurdish nation-state, if such entity were to be created, 
would have to be in what was still the territory under the Ottoman Empire20. Despite 
these limitations, the Paris conference produced a formula that included provisions 
for a Kurdish national state, albeit in vague language. Historians believe that the 
inclusion of the provisions in relations to the Kurds was mainly related to the 
decaying weakness of the Sultanate.  
 
One year after Paris conference, on August 10, 1920, the victorious allies, Turkey, 
and former subject nations of the Ottoman Empire attended a conference at Sever. 
The conference was aimed at signing the Treaty of Peace between allied and 
Associated Powers and Turkey in Sevres (France). The treaty officially put an end to 
the Ottoman Empire and in effect abolished Turkish sovereignty.  The Kurds had 
observer status in that part of talks involving Kurdistan and Armenia. Under the 
article 62 of the Treaty, a commission appointed by France, Britain and Italy was to 
oversee the introduction of the autonomy in an area bound in the west by the 
Euphrates, in the north by a future Armenian state, and in the south by Turkey, Syria 
                                                 
19 Ergil, Dogu "The Kurdish Question in Turkey”,Journal of Democracy - Volume 11, Number 3, July 
2000, p. 120 
20 Ibid p 123 
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and Mesopotamia21.Turkey agreed to British and French protectorate over 
Mesopotamia (Iraq) and Syria (Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan and Palestine), 
recognized the independence of Hejaz, Asir and Yemen, granted autonomy to 
Kurdistan (the province of Diyarbekir and southern part of Van province), ceded 
Smyrna (now Izmir) and Eastern Trace to Greece and Western Armenia (the 
provinces of Bitlis, Erzerum and northern part of Van province) to the Armenian 
Republic. Additionally, eastern half of the Trebizond province was to be partitioned 
between Armenia and Georgia thus providing the Armenian Republic full access to 
the sea. The Zone of the Straits formally remained Turkish but was to be neutralized 
and internationalized. Article 64 which is strictly related to final status of Kurdistan 
states: 
              
               “If, after one year has elapsed since the implementation of the present treaty, the  
                    kurdish population of the areas designed in Article 62 calls on the council of the 
                    league of Nations and demonstrates that a majority of the population in these  
                     areas wishes to become independent of Turkey, and if the council then estimates 
                     that the population in question is capable of such independence and recommends 
                     that it be granted, then Turkey agrees, as of now, to comply with this recommend- 
                    ation and to renounce all rights and titles to the area. The Details of this renunciation 
                    will be the subject of a special convention between Turkey and the main allied powers.  
                     If and when the said renunciation is made, no objection shall be raised by the main  
                     Allied powers should the Kurds living in that part of Kurdistan at present included  
                     in the Villyat of Musel seeks to become citizens of the newly independent Kurdish 
                     State”22          
 
 The state that the treaty of Sever envisaged for the Kurds amounts to little more than     
a mountainous rump of Kurdistan. Naturally, the Kurds under the Shah of Persia were 
excluded as well as those who lived under the French mandate in Syria. In addition to 
that, much of the northern Kurdistan was assigned to what was to become future 
Armenian state (See Map.3). Furthermore, creation of an independent state was 
hedged around with qualifications. Eventually, it depended on the judgment of outside 
powers and to the Kurdish desire and capacity for independence. Meanwhile, the 
treaty excluded the Kurds of Musel villiyat under the British mandate until such time 
as Turkish Kurdistan had gained its independence. Even if such a state were to be 
                                                 
21 Ibid, p 125 
22 Ibid, 132  
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created, it’s viability in geographical and demographic terms would be called into 
question since the largest portion of Kurdistan, where Kurds had massively inhabited 
was not included in such a state. See map 4  
 
 
 
The above map shows Portion of Kurdistan in Turkey23  
 Effective Turkish control Oct. 1918 - Sept. 1920 
 Olti district of Georgia local musl. control Oct. 1918 - Sept. 1920 
 Assigned to Armenia and Georgia by the treaty of sevres, Aug 10, 1920 
                                            
 
                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 www.photius.com/countries/syria/glossary 
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Turkey According to Treaty of Sevres: 10.08.1920 
 
 
 
                                   
 
Map. 4 Shows the boundaries of Kurdish Autonomy drawn in the Treaty of Sever24  
 
 
 
 
5.8 The Turkish Nationalist Backlash: 1919-1923 
 
The Sultan was kept in the custody of the Allies to ensure the cooperation of the Ottoman 
administration, which had effective jurisdiction in Istanbul and part of northern Anatolia, while 
they disposed the rest of the empire. Meanwhile, the Turkish nationalist’s movement was 
organised under the leadership of Attaturk. Nationalists employed every tool at their disposal 
to resist the dismemberment of the Turkish-speaking part of the empire. Assuming the 
vigorous opposition from Attaturk and other nationalists under his influence, the allies kept 
him away by dispatching him to eastern Anatolia. It turned out to benefit Attaturk, being away 
from Istanbul. Upon his arrival at Samsun in May 1919, he proceeded to rally support around 
                                                 
24 www.answers.com/topic/treaty-of-s-vres, p, 2  
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nationalist cause and to recruit25. In order to secure Kurdish support, Attaturk played again the 
so-often repeated religious card on Kurds, assuming that the Sultan-Caliph was in the custody 
of infidels, and his second powerful card was that much of the northern Kurdistan were to be 
annexed to what was to be an Armenian state. In effect, these two-tracked messages got across 
well and gained immense support for Turkish nationalists against allied forces. Within span of 
short time, Kurdistan had become a strong centre for Turkish nationalists to wage their 
campaign against foreign troops26. The Guerrilla warfare grew to full-fledged campaign against 
the Greek army that threatened to involve allied forces. 
 
In July 1919, nationalists held a conference at Erzurum with Attaturk presiding to endorse a 
protocol calling for an independent Turkish state. In September of the same year, they again 
met at Sivas and pledged to maintain the integrity of Turkish nation. Although the delegates 
voiced their loyalty to the Sultan-Caliph, they pledged to maintain the integrity of the Turkish 
nation. The congress adopted the National Pact27, which defined objectives of the nationalist 
movement that were not open to compromise. Among its provisions were the renunciation of 
claims to the Arab provinces, the principle of the absolute integrity of all remaining Ottoman 
territory inhabited by a Turkish Muslim majority, a guarantee of minority rights, the retention 
of Istanbul and the straits, and rejection of any restriction on the political, judicial, and 
financial rights of the nation28. The Ottoman parliament which met in Jan 1920 approved the 
National Pact, albeit Nationalist-Ottoman relations were problematic.  
 
 
In reaction to these developments, Allied forces seized public buildings and arrested and 
deported numerous nationalist leaders, and had a parliament dismissed. Allied actions brought 
a quick response from the nationalists. In April 1921 they convened the Grand National 
Assembly in Ankara, in defiance of the Ottoman regime, and elected Atatürk its president. The 
Law of Fundamental Organization (also known as the Organic Law) was adopted in January 
1921. With this legislation, the nationalists proclaimed that sovereignty belonged to the nation 
                                                 
25 Kinross, Patrick Balfour, Baron,  Attaruk : a Biography  of Mustafa Kemal Attaturk, Father of 
Modern Turkey, New York, Morow, 1995: pp 12 
26 Sonyel, Salahi Ramsdan, Turkish Diplomacy 1918-1923: Mustafa Kemal and the National 
Movement, London, Sage Publication ltd, 1995: p 45 
27 Ibid, p 54 
28 Ibid, p 86 
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and was exercised on its behalf by the Grand National Assembly29. These developments, in 
essence, marked the start of re-visiting Allied strategy. 
 
The Nationalist and Allies had a deep-seated hatred of each other. Speaking broadly, Turkish 
nationalists grew vigorously hostile to Allies when in the summer and fall of 1919, with the 
authorisation from the Supreme Allied War Council, the Greeks occupied Ardianpole, Bursa, 
and Izmir. The Greeks had soon moved as far as Usak, 175 kilometres inland from Izmir30. In 
the early stages of war, the military action between Greeks and Turks was inconclusive, but the 
nationalist cause was strengthened next year by a series of victories on the part of Turkish 
nationalists. In Jan and April 1921, Ismet Pasha defeated the Greek army, and in effect blocked 
the advance of the Greeks into the interior of Anatolia. In July of the same year, in the face of a 
third offensive, the Turkish nationalists decisively defeated the Greeks in a twenty day battle31.  
 
An improvement in Turkey’s diplomatic front accompanied staunch military success. 
Impressed by the viability of the Nationalist forces, both French and Italy withdrew from 
Anatolia by October 1921. The same year the Soviet Union, the first European power, signed a 
treaty with the nationalists in which they established the boundaries between the two countries 
and recognised them. The war that broke out in 1919 between the newly proclaimed Armenian 
Republic had been concluded in the summer of 1921 with nationalists breaking the Armenian 
resistance, as a result Turks had occupied the Kars region. In 1922, the nationalists recognised 
the Soviet annexation of what remained of the Armenian state, and in the process the Armenian 
minority living in Turkey went back to Armenia32. As things progressed, the whole diplomatic 
and political equation had been shifted in Turkish favour.  
 
Given the military front, the final drive began in August 1922, when Turks moved into Izmir 
and captured the city. Furthermore, the nationalist forces then concentrated on driving Greek 
forces out of eastern Thrace, though that campaign threatened to place Turks in direct 
confrontations with Allied forces defending access to the straits of Bosphorous and 
Dardanelles and in Constanipole, where they protected the Ottoman government. Avoiding 
engaging in military confrontation with nationalists, French troops withdrew from their 
                                                 
29 Ibid, p 96 
30 Smith. M. Llewellyn, Ionian Vision : Greece in Asia Minor, 1919-1922, London, Allen Lane, 1983:  
p 21  
31 Ibid, p 23 
32 Ibid, p 32 
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position, while British troops seemed prepared to hold their ground against the advancing 
nationalist forces. A crisis was averted when Attaturk accepted a British-sponsored truce that 
in effect brought an end to the fighting between Turks and Greeks. The Truce itself clearly 
implied that the Allies were unwilling to fight on the side of the Greece33. The tangible 
progress the Nationalists made against Greeks, who occupied the most strategic spots and 
unwillingness of the Allies to face the Turkish forces concluded the Armistice of Mudyayan on 
October 1922. According to the Armistice, Greeks withdrew beyond the Marista River (See 
Map 4) and the Armistice accepted a continued Allied presence on the straits and in Istanbul 
until a comprehensive settlement could be reached34. The developments that occurred within 
the span of the three years, had transformed the whole political deals the Allies previously 
imposed on the  defeated Ottomans at Sever treaty in 1920.  
 
        
      5.9 Revisiting the Treaty of Sever: The Physical Division of Kurdistan  
 
The treaty of Sever imposed on the defeated Ottomans virtually destroyed the viability of the 
Turkey as a national state. The treaty was not recognised by nationalists who rallied around 
their charismatic leader Kemal Mustafa Pasha, later to be known as Attaturk. As late as 1923, 
the nationalists achieved the two staunching victories: the overthrow of the Sultan and physical 
eviction of Greeks from a number of strategic spots they occupied in the heartland of Turkish-
speaking Anatolia in the previous years. Given the scope of the success that nationalists made 
in the previous three years, the nationalists were clearly in a position to request a new treaty. 
Turkey was the only power defeated in  first World War  to negotiate with the Allies as an 
equal and to influence the provisions of the peace treaty. Ismat Pasha was the chief Turkish 
negotiator at the Lusan Conference that opened in November 1922. The National Pact of 1919 
was the basis of the Turkish negotiating position, and its provisions were recognized in the 
treaty concluded by Turkey in July 1923 with the Allied powers. It is worthwhile to mention 
that the United States participated in the conference but, because it had never been at war with 
Turkey, it did not sign the treaty35.  
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The Treaty of Lusan recognised Turkish soverngity over all its territory with two 
exceptions: the Musel villayat and Hatay province which included the port of 
Alexendretta. Foreign zones of influence and capitulations were abolished outside the 
zone of straits. No limitation was imposed on the Turkish military establishment. In 
return, Turkey renounced all claims on former Turkish territories outside its new 
boundaries. The treaty of Lusan did not mention the Kurds and spoke only of the right 
of non-Muslims, a category which naturally excluded most Kurds identifying 
themselves with Islam36 (See Map. 4).As a save-facing measure for the European 
powers to show that they had not abandoned the Wilson’s principles on the right of 
self-determination for ethnic nationalities, certain guarantees were included in articles 
37/44 of the treaty. Nevertheless none of the minorities handed over to Turkey were 
mentioned by name in the treaty37. Article 39 guarantees the language rights for all 
ethnic groups and states: 
“No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any language  in private intercourse, in 
commerce, religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind or at public meetings, notwithstanding the 
existence of the official language, adequate facilities shall be given to the non-Turkish speech for the oral use of 
their own language before the court”.38 
To prevent any future state laws in Turkey to infringe upon these guarantees, article 
37 of the Lusan treaty states: 
 “Turkey undertakes that the stipulations contained in Articles 38 to 44 shall be recognized as fundamental laws, 
and that no law, no regulations, nor official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any 
law, regulation, nor officials action prevail over them”39 
 
As an international mechanism of the checks and balance on enforcement of these 
provisions and others of the treaty, article 44 states: 
    
  “Turkey agrees that any member of the council of the League of Nations shall have right to bring to the attention 
of the council any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these obligations, and that the council may thereupon 
take such action and give such direction   as it may deem proper and effective in circumstance”40 
          
 
 On October 29, 1923, the Grand National Assembly proclaimed the Republic of 
Turkey. Attaturk was named as its president, Ankara as its capital, and the modern 
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state of Turkey was born. Thus, the birth of the Turkish national state recognised in 
the treaty of Lusan set the stage to divide Kurdistan among the newly created nation 
states in the region: Turkey, Iraq and Syria. Realising the inclination of the Allies not 
to press for enforcement of the article 38 and 39 which clearly call for respecting the 
rights of the minorities, on March 3, 1924 less than six months after creation of the 
Republic, a Turkish decree banned all Kurdish schools, organisations, publications, 
along with religious fraternities and seminaries41.see map 5 
   
   
                               Map 5. Shows the division of Kurdistan at Lusan, July 192342 
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The exclusion of the Kurds and the newly created Turkish state’s renouncement of 
claim over territories of the former Ottoman Empire at Lusan left open the future of 
Mussel Villayat and the question of who would control its vast oil revenues. Three 
years earlier at Sever, Britain had been appointed to exercise a League of Nations 
mandate over newly-created Iraq and Musel, but at the time of signing the treaty of 
Lusan, Turkey had yet to abandon its own claim to Musel. Britain galvanised allies 
support for its claim by sharing twenty five percent of the future oil revenues to 
French and twenty percent stake in the British-owned Turkish petroleum to the United 
States after US had complained about the colonial carve-up of the region43. Lord 
Curzon, the British principal negotiator and Ismet Pasha44 at Lusan expressed their 
concern for the Kurds of Mussel and used this to justify their claims to the territory45. 
But Britain, which was acting nominally on behalf of the newly-created state of Iraq, 
already pledged of the Sharif of Mecca Ottoman provinces of Mesopotamia in return 
for the Arab cooperation in bringing down the Ottoman Empire. Hence, Britain 
prevailed in de-attaching Mussel from the Turkish state and annexed it to the state of 
Iraq along with provinces of Baghdad and Basra. 
 
5.10 Conclusion: The Evolution of Turkish and Allied Strategic 
Interests 
 
What is clear is the Kurdish national movement approaching the first World War was 
not cohesive for mainly two reasons: the division between religious and secular 
elements within the movement, and the lack of effective communication between the 
movement and the Kurdish masses. Thus, the movement was too fragile and depleted 
to come up with any well-presented project. The Turkish Ottomans in pre-world War 
stage and during the throughout years of the war used this weakness in their favour. 
When the Kurds came to realise that the Ottomans would be defeated at the hands of 
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the Allied powers, it was too late to change sides. Besides that, the movement could 
not attract necessary support among the Kurdish tribes of Anatolia which set their 
tribal interests above any thing else46. Nonetheless, the defeat of the Ottomans in 1918 
and the signing the treaty of Sever in 1920 provided a turning point for the Kurds. 
From Kurdish perspective, the treaty of Sever, albeit being vague in terms of a 
promise for the creation of a Kurdish national state, was equivalent to the Balfoure 
declaration promising a national home for Jews. In the first place, the victorious allies 
had militarily occupied large swaths of the Empire with the purpose of disintegrating 
it. The Treaty of Sever not only promised Armenians statehood out of the territories 
carved from the Ottoman empire but also envisaged interim autonomy for the 
predominantly Kurdish areas of Turkey with a view to full independence if the 
inhabitants of the area wanted this47. That, however, never materialised because the 
Turkish national movement under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal known as Attaturk 
revolted against the Sultan and the occupying powers. In the process of the rebellion, 
Attatruk was successful in gaining Kurdish support in his quest. In the beginning of 
the war of independence, Attaturk skilfully invoked the concept of equality between 
the Turks and Kurds as the two Muslim brothers with an equal status in the state he 
would envisage. In his first speech to the newly gathered Parliament in 1920, Attatuk 
argued that the Parliament was not composed of the representatives of Turks, Kurds, 
Circassians and the Laz, but rather the representative of a strongly unified Islamic 
community. According to some accounts of his speeches and conversations with 
journalists, Attaturk even envisaged, that where the Kurds form majority, they would 
govern themselves autonomously48. It is apparent that Kurdistan for Attatuk and his 
rebellions nationalists facing the shortage of manpower and material could not afford 
to alienate the Kurds. For Attaturk like his Ottoman predecessors, Kurdistan 
represented a source of manpower. From the Kurdish perspective, the Kurds 
supported Attaturk understanding that a common Muslim cause would exist against 
the Western interventions, and that a future common multi-ethnic state would emerge. 
This view was shared more by religious elements in Kurdistan. The more secular and 
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sophisticated  section did not subscribe to the view assuming that all Attaturk’s 
rhetoric in respect of a bi-national state and the equality between Kurds and Turks as 
the two Muslim brothers was simply tactical with no substance. For this reason, they 
started rebelling against the Turkish nationalists in 1920 in Kocgiri, but Attaturk with 
help of Kurdish tribes at the behest of the religious figures proved superior, as a result 
crushed their revolt. Within the span of three years between 1920 and 1923, the whole 
political, military and diplomatic balanced clearly shifted in Attaturk’s favour. The 
Treaty of Sever (Agust 1920) in which a vague promise was made to the Kurds had 
now been replaced by the treaty of Lusan (April 1923) which basically recognised the 
Turkish national state49. The irony is that major powers heavily pre-occupied with 
their geo-strategic interests turned to follow pragmatic course. In other word, their 
strategic expediency took precedence over their moral and idealistic principles.  
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Chapter Six 
IRAQ 
 
            6.1 Introduction 
The historical plight of the Kurds living in Iraq provides a constant reminder of the 
artificial nature of the Iraqi state, and the most emotive indicator of the structural 
problems that have haunted Iraq since its formation. Liam Anderson and Garth 
Stansfield in their most recently published book believe that since the formation of 
Iraqi state, Kurds can be seen in two ways: victim both to the central government and 
neighbouring powers, and second almost opposing position is to see Kurds as proxy 
forces for states opposed to the Iraqi government. In both cases, it has been a fact 
within the last century that Kurds have been marginalised geographically and 
politically within the Iraqi state that has resulted in them being victim and 
provocateur1. As explained in Chapter five, the province of Musel remained a topic of 
dispute between the Allied powers and the Turkish government during the heated 
discussions at Sever 1920 and even 1923 at Lusan. For most part, Britain and its allies 
had no willingness to cede the control of the province to the state of Turkey while 
Turkey staked claim on the province. Apparently, Turks understood the fact that if 
they do not make claim over Musel, they might be drawn into some bargaining 
regarding the Kurds in Anatolia.  
 
In the light of the significance of the large population of the Kurds in Iraq (almost 25 
percent), this chapter will examine the formation of Iraq and the status of Kurds in the 
new state of Iraq. Furthermore, this chapter will analyse the reaction of the Kurds to 
the newly-created state of Iraq. In the context of the disturbing history of Iraq in the 
1920s, the status of the Kurdish national movement will also be analysed. 
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6.2 The Creation of Iraq and its Flawed National Identity 
When modern Iraq was put together from three disparate Ottoman provinces, it lacked 
a common religion, language, or ethnicity (see ethno-religious map 1 of Iraq on next 
page). Both the religious split between Sunnis and Shiites2 and the ethnic split 
between Arabs and Kurds had undermined a sense of shared Iraqi identity. Every Iraqi 
government had attempted with varying attempts to create a nation from the diverse 
elements within its boundaries. To that end, the regimes experimented with methods 
ranging from pluralism and assimilation to oppression and annihilation. It also 
periodically embarked on explicit campaigns to create a culture that would be both 
uniquely Iraqi and common to Kurds, Shiite Arabs, and Sunni Arabs. In the 1920s, 
British colonial office and new rulers of Iraq had tried to combine elements of Iraq’s 
Mesopotamian elements such as Arab, Kurd, Islamic and tribal heritages. However, 
no single formula had been capable of rallying all parts of the population. To the 
contrary, such fluctuating and contradictory policies further undermined the creation 
of a clear Iraqi national identity3. 
Despite these efforts, sectarianism, tribalism, and other forms of local communal 
solidarity have persisted in Iraq. Moreover, Iraq's circumstances in the 1920s and 
even onwards had forced Iraqis to revert increasingly to "pre-state" networks of 
religious sect or tribe or ethnicity. The regime's repression as well as the growing 
economic deprivation of both the Shiites and Kurdish regions has fed a sense of  
                                                 
 
2 Shi'a Muslims conclude that Ali was appointed by Muhammad to be his successor and the subsequent 
leader of the Muslims. In effect, Shi'a Muslims believe that to follow the true Sunnah of Muhammad it 
is obligatory to support the successorship of Ali. Sunni Muslims, on the other hand, believe that 
Muhammad did not choose a successor before his death. Upon Muhammad's passing, two of his 
companions Umar and Abu Bakr had a meeting in saqifah wherein they decided on the successor's 
identity as being that of Abu Bakr, whom they then introduced to the rest of the Muslim community as 
the first caliph. This claim to the successorship was disputed by Ali himself, the Banu Hashim of whom 
he was head, as well as many other supporters. However, Sunni Muslims stand by Abu Bakr's caliphate 
and are of the opinion that he held his office legitimately. This difference between following the Ahlul 
Bayt (Muhammad's household/family) and Sahaba (Muhammad's companions) has shaped both parties' 
views on some of the Quranic text, the hadith, personalities in Islamic history, and more. Hadith 
accepted as authentic by Shi'a have a high proportion of narrators from the Ahl al-Bayt, while hadith 
accepted as authentic by Sunnis do not 
3 The Truth About Kurds in Iraq (London: The Iraqi Press Office in London, July 1989 
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Shiites and Kurdish identity. As a result, the contemporary Iraq has reinforced  
tribalism, factionalism and sectarianism4. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
 
 
Map 6 shows Iraqis Ethnic Divisions 5 
The Shittes and Kurds in both the north and the south were brutally repressed by the 
Sunni-Arab ethnic-centric governments, and as a result they constituted the most 
serious challenge to the cohesion of the Iraqi state and the identity of Iraqi citizenship. 
Significant distrust continued to exist between the Shiites and the Kurdish community 
and the government. However, because of the absence of a clear and common goal for 
the community and the virtual disappearance of their religious and secular leadership 
with a democratic spirit, the Shiites and Kurds seriously challenged the Iraqi state and 
                                                 
4 Edmund Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question in Iraq (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1981).pp 20-
23  
5 www.firstworldwar.com/battles/mf 
  
86
to an extent expressed a desire for self-government6. The tremendous tension that 
existed between the Shiites and Kurds and the Sunni-dominated government was 
because of  lack of Shiite desire to separate the state from religion or merge with 
secularism .This was one of the factors that the Shiites would not agree with the 
Sunnis and the core of the Shiite leadership was comprised of the clerics and other 
spiritual figures who pushed for introduction of the Sharia into the state institutions. 
The Shiite in large part wanted to emulate their brothern clerics who challenged Raza 
Shah’s project of nation building in Iran after world war one7. The Shiite challenge to 
the state appeared when in 1920: a tribal revolt began against the British in the south 
of Iraq, incited largely by the Shiite clerics. Many of the Shiites clerics were Persian 
and felt threatened by British policies that endangered their influence among the local 
population and resented the occupation of Iraq by Christian infidels. The revolt was 
put down by the British, who saw the ability of the Shiite clerics to incite a far-
reaching rebellion as a danger both to them and to the young Iraqi state. 
In respect of the Kurds, at various times in the modern history of Iraq the Kurds had 
raised demands ranging from independence to federal union with Iraq to the liberation 
and unification of "Greater Kurdistan." Most Kurds advocate the idea of 
independence from Iraq but also support wide-range of autonomy in a federated Iraq 
as a middle ground.  
Each of the three main groups that make up Iraq's population-Sunni Arabs, Shiite 
Arabs, and Kurds-was torn between two affiliations:  as Iraqi and as a member of an 
ethnic or sectarian group. Because the Iraqi state is a relatively recent creation, the 
Iraqi identity is the least rooted. The ethnic and religious affiliations had deeper roots, 
greater historical weight, and a trans-national character in the days of Ottoman 
Empire. Historically, Arab identity has been based primarily on language and a 
collective memory of their place and role in history. Kurds, despite speaking different 
dialects, are bound together by their lack of a state and their history of experiencing 
repression by the Ottoman Sultanate and other nation states. This history of repression 
had rendered the Kurds sceptic towards the new creators and rulers of Iraq. These 
ethnic and religious ties had, to a large degree, impeded the emergence of an Iraqi 
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nationalism, created dilemmas of self-identification, and made relations among the 
three basic groups problematic8. 
The Sunni Arabs, as the ruling elite, had tried to balance and reconcile ‘Iraqiness’ and 
a broader pan-Arabism. By its very nature, however, a pan-Arab ideology precluded a 
separate Shiites identity and by definition excluded the Kurds. These efforts were 
accompanied by a divide and rule strategy, discouraging contacts between the Shiites 
and the Kurds. On other hand, the geographic location of the Sunnis in the centre of 
the country facilitated this approach. In addition to benefiting from the current 
political hierarchy in Iraq, Sunni Arabs tend to support the regime if only because it 
represents a bulwark against possible Shiite or Kurdish power.  
The establishment of modern Iraq posed a major dilemma for the Shiites, a significant 
majority in Iraq and sharpened the problem of their identity. Unlike the Kurds, who 
constitute a distinct ethnic group, the Shiites are Arab9. In coping with their identity 
crisis, the Shiites explicitly stressed their Arab culture as compared with their Iranian 
co-religionists. For the most part, Shiites had made attempts to accommodate their 
religious identity to the framework of the Iraqi state. Although Shiites resent the 
Sunni minority's repeated questioning of their loyalty and Arab bona fides, the Shiite 
community has never unified behind a Shiite cause. The Shiite political groupings that 
did occasionally emerge lacked a strong, leading personality, unified leadership, and a 
well-developed organization. In early days of modern Iraqi history in 1920s, there had 
been only one serious initiative by the Shiites aimed at effecting political change: the 
‘Great Iraqi Revolution’ of 1920 and the intifada as mentioned above. This attempt 
failed because of lack of a cohesive leadership and broad support from external 
powers10.  
The Kurds had consistently emphasized their separateness as an ethnic group, 
insisting, for example, on using the term ‘Kurdistan’, a distinct territory populated by 
a people with their own distinct characteristics from that of Arabs in the centre and 
south. Throughout 1920s, Kurdish nationalism had been in open conflict with Iraqi 
Arab nationalism disseminated from Baghdad. Overall, the collective memory that 
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Iraq had been made up of three separate provinces remained powerful. All attempts 
that British and central Sunni Arab authorities made failed to produce a cohesive 
national identity which could combine all social and political dynamics of Iraq over 
the twentieth century11.  
6.3 Kurds during the Period of the British Mandate,1920-  1932 
            6.3.1 Kurds and the Physical Presence of Britain 
Four days after the end of the war with Turkey, on 3 November 1918, the town of 
Mosul was entered and occupied by British troops as mentioned above (see chapter 
five), and the area of British occupation was held to extend over the whole of the 
Mosul province. Kurdish nationalist groups in exile outside Turkey, and local leaders 
in Kurdistan had long been asking for some sort of separate status for the area, and 
saw the defeat of the Turks and the occupation of Mosul by Britain as a golden 
opportunity for pressing their claims. In Iraq, two British officers with long 
experience of Kurdish affairs, E.E. Soane and E.W.C. Noel were instructed 
immediately to begin negotiations with local leaders12. The Civil Commissioner in 
Baghdad recommended to London on 30 October 1918 that a central council of chiefs 
for Southern Kurdistan should be set up under British auspices, and after three weeks 
in the area Noel recommended the establishment of a Kurdish state extending as far 
North as Van in Eastern Anatolia (some 90 miles north of the present Turkish-Iraq 
frontier)13. In mid-November, Sheikh Mahmud Barzinji, head of one of the leading 
families in the region was appointed qaimmaqam (governor) of Sulaimaniya14. It 
seemed that the British and other allies would not make their mind whether to merge 
the Kurds within new Iraqi state or allow them to have a separate national state. This 
uncertain status persisted until the Treaty of Lusan was signed in 1923. It would seem 
that the allies kept a close eye on the developments in Anatolia, where Turkish 
nationalist forces engaged in a heavy military confrontation with Greeks and other 
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allies force. Furthermore, allies tended to utilise the Kurdish card in Musel province 
in order to push the nationalist Turks to renounce their claims over the Province15.  
6.3.2  Inter-rivalry and lack of  a Unified leadership 
With the defeat of the Turkey, a degree of unity had emerged among the Kurdish 
leadership which was comprised of the tribal and religious figures. Although, the 
unity which the Turkish defeat had produced among the Kurds of Turkey and    Iraq 
was short-lived. Noel, the British commissioner, reported in the Spring of 1919 that 
Kurdish solidarity in central Anatolia had been based largely on fears that the Allies 
would exact retribution for the displacement and destruction of the Armenians and 
Assyrians, and now that this seemed no longer likely to materialize, disputes had 
broken out among rival tribes, none of whom would accept the over lordship of any 
single leader. In addition to that, the geography of the region, mountainous terrain 
with fertile valleys, together with traditional tribal rivalries, made the preservation of 
‘order’ on British Indian lines virtually impossible. The complications of Kurdish 
politics seem almost endless, but the difficulties were increased by British 
predilections for the construction of tidy administrative units, governed by ‘reliable’ 
or subsidised local leaders16.  
The chief difficulty was that the whole concept of self-determination required general 
agreement in the recognition of suitable representatives for the ‘Kurdish people’. The 
Kurds of the central area of Northern Iraq, around Dohuk, ‘Amadiya and Zakho, and 
those of Barzan and Arbil did not accept that Shaikh Mahmud’s lordship of 
Sulaimaniya entitled him to be recognized by them as King of Kurdistan.  Mahmud 
was in fact unable to exercise any authority over Halabja and Penjwin, both only 
twenty miles from his capital17, Selemenya (See map 7  on next page). Another group 
of claimants, the Badr-Khans, an ancient Kurdish family exiled to Constantinople 
since the mid-nineteenth century, may have had the ear of the British authorities there, 
but were no longer able to command support locally, and this was also true of the 
Baban family, a famous Kurdish family long resident in Baghdad.  
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The truth seems to have been that, had they been given the opportunity, the Kurds 
would probably have preferred to have been left to make their own administrative 
arrangements18. They welcomed their freedom which had been prepared to accept 
nominal British suzerainty; this can be explained more by their wishing to ensure that 
the Turks stayed away than by any active desire to be controlled by Britain. Further, 
the desire for Kurdish autonomy did not, because of traditional tribal and clan 
rivalries, at this stage produce any coherent movement towards Kurdish unity. By 
May 1919 the British authorities were forced to remove Sheikh Mahmud, who had 
succeeded in alienating almost all those upon whom he had relied to maintain his 
position in Sulaimaniya.It is noteworthy to point out that Sheikh Mahmud in principle 
believed in the idea of the Kurdish independent state but he also had a stronger 
leaning towards the Sunni Ottoman Sultanant than to make a clear cut deal with 
British19. A rival leader, Saiyid Taha of Neri, a descendant of Sheikh Ubaidullah of 
Shamdinan, the leader of the great Kurdish revolt of 1880, now appeared claiming to 
be able to head an independent Kurdish state under British protection. But it was clear 
that he also had too narrow a basis of support to ensure him any lasting success. The 
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treaty of Sevres, which had vaguely   included provision for an independent 
Kurdistan, was soon nullified by the revival of Turkish strength in the summer of 
192020. Despite lack of certain promise from external powers, most of the indications 
suggest that lack of unity among the core Kurdish leadership had in part contributed 
to the undermining the emergence of the Kurdish state.  
     6.3.3  The Reaction to Britain and The Idea of  Kurdish Autonomy  
Throughout late 1919 and for most of 1920 British troops were kept busy on the 
Northern frontiers of Iraq. Revolts flared up everywhere; some were inspired by the 
Turks in an attempt to drive British troops out of the Mosul area, and some were 
simply the normal Kurdish expression of distaste at the imposition of yet another 
outside authority. Gertude Bell, a British Commander, with somewhat limited 
comprehension of guerrilla warfare, considered the answer was to beat aghawat (tribal 
chiefs), who were preventing the more generally desired cooperation with the 
Britain21. Soane, writing knowledgeably about actual conditions in Southern 
Kurdistan, shows a different insight:  
   “Generally the mass of people desire no change at all; above all they do not want a council for 
Kurdistan, they rejoice at being saved from Sheikh Mahmud, and clearly Sheikh Mahmud’s rebellion 
failed because they did not support it. They, after all, know that we could not do anything if they chose 
to rise against us”22  
According to Soane, the Kurds throughout the course of 1920 were totally 
directionless. On one hand, the tribes rose up against the British while on another 
hand the Kurdish leadership failed to present any nationally based project. Late in 
March 1920 the British Cabinet authorized a public statement about the 
Mesopotamian Mandate. Britain would accept it, and Mesopotamia would include 
Mosul. Late in March 1920 the British Cabinet authorized a public statement about 
the Mesopotamian Mandate. Britain would accept it, and Mesopotamia would include 
Mosul. This decision was welcome news in Baghdad, but its significance was not at 
all welcome in Kurdistan.. It is worth remarking that the decision antedates by some 
five months the statement in the Treaty of Sevres that a plebiscite would be held in the 
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area. From that time onwards it has always been clear that the Kurds in Iraq have 
never wanted to be governed from Baghdad, but it has nevertheless always been 
essential, in terms of first British, and later Iraq, policy that they should be. 
Safeguards could be introduced: guarantees that the Kurdish language would be 
maintained and Kurdish officials employed, even the direct administration of 
Sulaimaniya by the British High Commissioner; but these paper promises were not 
enough. Even the most minimal attempts by H.M. Government to secure some sort of 
special treatment for the Kurds were vigorously resisted by the King Faisal, the newly 
installed King of Iraq. Some historians believe Faisal had on his mind that without the 
unconditional incorporation of the Kurds, mostly Sunnis, it was almost impossible to 
counterbalance the Shiite’s demographic strength23. In this sense, the difference of 
opinion began emerging between the Britain and  the King.  
By the early 1920’s the situation in the area presented more problems than before: it 
was reported from Sulaimaniya that public opinion that would oppose ‘even a 
conditional unity with Iraq Government’ while Dokuh, ‘Amadiya and Zakho would 
not object to incorporation within Iraq24. Rowanduz was still occupied by Turkish 
irregulars, while Arbil would accept a mutasarrif (mayor) from Baghdad if closely 
supervised by the British Political Officer. No uniform treatment of the whole area 
seemed possible.  
It was not long before any serious consideration of separate treatment was abandoned, 
and the idea of wholesale incorporation of the area into the Iraqi state was generally 
adopted. In September, Cox telegraphed a summary of his own and Faisal’s views. 
Faisal feared that if any sort of separate Kurdish state were to be encouraged, the Iraqi 
Kurds would join with their fellows in Turkey and Persia and thus constitute a 
permanent menace to Iraq25. Furthermore, and this is the earliest specific statement to 
this effect, the King wanted the inclusion of Kurdistan within Iraq to secure a 
permanent preponderance of Sunni over Shia in the Constituent Assembly. Cox 
concluded:  
             “To my mind it seems that it would be a reasonable course to work for the inclusion  
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                  of   Kurdish districts and their participation in National Assembly on conditions of 
                  local assent and special supervision by British Officers and if necessary by High  
                  Commissioner”26 
Churchill replied:  
              “Appreciate force of arguments in your 503 (above) – subject to proviso that Kurds 
                  are  not  to be put under Arabs if they do not wish to be”27 
Even this proviso was doomed to be relegated to the lumber room of broken 
diplomatic promises. It soon became clear that it would simply not be possible to 
allow free expression of opinion on the part of the Kurds who were not at all content 
at the prospect of being permanently joined to Iraq. It became essential to devise 
circumstances which would effectively rule out the possibility of the creation of an 
independent Kurdistan, or anything which might make the Kurds believe that this 
could be achieved. Cox wrote to Faisal in January 1922 that both Turkey and Iraq 
would profit from agreement on this issue:  
           “the effect of this will be that while having to abandon the contingent possibility of 
              the Kurdish areas of Iraq joining a Kurdistan which would be definition be 
              entirely independent of Turkey, the Turkish Government would also be free  
              from the obligation of allowing the Kurdish areas of Turkey itself to opt for 
               complete independence”28. 
It seems that an understanding had been established on the inclusion of the Musel 
province in Musel while Turkey would not be forced to any sort of autonomy for it’s 
own Kurds as long as it does not stake a claim over Musel. In the absence of any 
immediate agreement with Turkey, however, the security situation continued to 
deteriorate. Between July 1921 and December 1922 eight British officers were killed 
on the northern frontier; some were ambushed, and others killed on active military 
service. By the autumn of 1922, the British authorities were forced to bring Sheikh 
Mahmud back to Sulaimaniya in a second attempt to bring order out of chaos. 
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Predictably, he proved no more acceptable, either to those who had installed him or to 
those over whom he ruled, than he had been in 1919, since he was unwilling to 
confine his activities to Sulaimaniya. Noel reported the situation there in October:  
         ‘I am up against the universal suspicion, in some cases almost amounting to a certainty, that 
           we are determined to get the Kurds into Iraq by hook or by crook and that the election  
           is all eyewash (i.e. the elections to the Constituent Assembly)…I would point out that 
           to the Kurdish mind the assurances that no Kurds will be forced into Iraq cannot be squared 
           with the principle of Kirkuk Iiwa as an electoral college.29’  
 
 Problems were caused by the delays over the ratification of the treaty by the 
Constituent Assembly, and these difficulties were compounded in the North by the 
lack of enthusiasm of a large proportion of the population for the whole idea of the 
Iraq State. Kirkuk had little enthusiasm for Iraq, and even less for Shaikh Mahmud. 
Furthermore, as the leading citizens of Kirkuk town pointed out, while they knew of 
and did not like the arrangements Britain had made for Iraq, they had no idea what 
Britain intended for Sulaimaniya and the rest of Kurdistan. C.J. Edmonds, the 
Political Officer in Kirkuk, suggested inviting representatives from Kirkuk and Arbil 
Iiwas (Province) to Baghdad to discuss a possible federation which might be arranged 
on the lines of an Indian Political Agency30. It became widely apparent to the Kurds 
that there was no longer any hope for Kurdish independence, but merely a limited 
autonomy within Iraq; Kurdish disapproval of this arrangement explains the failure of 
the formal offer to the Kurds in December 1922:  
               
         ‘H.B.M. Government and the Government of Iraq recognize the rights of the Kurd living        
            within the boundaries of Iraq to set up a Kurdish government within those boundaries  
            and hope that the different Kurdish elements will, as soon as possible, arrive at an 
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            agreement between themselves as to the form which they wish that the Government should 
           take and the boundaries within which they wish to extend and will send responsible  
           delegates to Baghdad to discuss their economic and political relations with H.B.M. 
           Government and the Government of Iraq.’31  
 
The terms of this invitation seem to have encouraged Sheikh Mahmud to listen more 
attentively to the emissaries who had been visiting him with promises of co-operation 
from Turkey, although he was at the same time losing ground in his own bailiwick of 
Sulaimaniya. There is strong evidence of disagreement between Noel and Edmonds 
over whether to continue to support Mahmud; reports received in the Residency were 
both contradictory and acrimonious, and it is difficult to get a clear picture of events 
in the area. What does emerge is that by the end of December a band of Turkish 
irregulars under one Euz Demir had gained ascendancy over Sheikh Mahmud. Noel 
reported from Arbil that Mahmud was definitely opposed to any form of Iraqi 
suzerainty, that he was gaining more support in Arbil and Kirkuk and that he was 
financing himself by means of the tobacco excise32.  
Early in 1923, with the failure of Lausanne to come to any immediate settlement of 
the boundary, it was decided that a major show of force was the only way of dealing 
with the situation. This development was the beginning of the ‘Forward Policy’ 
mentioned in Chapter II, which caused considerable alarm in Whitehall. Local 
Administrative Inspectors were informed:  
         “In the course of the operations it is hoped…to extend the influence of the Iraq  
            Government among Kurds who are at present not subject to it, and any opportunity 
               which presents itself…should be seized upon and reported at once”33.  
Rowanduz was occupied by Imperial troops on 22 April, and Koi and Rania shortly 
afterwards (See map on next page). It was decided that the garrisons should stay in 
position until the arrival of the proposed frontier delimitation commission, since 
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evacuation would enable the Turks to reoccupy at once and proclaim a status quo in 
Turkey’s favour. The turbulence which continued on the frontier throughout the 
remainder of the year was, according to the High Commissioner, due to lingering 
Turkish fears that the authorities in Iraq intended somehow to give independence to 
‘their Kurds, thus forcing Turkey into an embarrassing position vis a vis her own 
Kurdish population:  
         “It suggest that it might considerable ease the frontier negotiations if we could give  
            preliminary official pledge to Turkey that in the changed circumstances we have  
           abandon  of Kurdish autonomy included in the Treaty of Sevres and that our aim is to 
           incorporate in Iraq as far as may be feasible under normal Iraqi administration all the 
           Kurdish areas which may fall on the Mosul side of the frontier as the result of the 
           negotiations”34 
 
Attacks by combined Turkish and Kurdish forces continued through the autumn and 
winter of 1923 and into the spring of 1924. However, by the middle of the year it was 
apparent that British forces had the upper hand, especially after the re-occupation of 
Sulaimaniya in July 1924. In a final attempt to prove themselves a force to be 
reckoned with, Turkish troops crossed the Hazil Su in the autumn and attacked 
Assyrian settlements in the vicinity of ‘Amadiya and Dohuk; on this occasion the 
Turks were not simply encouraging irregulars, but were employing Turkish army 
units. The Air Officer Commanding noted that had an attack on Zakho not been 
frustrated by prompt action, Mosul would have been seriously at risk. It seems that the 
Turks were determined to make the most of the delay between the appointment of the 
Frontier Commission and the plotting of the status quo frontier, which lasted from 30 
September to 15 November 192435.  
It has already been observed that both the British and Iraq Governments wanted the 
inclusion of Mosul within Iraqi State; it will be equally clear that the Kurdish 
inhabitants of the area were at best indifferent and at worst positively hostile to this 
aim. The Turks and the Kurds took advantage of the delay in the settlement of the 
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frontier to keep the area as turbulent as possible: the Kurds, to gain maximum 
advantage in terms of control, and the Turkish suzerainty36. Neither the Turks nor the 
authorities in Baghdad could afford to allow independence or even autonomy to be 
granted in the area; the Turks were fearful of the consequences of an unruly Kurdish 
state on their borders, and the Iraqis did not want to single out areas for any form of 
special treatment which would limit authority of the Government.  
  6.3.4    Kurds and Drawing the Boundaries of the State of New Iraq   
By June 1924, a few days after the ratification of the 1922 Treaty by the Constituent 
Assembly, direct negotiations over the frontier between Britain and Turkey broke 
down in Constantinople, and the dispute was referred to the arbitration of the League 
to investigate local conditions and generally to sound out local opinion, to discover 
whether the inhabitants wished to stay with Iraq or go over to Turkey. The activities 
of the commission were confined to the southern, or Iraqi, side of the status quo 
frontier, the so-called Brussels line37.  
The commissioners commenced their work with a series of meetings and interviews in 
London late November, and did not arrive in Iraq until early in January 1925. It is 
worthwhile to mention that Turkish pressure increased throughout the autumn of 
1924; Sheikh Mahmud’s activities in the vicinity of Sulaimaniya had occasioned the 
bombing of the town by the R.A.F. in November, a decision which occasioned some 
unease in London. The area was therefore still in a state of unrest at the time of the 
Commission’s visit, though the coming of winter had forced an end to serious 
campaigning. In the course of a visit lasting from January to March, the Commission 
head evidence in Baghdad, and made extensive tours of the Mosul wilayet under close 
British supervision; at one point the members threatened to resign if facilities for snap 
visit to areas were not made available. They did in fact manage to travel to most of the 
more important centres38.  
It emerged fairly early in the Commission’s visit that its members were likely to 
recommend, in some form or other, an extension of the British connection. Dobbs 
wrote to the Colonial Office at the end of February that he was convinced that Iraq 
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would be awarded the Mosul wilayet (Province) if British tutelage could be extended 
‘far beyond the Protocol period’39,  in other words beyond the previously stipulated 
four years after conclusion of peace with Turkey. However, the Commissioners 
continued their interviews and tours, causing local political officers to complain of 
‘paralysis’ of administration and the ‘well-nigh impossible strain’ caused by their 
visits. The fact was that by early 1925 the more accessible parts of the Mosul wilayet 
had been under direct and effective government control for over six years, and 
integration of administration and services was almost total: six years under Anglo-
Iraqi control had made the prospect of Turkish reoccupation seem remote, and on the 
whole unwelcome. Furthermore, the Commission seem to have considered that the 
welfare of the Christian minority population of the area, and, apparently, of the Kurds, 
would be better served by the Iraqi than by the Turkish Government. It is difficult to 
gauge the Commission’s attitude in the matter of the exploitation of the Mosul 
oilfields; Count Teleki’s intervention has already been mentioned, and it is a fact that 
the concession rights to the Turkish Petroleum Company were signed by the Cabinet 
at the very end of the Commission’s visit40.  
The Commission presented its full report to the League on 17 July 1925, very much 
on the lines anticipated by Dobbs. It laid down that Mosul was to be part of Iraq, 
subject to an extension of the connection with Britain and subject also to safeguards to 
preserve the character of the Kurdish areas in such matters as administrative 
personnel, education and language:   
             “The British Government is invited to submit to the Council of the League of Nations 
                 a new Treaty with Iraq, ensuring the continuance for 25 years of the mandatory 
                 regime defined by the Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Iraq and by 
                 the British Government’s undertaking, approved by the Council on 27 September 
                 1924, unless Iraq is, in conformity with Article I of the Covenant, admitted as a  
                member of the League before the expiration of this period…The British Government, 
               as Mandatory Power is invited to lay before the Council the administrative measures 
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               which will be taken with a view to securing for the Kurdish populations mentioned  
               in the Commission of Inquiry the guarantee regarding local administration recommended 
                by the Commission in its final conclusions.”41  
 
There was some delay in the acceptance of the Report: Turkish diplomacy succeeded 
in referring the matter for final settlement to the Permanent Court of International 
Justice at The Hague. However, the Commission’s Report was not to be reversed, and 
by 18 July 1926 it had been accepted by all parties concerned.  
In spite of the prolongation of the period of mandatory control which it entailed, the 
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of January 1926, which embodied the League’s recommendations, 
was received without serious opposition in Iraqi political circles, except among the 
pro-Turkish groups in Kirkuk, Mosul and Sulaimaniya. The note of resignation is 
evident in a contemporary report of Baghdad public opinion:  
          “Thos in favour of the Treaty, on whatever grounds, use the argument that the Treaty 
               is not only essential for the retention of the Mosul wilayet but is also essential for the 
                actual existence of the independence of Iraq and its monarchy”42. 
 
In the Chamber, the Treaty was passed unanimously on 18 January 1926; there were 
58 votes in favour, and 19 abstentions, corresponding to Yasin al-Hashimi’s followers 
associated with his Hizb al Sha’b (People’s Party). A rumour reported from Hilla 
suggested that the British had arranged this token opposition to avoid criticism that 
they had created an artificial unanimity43.  
Apart from the stipulations on Kurdistan, which were underlined in the course of an 
impressive speech by the Prime Minister, ‘Abd ak-Muhsin al-Sa’dun, on 21 January, 
the new Treaty included provisions for reviewing the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of October 
1922 every four years. On the occasion of each review, H.M. Government undertook 
to consider either recommending Iraq for admission to the League of Nations, or, if 
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this was not judged possible, to consider amending the Military and Financial 
Agreements attached to the 1922 Treaty. The first of these reviews would fall due, in 
accordance with the Protocol of 1923, in the spring of 1927. It is worth pointing out 
that the 1926 Treaty in no way contradicts the Frontier Commission’s Report; both 
documents stipulate that the Mandate shall continue for 25 years, but equally, both 
contain clauses providing for the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations before 
that date. Naturally, King Faisal and the Baghdad politicians seized on the ‘escape’ 
clause, and began at once to work for the earliest possible entry of Iraq into the 
League. Hence, the Iraqi entry into the league of nations made Iraqi young state 
stronger diplomatically and thus prevent the prospects of the emerging Kurdish state 
which posed a great potential in terms of natural resources. Overall, what King Faisal 
wanted to achieve would correspond with the British wishes in Iraq44. The Musel 
Vallayat was included within Iraq and the autonomy promise made to the Kurds 
remained unfulfilled in practical terms.  
6.4 Conclusion 
 
 
In the aftermath of the first World War, the precise territorial configuration of the new 
state had yet to be determined. There was no dispute that the provinces of Baghdad 
and Basra were components in the fledging Iraqi state. However, the northernmost of 
the three former Ottoman provinces, Musel, raised a number of strategic problems. 
Most notably, the initial assessments by the British government suggested that large 
oil reserves of oil were located in Mussel. Access to the oil reserves surfaced as a 
primary motivating factor behind the British decision to incorporate Musel into the 
new state of Iraq.  
 
The inclusion of Kurds in the  Iraqi state was not something the Kurds desired, yet it 
is unclear whether they would be able to administer their area because Kurdish 
society was critically divided across tribal, regional, urban and rural lines. Sheikh 
Mahmud, who raised the idea of Kurdish state for southern Kurdistan lacked 
necessary sources: the attributes of a sophisticated leader to gather support around his 
vision, and lack of acceptance from Erbil and Badinan, where the inhabitants favoured 
their own candidate, Sheikh Abudsalam Barzany. Furthermore, the deep rivalry 
                                                 
44 Ibid, p 74  
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embedded among the Kurdish leading families over leadership complicated the 
emergence of consensus among the Kurdish elite over a national agenda for 
Kurdistan.  
 
The British facing growing problems in the region failed to take Kurdish concerns 
seriously. When suited to their short terms interests, they raised the Kurdish issue. For 
the Britain, two things surfaced as the most important: persuading the Turkish state to 
revoke any claim over Musel that posed oil potentials and other natural resources, and 
inclusion of the Kurds as a Sunni patronage to assist Faisal survive. Seen from this 
prism, the inclusion of the Kurds could help counterbalance the Shiite demographic 
strength. British proceeded with this policy without regarding the intrinsic fact that 
the Kurds constitute a totally distinct group with little affiliation to Iraq. It is this 
decision that had tragic and far-reaching repercussions for the unity and coherence of 
Iraq for the decades to come.  
 
 
 
 
Chapter Seven 
Turkey 
7.1 Introduction 
The following examines the concept of the new state of Turkey established on the 
ruins of the Ottoman Empire and the identity the new state shaped in the aftermath of 
the World War I. Furthermore, the Kurdish reaction to the new State will be 
thoroughly analysed. In order to understand the of Kurdish reaction and the 
motivating reasons behind the Kurdish reluctance to co-opt with the Turkish state, the 
rebellion led by Sheikh Said will be the central theme examining the Kurdish reaction. 
Because of the significance of the rebellion which shaped Kurdish-Turkish 
relationship in the aftermath of the creation of a Turkish national state, this chapter 
will place the main focus on how the uprising impacted domestic politics and the 
Turkish nationalism discourse  promoted by the state in the later decades.  
7.2 National Conception of the Turkish Republic and Kurdish 
Identity 
The Turkish republic is the successor state of the Ottoman Empire, which dissolved 
during the First World War after more than a century of decay. However, the republic 
is a dramatically different construct from its predecessor. The Ottoman Empire was an 
authoritarian monarchy with a religious foundation derived from the Sultan's claim 
that he was also the Caliph, the spiritual head of all Muslims of the world. However, 
the Empire recognized minorities and accorded them extensive self-rule, but it defined 
minorities in religious terms. Hence, no Muslim people was ever accorded minority 
rights, while Jews and Christian Armenians, Serbs, Greeks, and others were living 
within the Ottoman jurisdiction. Before the twentieth century, this approach posed 
few problems, especially given that the Muslim peoples in the Empire developed 
national identities considerably later than the Empire's Christian subjects in the 
Balkans, and did so at least partly as a result of the latter's emerging national 
awareness. Collective identities were based primarily on religion--Islam at the 
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broadest level and various religious orders and sects at the local level--and regional or 
clan-based units1. 
The Turkish Republic, by contrast, was modeled upon the nation-states of Western 
Europe, particularly France. It was guided by six ‘arrows’ or principles enunciated by 
its founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk: republicanism, nationalism, secularism, 
populism, etatism, and reformism. Among these, the first three principles form the 
foundations of the Republic. Although Turkey was no democracy in Ataturk's 
lifetime, the principles of republicanism and populism suggest the goal of popular 
rule, that is, a democratic political system. In the speeches and writings of Ataturk, 
republicanism unmistakably meant a break with the monarchy of the past2. The 
second pillar, secularism, entailed a break with the Islamic character of the state. 
Although religion was to be kept out of political life, however, this is not to imply that 
Kemalist Turkey was in any way atheistic. Indeed, as Dogu Ergil has noted, Ataturk's 
highest goal in the religious field was the translation of the Quran into Turkish. In 
fact, the aim of the new regime was twofold: to dissociate the state from religious 
principles, and to "teach religion in Turkish to a people who had been practicing Islam 
without understanding it for centuries."3 The regime's policies, most blatantly the 
abolition of the Caliphate, nevertheless enraged the more religious parts of the 
population. This included the Kurds, who have been described as being at that time "a 
feudal people . . . of extreme religious beliefs."4 Indeed, the Kurdish population was 
ruled by local hereditary chieftains whose power often stemmed from the backing of 
the Naqshbandi or Qadiri religious orders5. 
                                                 
1 Ergil Dogu, “The Kurdish Question in Turkey”, Journal of Democracy, Volume 11, Number 3, July 
2000, pp 130-135 
2 Ibid, p 146 
3 Ibid, p 147 
4 Ibid, p1 50  
5 Ibid, p1 52, Sufi orders have been prominently present in Kurdistan, and the Sufi shaykh is perhaps 
more representative of Kurdish Islam than the legal expert. Most of the best-known `ulama in Kurdish 
history were sufis, and many of these sufis acquired considerable political influence. Various sufi 
orders were present in Kurdistan at one time or another, but for the past few centuries the scene has 
been dominated by the Qadiriyya and the Naqshbandiyya. The orders have at certain moments played 
important social and political roles in Kurdistan, because they represent a pattern of social organisation 
independent of the tribes. At one level, a sufi order is like an informal school offering a standardised 
package of spiritual exercises and mystical techniques, which the novice practices under experienced 
guidance. These techniques have been developed by the founding fathers of the orders but are believed 
to be based on teachings handed down orally from the Prophet himself. Only the most accomplished 
mystics are allowed to teach these exercises; they are known as murshid ("guide") or, in Kurdistan, as 
shaykh. This is not an informal title: one only becomes a shaykh with a     written certificate (ijaza) 
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It remains a fact, however, that the Kurds are the one ethnic group that to a large 
degree has retained a distinct identity. There are several reasons for this, of which a 
major one is demography. The Kurds are by far the largest non-Turkish-speaking 
group in the country. A second reason is geography: the Kurds were settled in a single 
area of the country that is distant from the administrative center and inaccessible 
because of its topography. Thirdly, the Kurds differed from other large groups such as 
Slavs or Caucasians in that they were an indigenous group and not comparatively 
recent migrants. Uprooted immigrant populations that have suffered severe upheavals 
and hardships were significantly more likely to embrace a new national identity than 
indigenous groups. Fourthly, the Kurds, unlike other populations, were organized 
according to a tribal and feudal social structure, a factor that remains crucial to this 
day. Attaturks concept of the new nation state would not include the integration of the 
mosaic of the peoples living within Ottoman Empire. Essentially, the Turkish nation-
building project would have been successful if state policies had sought integration of 
territorially-based ethnic Kurds within a broadly-defined civic national framework 
rather than radical assimilation of the distinct group into Turkishness.  As the Turkish 
identity has strengthened and become extreme and previous identities receded, 
Turkish identity itself has became more homogeneous; as such it carried the risk of 
growing less civic and more ethnic in nature6.  
7.3 The Rebellion of Kurds against the Turkish State 
7.3.1  How the Seeds of the Problem were planted? 
After the treaty of Lusan was signed between allies and the Turkish nationalists, the 
central state in Turkey began a radical transformation of social fabrics of the society. 
In respect of the Kurds, Attaturks project excluded certain distinct characteristics of 
the Kurds from his project. His attempt, to an extent, had made some progress in other 
areas, where there were largely immigrants from  Eastern Europe while in the Kurdish 
areas of South East confronted an enormous challenge. Kurdish religious and secular 
leadership seemed to have been unable absorbed the inconclusive Attaturk’s platform 
for transforming the society in that it incorporated the main tenets of Kurdish culture 
                                                                                                                                            
from his own teacher; a long period of training under the master's supervision is only one of the 
conditions, and an ijaza is not given automatically.  
6 Ibid, p 163  
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into Turkishness7. If the Kurds expected equality in the management of the new state 
they were sorely disappointed, as the new regime quickly embraced everything it 
deemed modern from a centralising mission to a secular approach that was to bring it 
into line with contemporary values of the nation building projects process of the 
period. The state also assumed a Turkish character through a process by which 
Kemalist regime re-invented the Turkish ethnicity. Ismat Inonu, Attaturk’s confident 
and successor succinctly summarised the official position in 1925: “We are frankly 
nationalists and nationalism is only factor of cohesion. In the face of a Turkish 
majority other elements have no kind of influence. We must Turkify the inhabitants of 
our land at any price, and we will annihilate those who oppose the Turks”8. In the 
1924 constitution, the terms ‘citizenship’ and ‘citizen’ had been equated with 
Turkishness. Article 15 of the constitution also states that one had to be a Turk to 
become a member of parliament and the like. Certainly, the Kurds could qualify as 
Turks, but only at the expense of denying their own ethnic identity9. Here, the seeds 
of the eventual Kurdish dissatisfaction were planted: in a state now officially defined 
as ‘Turkish’ the Kurds were not Turks, and only by giving up their own ethnic 
identity could they be treated as Turks. It is obvious that the leaders of the Kemalist 
regime perceived unintegrated, unturkified Kurds as both a backward element and a 
potential threat to the integrity of the modern state they were intent on constructing. 
Compounding the problem was the fact that with the rise of Sheikhs and Islamic 
tariqatas (religious orders) in the nineteenth century, it was Islam that had assumed a 
major role in bringing the Turks and Kurds together. But the decision of the new 
regime to abandon religion as one of its unifying characteristics and with abolishing  
the Caliphate in 1924, another bond that united both communities appeared to have 
been severed. This also provided the Kurdish sheikhs in the east such as Sheikh Said, 
with a justification for rebelling against Ankara. With population exchanges with 
Greece that followed the establishment of the Republic in 1923, the Kurds became the 
single largest unrecognised minority with the potential to threaten the state10.  
 
                                                 
7 Gunter, Michael M., The Kurds in Turkey: A Political Dilemma, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1990, 
p 20  
8 Ibid, p 23  
9 Ibid, 25  
10 Taha Parala and Andrew Davison, “Corporatism in Kemalist Turkey: Progress or Order? (Modern 
Intellectual and Political History in the Middle East”, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p 3  
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7.3.2  The Leadership Composition 
The Nicknamed Sheikh11 (See his photo bellow) Said rebellion was the first large-
scale nationalist rebellion by the Kurds against the Turkish state. The core of the 
leadership was comprised of religious figures in the Naqshabandi sect and seculars 
who mostly were members of the Azadi Congress (Liberation Congress). Finding 
themselves excluded from the identity that the state shaped, the religious and secular 
elements of the Kurdish society set a side their differences and unified together. It is 
worthwhile to note that   the role of the Azadi was fundamental in its unfolding. 
Kurdish intellectuals and military officers were at the heart of the nationalist 
movement, in terms of organization and recruitment. The paramount influence of the 
more secular or non-cleric Kurdish nationalist organizations must be separated from 
the rebellion itself and its sheikhly leadership. The Sheikh Said rebellion was led 
largely by sheikhs, a deliberate determination by the leadership of Azadi from 1921 
onward. These decisions were defined and given force in the Azadi congresses of 
192412. The fact that the rebellion had a religious character was the result of Azadi's 
assessment of the strategy of pragmatism and tactics necessary for carrying out a 
successful revolution. While the Sheikh Said rebellion was a nationalist rebellion, the 
mobilization, propaganda, and symbols were those of a religious rebellion. From the 
Turkish perspective, the Kurdish rebellion against the central state was religious.  
Turkish scholars such as Behcet Cemal and Metin Toker assume that the character of 
the rebellion was religious rebellion, instigated by reactionaries, who happened to be 
Kurds, against the secularizing reforms of the Kemalist government from 1922 
onward (especially the abolition of the caliphate on 3 March 1924 and the National 
Law Court Organization Regulation among others)13. Although, it must be noted that 
the rebellion itself started after the central state invaded the Kurdish schools and 
publications and destroyed their offices and school buildings14. 
                                                 
11 Sheikh is a religious figure who could rally people around certain issues and the people of Kurdistan 
at the time listened to them and naturally followed up their decrees.  
12 Kirisci, K. and Winrow, G.W, The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-State 
Ethnic Conflict, London, Frank Cass, 1999: pp 34-37  
13 Ibid, p 40 
14 Ibid, p 41  
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                        Sheikh Saed Piran, the leader of the Kurdish rebellion (1925)  
It is worthwhile to note that recently some scholars in the field of Kurdish nationalism 
have characterized the rebellion as "a nationalist rebellion in religious garb". The 
basis of this is the fact that Sheikh Said was an ardent nationalist, as demonstrated by 
his earlier career. Martin van Bruinessen, the only scholar who has studied the 
rebellion in detail, has stated emphatically that "the primary aim of both [Sheikh Said 
and the Azadi leaders] was the establishment of an independent Kurdistan15." Sheikh 
Said was an example of a man who had been simultaneously an ardent nationalist and 
a committed believer. Many of the leaders of the rebellion with sympathy to the 
Ottoman Sultanat may have been genuinely upset by the abolition of the caliphate. 
But for the average Kurd who participated in the rebellion, the religious and 
nationalist motivations were doubtless mixed. Most of the Kurds thought that the 
sheikhs who led the rebellion were religious and, more importantly, Kurds. Although 
leadership was a mixture of nationalist and religious figures, yet the motivations 
                                                 
15 Ibid, p 42  
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behind rebellion were nationalistic against a stronger nationalism, Turkish intent on 
removing any Kurdish features or characteristics16.   
7.3.3 The Factors behind the Rebellion 
Many crucial events, factors, and developments played a role in the rebellion. Many 
of the leaders wanted to protect their land, their domination of the markets for their 
livestock, and their control of the legal system, all or some of which seemed to be 
threatened by the secularizing and centralizing reforms of the central government in 
Ankara. The Sheikh Said rebellion was a turning point in the history of the Kurds in 
that nationalism was the prime factor in its organization and development. This is 
indicated by the fact that the subsequent large rebellions by the Kurds were nationalist 
and religious, employing nationalist symbols and propaganda. The Sheikh Said 
rebellion clearly demonstrated the direction that Kurdish nationalism was to take. In 
the rebellion, nationalist slogans were extensively used to inspire and encourage the 
Kurds to rise to challenge the state17. 
This is not to say that traditional motivations of banditry and tribal feuds, as well as 
personal vendettas, were not prominent casual factors in the rebellion. In this and in 
other senses, Amal Vinogradov believes that the rebellion could be described as 
"primitive,"18. The Sheikh Said rebellion, like the Iraqi Kurdish rebellion, was a 
genuine national response to fundamental dislocations in the Kurdish political and 
socioeconomic spheres. Like their Kurdish counterparts who had gained so much 
experience by their participation in the Hamidiye Regiments in the last days of the 
Ottoman Empire and in the first World War, the Iraqi tribesmen (some of whom were 
Kurdish) who fought in the Ottoman army benefited from the military experience they 
gained in World War I. One of the interesting developments concerning the Sheikh 
Said rebellion of 1925 was the supposed efficiency of arms and technology in 
supporting revolution and rebellion by dissident and nationalist minority groups. The 
participation of Kurdish, Arab, and Iranian tribesmen in the Ottoman, Qajar, and 
British armies and their familiarity with the substantial technological and military 
changes that had been occurring since the 1880s may have contributed to their 
                                                 
16 Ibid, p 43  
17 Ibid, p 45  
18 Ibid, p 47  
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conviction that these weapons and organizational methods could be used effectively 
in their own national movements. Their assessments may have been sound. It was 
misfortune of all three rebellions, however, that they were challenged and defeated by 
more powerful forces and stronger nationalisms. In the case of the Kurds in new 
Turkey it was the stronger state and more developed nationalism of the Turks. For the 
Kurdish rebellion in Iraq, the same was true. The Iraqi Kurds opponent, the newly 
created state of Iraq, backed and supported by the British, was able to defeat the 
rebels. Unlike the Sheikh Said rebellion, British forces played a major role in the 
suppression and defeat of the Iraqi Kurdish revolt in southern part of Kurdistan (Iraqi 
side). It is possible that exposure to modern weapons, but not to modern diplomacy, 
may have caused the leaders of both rebellions and/or revolts to act prematurely19.  
7.3.4 The Organisational Weakness 
The Sheikh Said rebellion was tribal. The proportionate number of nomadic tribesmen 
who took part in the rebellion was much higher than in the Iraqi Kurdish rebellions. 
Few tribal or peasant cultivators participated in the rebellion as combatants. Indeed, as 
indicated above, the leaders of the rebellion did not even try to recruit the tribal and 
peasant cultivators, either because they thought that the peasants were simply too 
much under the thumb of the landlords through fear, coercion, or indifference. The 
role of the tribal and peasant cultivators was much greater in the Iraqi rebellions. It is 
difficult to know how much land was owned by derebeys or agas (Tribal chieftains) 
within the area of rebellion, although there were a number of large landowners in the 
extended area (e.g. Diyarbakir) of the rebellion. If tribal chiefs are classified as 
derebeys or agas , then it seems that most of them were engaged in animal 
husbandry20. But the landlords of the Diyarbakir plains opposed the rebellion (See 
Map below). They played a principal role in assuring that Diyarbakir remained loyal 
to the Turkish government when it was attacked and besieged by Sheikh Said. The 
cooperation of these agas (Tribal chiefs) with the government is another indication of 
the strong ties that the Kemalists had already established with many Kurdish agas and 
                                                 
19 Ibid, p 50  
20 Olson Robert, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheik Said Rebellion, 1880-1925, 
Austin, The University of Texas Press, 1989:pp 89 
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chiefs. It was a premonition of a future when they were to become one of the 
mainstays of the Ataturk coalition21.  
                    
                 Map 8 shows the heartland of Northern Kurdistan (Turkey)22.  
According to Robert Olson, the rebellion did not demonstrate much tribal 
coordination with urban dweller. Diyarbakir, heavily Kurdish did not rise in support 
of the rebels. The populace of Elazig, large region populated by the Kurds, initially 
surrendered without fighting, only to turn against the rebels because of their excessive 
looting and pillage. Again urban participation in the Iraqi rebellions was greater than 
in the Sheikh Said rebellion. The coordination with urban groups was inhibited by the 
territorial isolation of the core area of the rebellion. Communication, except on horse 
or donkey, was impossible, especially after the telegraph lines were cut. Also, 
telegraph lines had not yet been extended to many towns. The establishment of Azadi 
in Erzurum after 1921, in addition to the split in Kurdish nationalist movement, 
resulted in less contact with the Kurdish nationalists based in Istanbul, although, as 
said above, contacts between Azadi and Istanbul were maintained. The ulama 
(scholars) and sheikhs played a large influential role in the Iraqi rebellions, as they did 
in the rebellion of Sheikh Said. Their input in the rebellion of Sheikh Said was 
significantly greater than in the Iraqi Kurdish rebellion23. Thus, it suggests that the 
sectarian fault lines among the northern Kurds (Turkey) was wider than Southern 
Kurds (Iraqi side) and in more strict sense Kurds in Turkey were less homogenous 
than their Iraq counterparts.  
                                                 
21 Ibid, p 92  
22 www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/kurdistan-maps 
23 Ibid, p 103  
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7.3.5  Weak Nationalist Cohesion 
The Sheikh Said rebellion, then, was a prototype of a post- First World War 
nationalist rebellion. Its weaknesses were the usual ones: inter-tribal rivalry and 
Sunni-Shia differences, especially represented by the Hormek-Cibran24 tribal conflict, 
contributed to the lack of success. These cleavages were exacerbated by the 
Naksibandi/non-Naksibandi differences as well. These and other differences between 
Zaza and non-Zaza speakers played a chief role in the weakening of the rebellion and 
in the growth and sustenance of Kurdish nationalism. In addition to that, Urban-rural 
cleavages, tribal-peasant and landowner-tribal hostilities, and antithetical secular-
religious orientations among its leaders all contributed to its lack of success25. 
Furthermore, the Sheikh Said rebellion represented an incipient nationalism that was 
also challenged by a strong nationalism that had mobilized in the course of the past 
thirty years, gathered strength during World War I, and further energized by the war 
of liberation with the power of an organized state behind it26. Turkish nationalists 
claimed the territory on which the Kurdish nationalists wanted to create an 
independent Kurdistan. The Turks also proclaimed a nationalism that was based on 
ethnicity and was growing in coherence and dynamism especially after the Treaty of 
Lusan and  militarily enjoyed supremacy over the Greeks27.  
  Martin Van Bruinseen believes that the Kurdish rebellion demonstrated territorially, 
and politically, the increased vulnerability of the Kurds as a result of the 
displacement, deportation, and massacre of Armenians during World War I. The 
removal of the Armenians also removed the buffers of protection that their presence 
and nationalism offered the Kurds. The situation of the Kurds and the suppression of 
their nationalism was even more ironic in light of their eager participation in the 
deportation and massacre of the Armenians in 1915 and subsequently28. The truly 
tragic meaning that the elimination of the Armenians held for the Kurds and Kurdish 
                                                 
24 Hormek and Cibran are the large tribes in modern Turkish Kurdistan and occupy large areas with a 
population of more than a million and half. Bye the time Kurds challenged the central state, these tribes 
had been at loggers with one another and hence did not play any role in the rebellion. Some elements of 
those tribes sided with central state and in return the state rewarded them.  
25 Ibid, p 105  
26 Ibid, p 110  
27 Ibid, p 111  
28 Ibid, p 123  
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nationalism was recognized, as mentioned earlier, by some of the Kurdish nationalist 
leaders such as Halid Beg Cibran29.  
In assessing the effect of the rebellion of Turkey's history and politics,  Erik Jan 
Zurcher and  Metin Toker in their recent study indicate that the Sheikh Said rebellion 
and its aftermath represented a turning point in the history of the modern Turkish 
republic. They believe that one has to make a distinction between the event of the 
rebellion itself and its consequences. As an event, they assume, the rebellion was not 
much. As soon as the Turkish armed forces were able to mobilize, it was crushed. The 
tenor of their argument here is that the Sheikh Said rebellion had impacted the 
Kemalist project in the course of the later decades30.  
7.3.6  The Impact of the Kurdish rebellion on Turkish Politics 
Metin Toker believes that the consequences of the rebellion for Turkey, especially the 
Kemalists, were far more important than the rebellion itself. The main reason for this 
is, as Toker notes, that military action by the Kurds -even if they had displayed much 
more unity, cooperation, and coordination than they did- would never have withstood 
a focused attack by the experienced Turkish forces31. However, the rebellion as an 
event was more important than what Toker asserts because he refuses to acknowledge 
that it represented a challenging nationalism in competition with Turkish nationalism 
and, hence, threatening to the Turkish state.  
In terms of domestic Turkish politics, the rebellion was nearly as important as Toker 
suggests. According to him, the rebellion gave Kemalists, or "radicals" as he calls 
them, an opportunity to silence the criticism of the Istanbul press, which was aligned 
with oppositional groups and, shortly thereafter, regional newspapers as well. It also 
established the legal means via the Restoration of Order Law and the creation of 
independence tribunals to arrest the leading members of the opposition forces when 
the time was ripe, in June 1926 after the discovery of a plot in Izmir to assassinate 
Mustafa Kemal. Soon after the discovery of the alleged plot, twenty one members of 
the Progressive Republican Party and eleven of the most important members of the 
                                                 
29 Ibid, 124  
30 Ibid, 126  
31 Pelletiere, Stephen C., The Kurds: An Unstable Element in the Gulf, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 
1984: p 24  
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Committee of Union and Progress were arrested. Some escaped arrest only because 
they were abroad or went into hiding. Less than one month after the discovery of the 
plot, fifteen members of groups opposed to the Kemalists were condemned to death. 
Even the heroes of the revolution and of the war of liberation, such as Refet Bele, 
Rauf Orbay, and Kazim Karabekir, who managed to escape death, were never again to 
play significant roles in the politics of Turkey. The only exception was Fuad 
Cebesoy32.  
The suppression of the opposition to the Kemalists in the wake of the discovery of the 
assassination plot in Izmir in June 1926 has been dealt with adequately elsewhere. 
The point here is that the machinery to facilitate the crushing of the opposition both 
politically and legally was put into place in the effort to suppress the Sheikh Said 
rebellion. Ironically, many of those sentenced to death in the Izmir plot had voted for 
the very independence tribunals to which they fell victim. While the Kemalists had to 
wait until the purges of June-July 1926, nearly a year after the suppression of the  
Kurdish rebellion, to rid themselves of remaining opposition, the formal and 
organized opposition as represented by the Progressive Republican party was 
eliminated when the party was banned on June 3, 192533.  
It is widely believed that it was only after the Kurdish challenge to the state  that three 
"revolutions" were able to occur: the Code of Civil Law (Medeni Kanunu Devrimi) of 
4 October 1926; the Dress and Headgear Law (Kiyafet Kanunu Devrimi) of 25 
November 1925; and the Alphabet Law (Harf Kanunu) of 1 November 192834. These 
kinds of reform would only have been possible in a Turkey under the Restoration of 
Order Law. Indeed, Toker sees similarities between the period of 1925 and that of 
1957-60. In both instances, Ismet Inonu was able to assert his authority to restore 
order to the Kemalist program. Although, Kemalists did not have in 1957-60 the same 
power and legitimacy that Ismet Inonu and Mustafa Kemal possessed in 192535.  
In short, the Sheikh Said rebellion remains a symbol of the impediments -
conservatives, religious fanaticism, Muslim brotherhoods, and formal democratic 
opposition- that the "radical" Kemalists had to suppress or contain in order to proceed 
                                                 
32 Ibid, p 30  
33 Ibid, p 32  
34 Ibid, p 34  
35 Ibid, p 57  
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with their Western-oriented, capitalist directed, heavy industry-biased modernization 
program. The Sheikh Said rebellion emphasized to the Kemalists that this program 
might be delayed through continuing political infighting or might not be carried out at 
all. The decisions to pursue the Kemalist road to modernization were probably 
determined a few years earlier, but certainly there was a solid core that wished to 
pursue this course expeditiously by 1924. It was the Kurdish rebellion that created the 
atmosphere and the mechanisms to carry out the purges of 1926. The reason why the 
Sheikh Said rebellion is so important for Turkish history is that the laws and 
institutions created for its suppression were agreed to by those who opposed 
Kemalism. They agreed, no matter how reluctantly, because no patriotic Turkish 
official could tolerate a contending nationalism such as Kurdish within their new state 
.It was only after the rise of  Kurdish nationalism to newly created state that laws and 
institutions had been created to suppress an "external" enemy that are later used by the 
Kemalists in power to quash "internal" opposition. The Kemalist opponents and Fethi 
Bey36 realized this and therefore tried to depict the rebellion as a regional uprising, 
certainly one that was counterrevolutionary in their context. But the fact was that the 
rebellion was Kurdish and nationalist severely limited any objections that they could 
make. More strenuous opposition would have produced the charge that they were 
traitors. As it was, the members of the Progressive Republican party were charged 
with complicity in the rebellion, although such complicity was never proven37. It 
seems that the state took advantage of the Kurdish challenge as a reasonable excuse to 
suppress every form of opposition to Attaturk’s project. 
7.3.7  The Reaction of the State 
The Sheikh Said rebellion gave the Kemalist government a certain justification for 
categorizing serious opposition as being in league with the Kurds, having sympathy 
for Kurdish nationalism, or favouring ideologies that would strengthen Kurdish 
nationalism, or Kurdish ethnic power. If the red flag of the leftists was hoisted beside 
the green flag of Sheikh Said (representing Kurdish nationalism as well as Islam), the 
menace of the rebellion's legacy would be even more of a threat to Kemalism and, 
                                                 
36 Fethi Bey was one of the close associates of the Attaturk during the years of the revolution but in 
1930 he assigned Fethi Okyar Bey to organize an opposition party for the sake of what they called 
democracy.  
37 See Robert Oslon, p 61  
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possibly, in the future to the Kurdish state itself. The rebellion proved an opportunity 
to reduce the opposition to Kemalist modernization through the closing on 30 
November 1925 of all tarikats (lodges), zaviyes (cells), and turbes (religious tombs). 
Religious titles were abolished and wearing of clerical garb was prohibited. The Dress 
Law was passed on 25 November 1926, aimed against religious centers of opposition 
for the purpose of enhancing its legitimacy against the Kemalists. It is important to 
note here that these laws were passed in an atmosphere of political consciousness on 
the part of Turkish public that their implementation and acceptance would reduce the 
threat of Kurdish nationalism38.  
The Sheikh Said rebellion in particular  and in general the Kurdish opposition to the 
Kemalist programme created and provided a means whereby most serious subsequent 
opposition to government policies or comprehensive disagreement with its progress 
laid open the possibility that the disaffected groups would be labelled as traitors. For 
this reason, in the aftermath of the rebellion, it was relatively easy to colour 
opposition forces with a hostile ethnic tinge. The vehicles created and the laws passed 
for the suppression of the rebellion and the symbols of opposition to the Kemalist 
program that it generated meant that the consolidation of the Turkish state and of 
Turkish nationalism were greatly expedited by the suppression and perceived threat of 
Kurdish nationalism. From the Kemalists context, the nationalist aspirations of ten 
percent of population had to be denied if the nationalist goals of the other ninety 
percent were to be achieved. It is in this sense that the Sheikh Said rebellion, its 
suppression, and its aftermath were more important than the purges of 1926 within 
Republican Peoples Party, which simply eliminated the remaining opposition to the 
Kemalists' programs. Most of those who were purged or sentenced to death agreed or 
would have agreed with the position subsequently adopted by the Turkish government 
vis-à-vis the Kurds and their nationalism39.  
The suppression of the Sheikh Said rebellion contributed to the consolidation of the 
new Turkish republic, the evolution and domination of the Republican People's Party 
(Cumhuriyet Halk Firkasi) and the one-party state it represented up to 1950, and the 
greater articulation of Turkish nationalism on which the party and the state were 
                                                 
38 Ibid, pp 69-71 
39 Ibid, p 81  
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based. The creation of a one-party state conditioned the lack of serious discussion of 
policy alternatives, which in turn meant that there was a mono-dimensionality to the 
possible ideological solutions to the problems and challenges that the young republic 
would confront. It is this one-dimensional approach that led to the great surprise of 
the Republican People's party at the strength of appeal of the Democrat party in 1946. 
The inability of the Republican People's party to learn from the lesson of 1946 led 
inexorably to its defeat in 1950. In this sense, one of the reasons for the defeat of the 
People's Party in 1950 was the legacy of the mono-dimensionality that the Sheikh 
Said rebellion and its consequences introduced into the Turkish polity. In fact, the 
entire post-World War II period, when the military was in power in 1960-61, 1973, 
and from 1980 onward, follows a pattern shaped by the political and ideological 
consequences of the rebellion and more specifically the Kurdish question which had 
emerged as a stumbling block to the Kemalist project in Turkey. Although, many 
factors contributed to the emergence of the modern Turkish polity- the Kurds and 
Kurdish nationalism may not be the single most important factor. But their influence 
on the development of modern Turkey can not be under-estimated40. 
In the course of six decades from 1920 to 1980s, seventeen of the eighteen military 
engagements in which Turkish military fought from 1924 to 1938 occurred in 
Kurdistan. Turkey's armed forces intervened in Hatay in 1938, in Korea in 1950-1953, 
and in Cyprus in 1974. The military engagements against the Kurds far exceeded the 
number of external interventions and engagements. By the 1980s, Turkey's military 
actions against the Kurds had assumed external as well as internal proportions. In 
1983, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, Turkish forces entered Iraq in order to suppress and 
contain Kurdish nationalist and guerrilla groups. The point is that the struggle against 
Kurdish nationalism, in which certain patterns of policies were implemented and 
against which certain nationalist, ideological, and psychological premises and 
attitudes were initially adopted in 1925, continued to play an important role in 
Turkey's policy decisions more than fifty years after the Sheikh Said rebellion, the 
first potential challenge to Kemalism. These factors have continued to influence 
Turkish policy well into the twenty century. Hence, Kurdish nationalism articulated 
and symbolized by the Sheikh Said rebellion as a first challenge to the Kemalist-
                                                 
40 Cited in Mustafa Erdogan, The Quest of Democracy in Turkey Without Islam”, Foreign Affairs, 
2001, No. 8: p 37-43  
 117
oriented state had been part of anti-Kurdish official policies of the state for many 
decades41.  
7.3.8  British Involvement 
The objectives and policies of the third major party involved in the Sheikh Said 
rebellion, Great Britain, are important to be noted as  Britain was the most influential 
player in the region at the time. Great Britain had consolidated its power in northern 
Iraq through its forward policy, adopted after the Air Ministry assumed control of 
military operations from the War Office in August, 1922. From 1922 to 1925, the 
RAF (Royal Air Force), under the command of Sir John Salmond, who replaced Sir 
Hugh Trenchard as chief of the Air Staff in 1929, pursued a vigorous bombing policy 
against the Kurds in northern Iraq42. The bombing forced Turkish forces led by 
Colonel Ozdemir to retreat from Rawanduz (border town of Iraqi Kurdistan) in June 
1923. In many ways, the formal treaty between Turkey and Iraq on 5 June 1926 was 
shaped by the success of the British bombing policies. It seems that the new Turkish 
republic was quick to learn from the British. By the end of 1926, Turkey had acquired 
106 aircraft. In the following years, air power was used extensively in military 
operations against the Kurds. Air power was an effective means by which the new 
Turkish republic consolidated its state power, especially against the Kurds, just as 
British air power was instrumental in consolidating Britain's imperial power in the 
post-World War I Middle East. The lessons learned regarding the use of air power in 
northern Iraq, especially during the period 1922-1925, were used to good advantage 
by the British in Sudan, the Northwest frontier, Palestine, and other places. These 
examples are illustrative of the relationship between established empires and new 
states when two are not in direct military conflict but both wish to subdue third parties 
following policies antagonistic to the empire or to the new state. It became easier for 
Britain and Turkey to bomb Kurds than to make political concessions to Kurdish 
nationalism43. 
                                                 
41 Ibid, p 47 
42 Gunter, Michael M., The Kurds in Turkey: A Political Dilemma, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 
1990:pp 57  
43 Ibid, p 61  
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In the period prior to Sheikh Said rebellion, the Kurds (and Turks, too) had to face the 
new technology of massive bombing, including incendiary bombing at night. In  
the post-Sheikh Said period, the Kurds had to face the might of an experienced British 
air force, as well as the burgeoning and increasingly effective Turkish air force. It 
would be more than thirty-five years before the Kurds had adequate antiaircraft guns. 
In the intervening years, the Turks and the British (Iraqi) forces were able to extend 
their control over areas of Turkey and Iraq that were predominantly Kurdish. Around 
the same time by 1926, the same bombing policies against the Kurds were followed 
by Reza Khan in Iran and it seems that Raza Khan followed the Turkish model to 
suppress the Kurds44. The effective use air power and its implied threat played an 
important in the origins and consequences of the Sheikh Said rebellion. The 
psychological terror it induced in the peasant and nomadic peoples of Iraq and Turkey 
and Iran, especially through incendiary night bombing, proved to be especially 
effective. Iraq was, according to L. S. Amery, the British colonial secretary in 1925,"a 
splendid training ground for the Air Force"45.  
One of the results of this effective British use of air power between World War I and 
World War II largely against the peoples of British colonies was that it contributed to 
the unpreparedness of British air defences against the Germans at the outbreak of 
world War II, what A.J.P. Taylor has called RAF's "doctrine that overwhelming 
superiority was the only defence." Right up to the outbreak of the Second World War 
and even during it, " the policy Lord Hugh Trenchard, who was chief air marshal from 
1919 to 1929, had established was followed: "Bombing," he held, "could win a war by 
itself; it was also the only means of not being bombed by others. Trenchard and his 
successors persistently neglected air defence"46. Trenchard had first witnessed the 
great effectiveness of strategic air bombing, sometimes in coordination with infantry, 
in northern Iraq during the early 1920s. Taylor was of the opinion that the successful 
use of British air power in northern Iraq contributed to the deterioration of the British 
army, the lack of mechanized vehicles, and the failure to create a sufficient defence 
system in the 1920s and 1930s. British success against the Turks and then against the 
                                                 
44 Ibid, pp 71-73  
45 Ibid, p 86  
46 Rasul Hawar, ‘Kurds in Northern Kurdistan From The Beginning of History Till The Second World 
War’, Khak, 2000, p 20  
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Kurds in northern Iraq in the early 1920s may have contributed subsequently to the 
RAF's lack of preparedness against the Germans on the eve of and during the early 
years of World War II. Turkish new state adopted the British model and air power 
used against the Kurds, to an extent, weakened the morale of the Kurdish troops who 
opposed the state.  
7.4 Conclusion: Evolution of the Turkish Nationalist Discourse 
Kurdish resistance to the extension of Ankara’s political, economic, social, and 
cultural roles began. At times violent, this resistance has been continuous and has 
remained a major preoccupation of successive governments in Turkey. The rebellion 
started prematurely and rebels had no time to gather all of their assets. The rebellion 
was eventually suppressed by Turkish army with a great deal of force and violence. It 
leaders and their supporters were tried and some of them summarily executed by the 
newly created tribunal called the Independence Tribunal47. These became one of the 
main tools of repression in the Kurdistan for years to come. The rebellion had both a 
religious and nationalist character. It was as much a revolt against the secularists and 
anti-Islamic tendencies of the new regime as it was first stirrings, albeit regionally 
circumscribed, of Kurdish nationalism. It seems, for the first time these rival elements 
of Kurdish society, nationalists and Islamic oriented figure, came together against the 
state. The rebellion, according to Bernard Lewis, represents a turning point in two 
ways: on one hand it gave a greater impetus to the Kemalists efforts at secularisation 
and repressing religious orders whereas on other hand it marked the start of an era of 
uneasy relationship between Kurds and Turks48. Almost from the beginning, the 
government decided on the eventual complete assimilation of Kurds by force if 
necessary whenever and wherever serious nationalist resistance was encountered. 
From the perspective of the time, the regime may not have been unrealistic in 
attempting to integrate the Kurds by assimilating them: There was no Kurdish 
cohesive leadership that could exert significant pressure, much less one that could 
mobilise against the Kemalists to pose an immediate threat. In other words, Kemal 
and his associates did not expect to encounter significant resistance to their project in 
the long run. In their quest to build a modern state, the Kemalists decided to emulate 
                                                 
47 Bernard Lewis, ‘ Why Turkey is only Democratic Country in Middle East?’, New York, Yale 
University Press, 1996, p 12  
48 bid, p 13  
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the homogenous states of the west. They were intent on building the centre at the 
expense of the periphery. The Kurds, as a result, were relegated to the minor errant 
Turks or descendents of Turkish tribes. Expression of nationalist thought as well as 
language and culture were severely repressed. This was a long way from where the 
Kurds mentioned as coequal members of the new state, they had become nonentities. 
The new media ceased referring to them as Kurds. The government passed many laws 
that enable it to exile Kurds from their traditional areas to other parts of the country, 
where they would be in a minority. The attitude of the new regime towards the Kurds 
had undergone a subtle change as it tried to come to gripes with the new Turkish 
identity it was constructing. As Taha Parlda demonstrates, Attaturk’s conception of 
nationalism underwent a significant degree of change: It started off as anti-imperialist 
and Wilsonian in spirit, careful and peaceful in orientation49. His conception of 
nationalism had many inherent contradictions. Not only did it discourage interest in 
Turks living in other parts of the world, but it also encouraged a dual understanding of 
Turkishness. The resulting Turkish nationalist discourse was both civic and ethno-
cultural in nature. It’s civic character made possible the rise of assimilated Kurds, 
while it’s ethno-cultural aspect formed the basis of forced assimilation and repression 
of those Kurds who refused to accept Turkish identity. The regime’s assimimilation 
was too ambitious as it required that Kurds give up not only their political identity but 
also all forms of their cultural links and the language that bound them. The 
suppression of language, the unavailability of books and other materials in Kurdish, 
and the bans of the use of language meant that with time Turkish became primary 
language for many, and especially for those who left their traditional areas for 
economic reasons or because they had been exiled by the central government. 
Assimilation had it’s limits; those limits were imposed by geography (remoteness of 
the region), economics (the backwardness of the region making it easy for it be 
economically ignored) or lack of resources (the Turkish government’s resources were 
not sufficient for a massive task it confronted in educating the Kurdish inhabitants). 
The   harsh assimilation policies of the state also had a reverse effect: they set in 
motion-albeit slowly, a process of constructing a new sense of Kurdish national 
identity. Although, the rebellion of Kurds was defeated by a more powerful Turkish 
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army, yet the consequence of rebellion left its impact on the Turkish and Kurdish 
psyche in the subsequent decades.  
Chapter Eight 
Iran 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter will begin by examining the background of Iran’s history during the First 
World War. Since the external intervention increased greatly during the First World 
War period, particular attention is paid to analysis of  the internal and external forces 
that wielded a tremendous influence on the political developments in the country. As 
Iran approached the First World War, the central government was fragile to an extent 
that it could hardly practise its authority over the peripheral territory. This stimulated 
a view among the Iranian that their country would disintegrate along ethnic lines.  The 
weakening of the central state fuelled the rise of peripheral grievances on the part of 
Kurds and Baluches. In the context of the rise of the peripheral reactions to the fragile 
central state, the rebellion led by Simko in Kurdistan will be thoroughly analysed in 
this chapter.  
                                  8.2 Background: Internal Struggle  
 
 
The most conspicuous feature of Persian history from 1900 to 1921 was a very 
complicated interplay between the Persian forces attempting to establish 
constitutional government and intervention of the Russian and Britain governments. 
Mohammad Ali, a new Shah, repeatedly swore to uphold the constitution signed in 
1906, but was extremely irked by the Majlis (parliament) control of funds and soon 
showed that his real aim was to destroy the constitutional government. At the time, 
Russia viewing Iran as a sphere of influence aided the Shah in pursuing his course 
over developments in Persia. Britain, the other imperial power with special interest in 
Persia, adopted a dual-policy: one the one hand it encouraged constitutionalists and 
liberals to impose limitations on the exclusive powers of Shah, on other hand it took a 
more pragmatic line by projecting it’s monopoly over the Persia’s oil industry1.  
 
                                                 
1 Joseph M. Upton, “Modern History of Iran”, Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1995: pp 41-43 
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The Anglo-Russian agreement signed on August 31, 1997 was ostensibly to 
strengthen the military and economic position of the two powers in the face of a 
growing threat from Germany. Minimising the danger of Anglo-Russian conflict in 
Persia, the agreement was aimed at establishing a Russian zone on North, a British 
zone in Southeast, and a neutral zone in between. Russian zone included all of the 
large cities in Persia except Kerman which was in the British zone and Busher in a 
neutral zone. Hence, the two powers in effect could have played a central role in 
determining the course of events in Persia2.  Although the preamble included the usual 
engagement to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, but the agreement 
was concluded without any consultations with Persian officials.  
 
The Anglo-Russian agreement dismayed the constitutionalists because they believed 
on the basis of the substantial encouragement rendered to them by British officials in 
Persia, they could count on the support of the British government. Following the 
Anglo-Russian treaty, British tilted toward the Shah and his supporters and 
encouraged them to destroy the constitution, while Russia not only established a 
military and economic position in Northern Persia but also supported the efforts of 
Shah to destroy the constitution. It was apparently a coincidence of mutual interests 
that had driven Anglo-Russian policy towards the Persia3. This prompted the Shah to 
launch a coup d’ etate’ in 1908 that ended a constitutional government and established 
a martial law in Tehran under the Russian commander of the Cossack Brigade and 
inaugurated a reign of terror in all cities. As a result, civil war broke out in various 
places, notably at Tabriz, where Russian armed forces wiped out the opposition to 
Shah. A year later, on July 16, 1909, a combination of constitutionalists and liberals 
succeeded in deposing  the Shah. Although Russia attempted to regain his throne by 
force in 1911 but were unsuccessful. The new Shah, the deposed Shah’s son, who 
took a throne after deposing his father, had a symbolic role. He did not wield the 
powers necessary to change government decisions.  
 
The most disastrous effects of these events were: first, the appearance of deep rifts 
within social groups, second, the spread of opportunism as convictions weakened 
under mounting pressures and temptations domestically and internationally. These 
                                                 
2 Ibid, p 56 
3 Ibid, p 57 
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intra-factional struggles left the Persian state in complete disarray. It affected all 
populations including the far fringes of Persian territory. The authority of the central 
government weakened and the provincial governments were unable to maintain law 
and order in the provinces. In this Hobbesian situation, peripheral provinces populated 
by peoples identifying themselves with different ethnicities and nationalities from 
Persia began asserting their deep-seated grievances against the central government 
dominated by Persians4.  
 
When the First World War began, Iran had announced its official policy of neutrality. 
Ahmad Shah, who announced the policy, had no significant forces to back up his 
policy. For this and other reasons, Russian and Turkish troops competed to take 
control of Northern sections of the country and Britain subsequently controlled South 
and East. Furthermore, Germans carried on successful efforts to harness the Russian 
and British until the end of the war, although they did not succeed in getting Persian 
government to abandon its policy of neutrality5. The fighting movements and 
maintenance of Turkish and Russian troops increased the chaos already prevalent in 
the peripheral provinces of Azerbaijan and contributed to the famine of 1918 that 
caused the death of a quarter of the agriculture population. It must be noted that the 
Kurdish populated area was not affected and almost remained unaffected.  
 
Persian’s most fundamental concern was that if the allies won the war, Persian 
independence and integrity would be lost. They, therefore, regarded Germans, 
regardless of the actual objective of German policy in Persia, as the most effective 
source of help to save Persia’s independence and territorial integrity. For this main 
reason, not only Germans meet with favourable receptions in high government circles, 
but they succeeded in organising a separate national government in Kermanshah, 
mostly populated by the Kurds. From a Persian perspective, Russian and British 
rigorous influence in Persia could be counterbalanced by  German’s modest influence. 
On Northern front, Russia, now under a new leadership pre-occupied with domestic 
unrest, decided to withdraw its troops by the end of 1917. Furthermore, Turkish troop 
morale was low and the Nationalist forces on Northern and Southern fringes of the 
                                                 
4 Martin Van Bruinseen, “ Iran’s Kurds During Great War”, New York, Yale University Press, 1989: p 
21 
5 Ibid, p 27 
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Empire made remarkable advances in liberating their nationalist-marked lands. The 
defeat of the Axis powers by the end of the war which was followed by the Russian 
domestic change had left Britain in a more favourable position that could hold the 
powerful cards to affect events in Persia6.  These developments in the aftermath of the 
First World War I created a more physical space for the Kurdish-leaning nationalists 
in Eastern Kurdistan7. In other word, Persia was in decline and was exposed to come 
apart along ethnic lines. The weakness  of the central government over the peripheral 
areas accompanied with withdrawal of Russian troops and weakness of the Ottoman’s 
military position in Azerbaijan allowed to the Kurdish tribal chieftains to rise up 
against the against Persia. At this point, Kurds were intent to use the opportunity to 
liberate  Eastern Kurdistan.  
 
8.3 Rise of Peripheral Nationalism 
 
Michael Hetches defines State-building nationalism as “the nationalism that is 
embodied in the attempt to assimilate or incorporate culturally distinctive territories in 
a given state. It is the result of the conscious efforts of central rulers to make a 
multicultural population culturally homogeneous”8. He furthermore believes that 
since the rationale for state-building nationalism is often geopolitical - to secure 
borders from real or potential rivals - this kind of nationalism tends to be culturally 
inclusive.  
 
Given the Persian case, Persia throughout eighteenth century was not integrated and 
the Persian (Fars) nationalism was dominant to an extent that it practically failed to 
incorporate other ethnics in culturally distinctive territories within a state. Although in 
the first decade of the twentieth  century an attempt was made to expand the effective 
authority of the state to all adjacent territories, but the kind of nationalism discourse 
the central state promoted at the policy level and to an extent at rhetorical level was 
exclusive, for Persian identity mainly reflected Fars-ethno centrism and the concept of 
Persia naturally gave a sense of exclusiveness in relation to other ethnic identities in 
                                                 
6 Ibid, p 28 
7 Ibid, p 32 
8 Micheal Hetcher, “Containing Nationalism”, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 2000: p 
16  
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Iran, including Kurds, Baluches, Arabs, Gilanis and Mazadaranis. The Persian rulers 
unlike the European rulers, who tried state-building nationalism to extend the state 
authority, were vehemently apprehensive of other ethnicities. This is not to say that 
Western European state-nationalism did not produce backlashes but speaking from a 
comparative context, Persian rulers did not leave the necessary space for other ethnics 
to practise their cultural and linguistic rights without aggressive government 
restrictions.  
 
The government policies failed to create a harmony reflected in the reactions of 
ethnicities, notably Kurds. With further eroding of the central state authority over 
large swaths of periphery during and after the First World War, peripheral nationalism 
surfaced in a violent form as was the case in Baluchistan, Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. 
Peripheral nationalism, according to Micheal Hetcher, “occurs when a culturally 
distinctive territory resists incorporation into an expanding state, or attempts to secede 
and set up its own government”9. Very often this type of nationalism is spurred by 
efforts of state-building nationalism. It must be noted in the case of Persia, no serious 
attempt was made by the central government to homogenise a culturally 
heterogeneous Persia through an inclusive programme. As a consequence of the 
government failure, Persia had shaped an identity crisis that posed a potential prospect 
for the division of the country. It is at this point that the resentment against the central 
state became increasingly assertive in the second decade of the twentieth century. In 
the course of the two decades, the peripheral nationalist tendencies constantly 
emerged and surfaced in a way that posed a challenge to the integrity of Persia 
dominated by Farses.  
 
8.4 Geo- Politics and Ethnic Make Up 
  
The Kurds who make up around 11 percent in Iran unlike the Kurds in the 
neighbouring countries have had to cope with the two special geo-political conditions: 
they have the Soviet Union as a neighbour, and they are part of a state made up of 
minorities. The central state is so determined to prevent any of the ethnic minorities 
achieving an autonomy which would set a precedent for others and which could lead 
                                                 
9 Ibid, p 23 
 126
to the break up of the state. In Iran, historically the aspirations of the Kurds for 
autonomy or independence are matched by the separatist tendencies in Azerbaijan 
(23-24 percent)10, Baluchistan (4-5 percent)11, Bakhtiaris (2-3 percent)12, the 
Georgians (1 - 2 percent)13, and the Arabs of Khuzestan (4 percent)14. It must be noted 
that Farsis are the majority of the population (45-46 percent). Thus, the policy of the 
successive governments in Iran has always been to centralise, to allow developed 
government in the provinces as long as long they remain loyal to Tehran and to crack 
down on the ethnic movements wanting autonomy within the state or outright 
independence15.  
 
From a historic perspective, from the time of the Czars to the present day, Iran has 
always had to regard the wishes and actions of its northern neighbour, and to step 
carefully in its own dealings with its people on the border zone. From the nineteenth 
                                                 
10 The Azerbaijanis (also known as Azeris) compose about a quarter of Iran’s population, and are the 
largest minority in Iran. They are Shi'i Muslims by faith), and in many respects are similar to the rest of 
the Iranian population, Many prominent Iranian Shi'i clerics have been and are Azeris. The main 
factors that differentiate them from the rest of the Iranian population are their Azerbaijani ethnicity), 
and their native language of Azeri Turkish). The Azeris live principally in the northwestern Iranian 
provinces of East/West Azerbaijan as well as in urban centers such as Tehran 
11 The Baluchis--who constitute the majority of the population in Baluchestan and Sistan. They are part 
of a larger group that forms the majority of the population of Baluchistan Province in Pakistan and of 
some areas in southern Afghanistan. In Iran the Baluchis are concentrated in the Makran highlands, an 
area that stretches eastward along the Gulf of Oman coast to the Pakistan border and includes some of 
the most desolate country in the world. The Baluchis speak an Indo-Iranian language that is distantly 
related to Persian and more closely related to Pashtu, one of the major languages of Afghanistan and 
Pakistan 
12 The Bakhtiari tribe inhabits an area of approximately 67,000 sq. km (25,000 sq. mi) that straddles the 
central Zagros Mountains in Iran. Although only about a third of the tribe is nomadic (the rest are 
settled agriculturists), the nomads embody the Bakhtiari cultural ideals. They specialize in producing 
meat and dairy products and migrate seasonally with their sheep, cattle, or goat herds from high plateau 
pastures, where they spend the summer, west of the city of Esfahan, to lowland plains in the province 
of Khuzistan for winter herd grazing. Their migration is among the most spectacular known among 
nomadic paternalists anywhere. They are obliged to cross mountain passes at about 3,050 m (10,000 ft) 
and therefore have to time their movement with extreme care in order to minimize the danger of early 
snowfall, flooding mountain rivers, and lack of grazing. Traditionally these dangers took a heavy toll, 
but in recent years the government has helped the migration by building bridges, improving the route, 
and setting up fodder supplies en route 
13 The center of Georgians in Iran is a small city to the west of Isfahan, Iran's second largest city, 
named Fereydoon  Shahr.In many other places such as Najaf Abad, Rahmat Abad (near Isfahan) and 
Orji Mahalle in northern Iran, there are ethnic Georgians 
 
14 The province of Khuzestan is situated in the southwest of Iran, and covers an area of 63,238 sq. km. 
The various townships of the said province are as follows: Abadan, Andimeshk, Omidiyeh, Ahvaz 
Eazeh, Baq-e-Malek, Mah Shahr, Behbahan, Khoram Shahr, Dezful, Dasht-e-Azadegan, Ramhormoz, 
Shadegan, Shoosh, Shooshtar and Masjed Soleiman.  
15 Pelletiere, Stephen C., The Kurds: An Unstable Element in the Gulf, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 
1984: p 178  
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century onwards, Russia had retained a sphere of influence in the northern half of the 
country, while European powers vied for control of the south. That state status quo 
remained effective until the US and Britain took over by invading the country in 
World War Two. In Iran, the Kurdish question, given the historic context, has always 
been part of the above said geo-political conditions. In other word, the question of the 
Kurds in Iran is more complex than in the neighbouring countries as the Iranian social 
and political make up is more heterogeneous than Iraq and Turkey 16(See Map 9 of 
Iran below).  
 
 
                                               Map 9 shows ethnographic of Iran17  
                                                 
16 Ibid, 180  
17 www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/iran 
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8.5 The Kurdish Rebellion: A Potential Challenge to the State of 
Persia 
 
8.5.1  Kurds between Ottomans and Persia 
In order to put the events into a proper context a few short remarks on political 
developments in the area during Simko’s time should be made. In 1906 Ottoman 
troops invaded Iranian Azerbaijan and occupied a significant part of the Kurdish-
inhabited districts of that province. They remained present, though not in full control, 
until 1911, when they were expelled by the Russians. The latter had in 1909 invaded 
the province and occupied Tabriz which was then, together with Rasht, the last 
bastion of Iran’s Constitutional movement. They stationed infantry and Cossacks in 
Tabriz, Khoy, Dilman and Urmiyeh, all belonging to the province of Azerbaija. Until 
the outbreak of the First World War they managed to keep a measure of law and 
order. During the war, Azerbaijan was occupied by the Turks in turn (January 1915), 
the Russians (1916-17) and the Turks again (1918). In late 1914 the Nestorians of 
Hakkari, fearing genocide under the Ottomans, fled to Urmiyeh and Salmas, the two 
Kurdish cities , seeking Russian protection18. Many of them were to help the Russians 
as advance scouts when they invaded central Kurdistan and often took private revenge 
on the Muslim population. Around this time, Christian-Muslim relations deteriorated 
badly during the war. 
After the 1918 Britain was in control of present Iraq with the exception of its 
mountainous north-east. The Kemalists were soon active all over Turkey. They had 
important centres at Rowanduz, a strategic town located on border where borders of 
Iran, modern Turkey, and Iraq meet (which the British considered theirs) and at Van, 
and they attempted to mobilise the Kurds against the British. The latter did the same: 
they made many promises with respect to the establishment of an independent 
Kurdistan, which was to serve as a buffer zone between Turkey and Iraq19. 
                                                 
18 Cited in Bruinseen, “Kurds During the Great War”, P 56  
19 Ibid, p 58  
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Meanwhile Iran’s post-war government was weak and torn by internal struggles 
among the political elite and by secessionist movements in Gilan and Azerbaijan, and 
Baluchistan. The Anglo-Iranian treaty signed by the Tehran government in 1919 
provoked a wave of popular protest that further weakened the central government. In 
1920 the middle classes of Tabriz revolted against the central government in Tehran. 
Some other Azerbaijani towns followed suit, and for several months an independent 
republic (named Azadistan) existed there. It was Riza Khan who, after his coup d’etat 
of 1921, succeeded in eliminating all centrifugal tendencies that emerged in the 
periphery of Persia (including that of the Kurds). Raza Khan’s main attempt was 
aimed at integrating Iran  received large blows from international and internal forces. 
In other word, the Kemalist movement in Turkey made a significant impact on Raza 
Khan in order to proceed with the process of national integration. By 1923, Kemalist 
Turkey was internationally accepted. The recognition of Turkey at Lusan further 
encouraged Raza Khan to integrate peripheral ethnicities into the central structure. 
Thus, the possibility of an independent Kurdistan seemed lost, or at least receded into 
an unclear and probably distant future20.See 10 map bellow  
 
 
                      Map 10 Shows Kurdistan surrounded by hostile neighbouring nations21.  
 
                                                 
20 Ibid, p 68  
21 www.princeton.edu/~humcomp/modiran 
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8.5.2  The Factors That Contributed to the Rise of Smko 
Around the turn of the century at least three chieftains were competing for paramount 
leadership of the Shikak22. The strongest was probably Ali Agha of the Avdovi 
Pisaqas; his sons Jafar Agha and Ismail Agha, nicknamed Simko, earned themselves a 
good a reputation as daring warriors. The second chieftain was Umar Agha, who led 
the Mamedi tribe (according to some sources he was an uncle of Simko, but there is 
much confusion), and the third was Mustafa Agha (later succeeded by his brother 
Ismail) of the Kardar Pisaqas who had also some other tribes and sub-tribes under his 
control. There was a high turnover of chieftains during those years. Another section of 
Avdovi Pisaqas, led by Ali’s brother Yusuf, living further south, was dispersed when 
Ali rose to power at Yusuf’s expense, and many of them were subsequently killed by 
the rival Kardars. Umar Agha of the Mamedi was killed by Iranian officials in 1902, 
and Mustafa Agha by his Avdovi rivals in 1906. Around the same time Jafar Agha, 
who had held official titles but continued to irritate the government of Azerbaijan by 
his raids on Urmiyeh, Salmas and Khoy, was invited to Tabriz by the Iranian heir 
apparent and treacherously killed23. 
It must be noted that it was disappearance of most other experienced chieftains that 
made Simko’s rapid rise possible. However, he was a clever and an opportunist 
politician who knew with whom to ally himself and when. As a young man he had 
assisted his brother Jafar in his raids, and he was to continue raiding throughout his 
career, thus attracting many roughs into his retinue. In the Constitutional Revolution 
of Persia, Simko turned against the Constitutionalists (urban Azaris) and, without 
being invited, took 300 horsemen to join the forces of Iqbal al-Saltaneh, the governor 
of Maku, against the anjuman of Khoy or the constitutionalists. As a reward Simko 
was made sub-governor of Qotur district. In order to take advantage of him against 
the constitutional movement, the central government confirmed the appointment24. 
                                                 
22 Shkak is the name of the large Kurdish tribe in north of Iranian Kurdistan bordering modern Turkey 
and it is made up of many small tribes around the Urumeya,Salmas and Khoy. The area remained intact 
during the First World War. They were  more well-organised and well-disciplined than other Kurdish 
Tribes further South Iranian Kurdistan.  
23 See Martin Van Bruinseen, Agha, shaikh and state: the social and political structures of Kurdistan. 
London: Zed Books, 1992: p 32  
24 Ibid, p 34  
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Neither the Turks nor the Russians occupied the Shikak lands before the First World 
War; Simko’s contacts with both were mainly indirect. Prior to 1913 he appears to 
have co-operated with pro-Ottoman, anti-Russian Azerbaijanis, but in 1913 he 
delivered one of these, who had sought refuge with him, to the Russians in an attempt 
to gain their goodwill. He was apparently successful, for in that same year a Russian 
observer noticed that two chieftains who had previously been clients of Ismail Agha 
of the Kardar Pisaqas (Simko’s main rival) swore, under Russian pressure, fidelity to 
him. By that time Simko was in regular contact with Kurdish nationalist circles. 
Nationalist and private ambitions went together in him and cannot be separated. He 
had married a sister of Sheikh Sayyid Taha, grandson and successor of the famous 
Sheikh Ubeydullah. This was a convenient marriage, for the sayyid was the most 
influential man across the border, besides being a leading nationalist. Simko and 
Sayyid Taha were to co-operate much in the following decade. Another of Simko’s 
contacts was Abd al-Razzaq Bedirkhan of the famous nationalist family descending 
from the emirs of Botan. Sayyid Taha, Abd al-Razzaq and Simko’s brother Jafar had 
previously been invited to Russia, whence they had returned with ‘generous gifts and 
encouraging messages that stimulated their imaginations and ambitions. Abd al-
Razzaq started publishing a monthly Kurdish newspaper in Urmiyeh in 1912. After 
some time, however, the Russians banished him from Urmiyeh, and according to one 
historians, it was Simko who took over the responsibility for the paper until it stopped 
publication in 191425. By 1914, Smko, the chief of leading Shikak tribe, emerged as 
the most powerful figure that could command respect and authority among almost 
other Kurdish tribes in North and South part of Iranian Kurdistan. His prominence 
posed a challenge to the central government.  
 
8.5.3  Simke’s Pragmatism during the First World War 
During the war Simko stood aloof from the real fighting, trying to keep all doors 
open, while expanding his control of the frontier districts. The Russians once arrested 
him and sent him to prison in Tiflis but, expecting to achieve more with the carrot 
than the stick, they let him return to Azerbaijan on the condition that he lived in the 
town of Khoy and remained loyal. When the troops of the Russian general Baratoff 
were called back from central Kurdistan after the Bolshevik revolution, Simko 
                                                 
25 Ibid, p 45  
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managed to capture many of their arms, including field-guns. From other parts of 
Kurdistan too arms started flowing towards Simko, who had by then already a wide 
reputation as a nationalist leader. These arms were either left behind by departing 
Russians or had belonged to the Kurdish militias that had fought on the Turkish 
side26. 
Simko was not the only one to arm himself, however. The Nestorian Assyrians (the 
local ones, but especially the refugees from Hakkari, who were more militant) were 
quite well-armed too, and they were reinforced by equally well-armed Armenians 
from Anatolia. The departing Russians, unable to protect them any longer, left many 
arms behind and stimulated them to organise in fighting units. According to Arfa, a 
French military mission had also brought arms for the Assyrians to defend themselves 
against the Turks. The Assyrians had desires similar to Simko’s: the establishment of 
an independent state, in Urmiyeh and Salmas. The local Muslim population (Azaris in 
the plains and Kurds in the mountains) were hardly pleased, and the Iranian 
government even less so. Famine and mutual depredations, in which the departing 
Russians had no small share, led to increased bitterness between Christians and 
Muslims. It was especially the Azaris and the ‘non-tribal’ Kurds that suffered, for the 
Christians were better armed. During riots in Urmiyeh in February 1918, the 
Christians got the upper hand and took control of the entire town. The Iranian 
government was incapable of restoring order. The governor of Tabriz, Mukht-i 
Shams, then approached Simko. At his instigation Simko invited Mar Shimun, the 
religious and secular leader of the Nestorians, for talks on a proposed alliance, and 
had him treacherously killed in March 191827. 
Simko’s men took no part, however, in the subsequent fighting between the invading 
Turkish armies and the Armenians and Nestorians, whom the British then attempted 
to mould into a force capable of stopping the Turkish advance. Only when most of the 
Nestorians, lacking strong leadership after the death of their leader, Shimun, fled in 
panic from Urmiyeh did his men join Turkish soldiers in their pursuit, killing many in 
                                                 
26 Ibid, p 47  
27 Ibid, p 59  
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June and July 1918. Turkish soldiers and irregular bands of Kurds entered the town 
and brought the town under their control28.  
The Armistice brought an end to the Turkish presence in Azerbaijan, and no strong 
government was left. The Iranian government appointed new governors at Tabriz and 
Urmiyeh, but they did not succeed in establishing control of western Azerbaijan. The 
only authority with a strong power base was Simon, whose private retinue had been 
reinforced with several hundred Ottoman soldiers, many of them Kurds, either simply 
deserters or people with nationalist motivations; others were mercenaries attracted by 
the high pay and the fact that Simko gave them wives. With their field-guns (some of 
them taken from the Russians) and machine-guns, they were to prove more than a 
match for the ill-trained government troops of Azerbaijan29.  
The government had for some time no way of subjecting Simko who continued more 
boldly than ever to raid the plains. The governor of Urmiyeh, Sardar-i Fatih, visited 
Simko in his stronghold at Chahriq (south-west of Dilman) and attempted to win him 
over by peaceful means, but Simko apparently saw this as further proof of weakness, 
and even expanded the areas where he took the tribute (‘loot’ in the Iranian 
perception, ‘taxation’ in his own) that was necessary to maintain his army. Some time 
later the governor of Tabriz, Mukarram al-Mulk, had recourse to modern technology 
and sent Simko a bomb-parcel that had been made to look like a box of sweets. Its 
explosion killed a younger brother of Simko and several of his retainers but failed to 
hurt Smko30. The rise of Smko was clearly a challenge to the central government that 
hardly could control other peripheral nationalist movements in Khuzistan, 
Baluchistan, Gilan and Mazandaran.  
8.5.4 Simko’s Rebellion Against the central government 
While the central government struggled to survive in the face of internal crisis and 
international pressure, Simko was busily preparing for the establishment of 
independence. In February 1919 there was a meeting of most important chieftains of 
Iranian Kurdistan, at which the proposal for an open insurrection against the Iranian 
                                                 
28 Ibid, p 61  
29 See Bruinseen Thesis on “Agha, shaikh and state: on the social and political organization of Kurdistan”. 
Ph.D. thesis, Utrecht University, 1978: pp 100-122  
30 Ibid, p 124  
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government was discussed. It was decided to postpone the rising until it had become 
clear what the attitude of the world powers in the region was going to be. The Kurds 
made an attempt to galvanise international support and for this reason Sayyid Taha, 
who had joined Simko and closely co-operated with him visited Baghdad in May 
1919 in order to obtain British support for an independent Kurdish state. On other 
hand, Simko himself addressed the Civil Commissioner, A.T. Wilson, by letter with 
similar requests. Neither received a definite commitment. According to Armenian 
sources, “Simko and Sayyid Taha were at the same time in touch with the Turkish 
nationalists at Van, the modern Kurdish city on the Turkish side, who wished to 
employ them for resisting the proposed repatriation of Armenians to eastern Anatolia 
and therefore promised help”31. In the following years the two Kurdish chieftains 
were to remain in contact with both the British and the Turkish nationalists32. 
Furthermore, according to Burinseen, a notable scholar on Kurdish nationalism, the 
Kurdish-Turkish diplomatic contact achieved a degree of success in that Turkey 
retrained the Kurds of Iran from supporting the elements of the Kurds who were 
hostile to Attatuk, and Iranian Kurds restrained the Turks to stop supporting their 
Turkish cousines in Azerbaijan, who were hostile to Simko33.  
Prematurely, without waiting for the other chieftains to declare themselves in open 
rebellion, Simko took the town of Dilman and laid siege to Urmiyeh and occupied 
part of the Azari population of the Lakistan district (north-west of Dilman) that 
refused to recognise his authority and pay taxes. Those who escaped were pursued as 
far as Sharafkhaneh on the northern shore of Lake Urmiyeh. Bruinseen assumes that 
the Kurdish tribes had been critically divided along their tribal interests and it may 
have been a chief factor behind the Simke’s decision to act without waiting them. 
Smko was cognizant of the fact the division among other Kurdish tribes were too 
wide to be narrowed down or bridged.  In addition to that, at the time central 
government was weak in and around Urumya and Azaris were not well-organised to 
stop Simko’s forces. Thus, during the autumn of 1919 Simko’s Kurds kept these 
districts north of the lake under occupation . Perceiving the danger from the Kurdish 
nationalist forces, the rural Azaris who experienced a looting from Simko’s forces 
                                                 
31 Ibid, p 134  
32 Also see Bruinsen on “ Kurdish tribes and the state in Iran: the case of Simko's revolt", in: Richard 
Tapper (ed.), The conflict of tribe and state in Iran and Afghanistan. London: Croom Helm, 1987: p 12  
33 Ibid, p 13 
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offered their full support behind the central government. Tabriz had a new military 
commander, Intisar, who efficiently mobilised and co-ordinated whatever troops he 
could find (gendarmerie, Cossacks, irregular Azari cavalry). Led by Filipov, a 
Russian Cossack officer who had just arrived from Tehran, these troops managed to 
repel Simko’s Kurds and to inflict heavy losses upon them. As a result, Simko was 
forced to take refuge in his mountain stronghold at Chahriq; many of his partisans 
deserted him (including several of the former Ottoman soldiers). For reasons which 
are unclear, however, instead of following up their initial success and forcing Simko 
to surrender unconditionally, Filipov and Intisar entered negotiations with him. As a 
result of the negotiations, Simko promised to compensate damage done in Lakistan 
and to send off his Turkish soldiers and to surrender all his arms to the state34. 
None of these promises was fully executed by Simko, and the whole affair ultimately 
strengthened Simko’s standing among the Kurds: he could apparently act against the 
state with impunity. During 1920 he re-established his control of the plains of 
Urmiyeh and Salmas and the southern parts of Khoy district. In Urmiyeh, he 
appointed men of his own choice as governors: at first Arshad al-Mulk, a local man, 
later Teymur Agha, a Kurdish chieftain from Kuhnehshahr. His men raided a vast 
area, mainly to acquire firearms and finance his future exploits. The areas under their 
control were ‘taxed’, and the central state preoccupied to contain other insurgent 
elements in the country was too weak to contain Smko’s forces. This status quo 
remained until 1921. Gendarmerie troops sent from Tabriz to relieve the area were 
defeated by the Kurds and pushed back behind Sharafkhaneh (March 1921). Simko 
proved the strongest again, and thereby attracted many new followers35.Other 
victories over government troops during that year resulted in further increases of 
support from other Kurdish tribes. In March 1921 his forces were still described as 
1000 horses and 500 foot, with a Kurdish flag; in a summer campaign they were 
already estimated at 4000, in the autumn of 1921 at 7000, while in his last great 
campaign, in the summer of 1922, 10,000 men are said to have participated. Each of 
the advances Simko’s forces made against the central government, the more Kurds 
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paid allegiances to him. Simko’s authority was recognised by a growing number of 
tribes36. 
Knowing that the nationalist forces need wider support to control all over Kurdistan, 
Smko had made contacts with almost all tribes further down in the South of Iranian 
Kurdistan. Early in 1920 there had been several meetings of a ‘Council of Kurdish 
chiefs’ presided over by Simko, which were attended not only by chieftains of some 
of the biggest tribes of Azerbaijan (Herki, Begzadeh, Haydaran, Shikak), but also by 
chieftains of the Artushi confederacy and other tribes of Hakkari in modern Turkey. It 
was said that in 1921 Simko appointed Ahmad Khan as the paramount chieftain of the 
Herki, and that this was generally accepted by this powerful tribe. It seems again as 
usual that the nationalist aspiration was arguably  the most effective factors behind the 
unification of Kurdish tribes against the central state37. In this sense, Bruninseen 
believes motivations were of a mixture: nationalist and private.   
By the middle of 1921 the area under Simko’s authority included all Iranian territory 
west of Lake Urmiyeh and from there south as far as Baneh and Sardasht (southern 
part Iranian Kurdistan), as well as the north-western districts of Iraq, where the British 
and the Kemalists were still competing for control. Besides the entire Shikak 
confederacy and the Herki tribe, also the Mamash, Mangur, Dehbokri, Piran, Zarza, 
Gewrik, Feyzullahbegi, Pizhdar and the minor tribes around Baneh had joined Simko. 
In October 1921 Simko’s troops entered the town of Souj Bulagh (Mahabad), which 
had until that date been held by government troops. 200 of the gendarmerie garrison 
were killed, another 150 were injured. It is worthwhile to note that forces of Simko 
pillaged the whole city which created immense resentment from the town’s people38.  
Souj Bulagh was strategic and the last bastion of the central government troops and 
naturally became the capital. Simko did not take residence there himself, however, but 
appointed a loyal chieftain, Hamzeh Agha of the Mamash, as governor. The Azari 
towns of Mianduab, Maragheh and Binab sent letters of submission to Souj Bulagh39. 
It is worthwhile to note that a chief factor behind the non-Kurdish tribes for Smko 
                                                 
36 Ibid, p 24  
37 Ibid, 27  
38 cited in John Joseph, Muslim-Christian relations and inter-Christian rivalries in the Middle East: the 
case of the Jacobites in an age of transition (Albany: SUNY Press, 1983), p 23  
39 Ibid, p 41  
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was not only their hostility towards Raza Khan Government but also the fear and 
intimidation Simko forces created in the area. According to some sources, his forces 
had bad reputation through looting and plundering40.  
Further military successes against government troops that year added to Simko’s 
standing among the Kurds, and swelled the number of his followers. By July 1922 his 
territory reached its greatest extension: it stretched as far east and south as Sain Qaleh 
(Shahin Dezh) and Saqqiz. Moreover, Simko was in permanent communication with 
tribes further south: he had influence in Mariwan and Awroman, and even tribes as far 
south as Luristan were to rise in support of his revolt. Similarly, many Kurdish 
chieftains in Turkey and Iraq had established friendly relations with him (See map 10 
of Iranian Kurdistan below). Although, there were no concrete plans for united action, 
but it could never harm to have relations with a successful social climber such as 
Simko Rumours started to circulate that the Iranian government was going to grant 
the Kurds autonomy because it could not subdue them. Those rumours were to prove 
unfounded, however41.  
                                                 
40 Ibid, 42  
41 Ibid, 45 
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                  Map 10   shows Eastern Kurdistan and the area under the control of Kurds during 1920s  
Since the coup d’é tat of February 1921 Riza Khan had devoted his energies to the 
building of a modern, disciplined, coherent national army. His efforts were soon to 
bear fruit. During 1921 and even in early 1922 Simko had been able to inflict repeated 
defeats on the government troops (irregulars, Cossacks, gendarmerie) sent against 
him, capturing many of their arms. In August 1922 however, a well-coordinated 
campaign by the reorganised army brought him to heel. The success of the central 
government over Simko, however, had more to do with international support for the 
Raza Khan than with the Iranian army. Around the same time, the British preferred to 
put their support behind Raza Khan and the Turks did not want to drag their legs into 
a conflict on their sensitive borders .In addition to that, fearing and assuming the 
unfair treatment from Simko’s force, the Shitte Kurds of the Southern Iran around the 
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city of Kermshan switched their allegiance to Tehran. Again, religion proved to be 
more effective factor than nationalism in the determining the Kurdish allegiance. With 
advances of Raza Khan Troops towards the heart of Kurdish-lands, Simko’s followers 
dispersed, leaving him nothing but a small band of loyal men. He had to escape into 
Turkey and from there to Iraq. Edmonds, who interviewed him on his arrival in Iraq, 
observed that he was especially bitter against the Turks and the British. The former 
had always promised him assistance but they too had now turned their armies against 
him, and the latter had passively allowed him to be crushed in spite of his usefulness 
to them42. 
As a refugee in Iraq, Simko did not remain idle but immediately started attempting to 
strengthen old ties and establish new ones with Kurdish chieftains there, in 
preparation for a return to Iran. He approached his old ally Sayyid Taha who was now 
used by the British to get the Turks out of Rowanduz and had lost interest in further 
adventures in Iran, and also Sheykh Mahmud of Suleymaniyeh, the most influential 
nationalist leader of southern Kurdistan who showed equally little interest in Simko’s 
problems. He even tried to appease the Assyrian refugees, who had been brought to 
Iraq by the British, and who still thought of return to Urmiyeh and Salmas. In 1923 he 
went to Turkey, to solicit Turkish support, but equally in vain. In 1924 Riza Khan 
pardoned him, and he returned to Iran. In 1926 he made a last abortive attempt to 
regain the virtual independence he had once held, and besieged the town of Dilman, 
assisted by sections of the Herki and Begzadeh tribes. This time, in the face of a more 
powerful and well-armed armies of Raza Khan, Smko’s attempts did not produce any 
outcome, and his army was crushed. Again he had to flee to Iraq. In 1929 the Iranian 
government invited him back again, offering him the governorate of Ushnuviyeh. A 
few days after his arrival he was killed in an ambush set up by the same government43 
8.5.5  The Organisational Weakness 
The most serious weakness of Simko’s movement was the absence of any kind of 
formal organisation. There was just the network of Simko’s private relations, no party 
to organise the followers, no formal government or war council. The major towns, 
Urmiyeh and Souj Bulagh, were administered by governors appointed by Simko who 
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were tribal chieftains unrelated to the inhabitants of the towns and simply took over 
the offices of the previous Tabriz-appointed governors, and to large degree the 
inhabitants of the towns despised them for their authoritarian attitude. There was no 
systematic and equitable taxation; Simko’s treasury was filled by indiscriminate 
looting, although, most  were inimical to him44. 
The Kurdish armed force constantly fluctuated in size, as tribal loyalty stood at its 
core and those loyalties shifted according to the circumstances. The more or less 
permanent nucleus consisted of the chieftains’ retinues, more precisely those of 
Simko himself and of Amr Khan, head of the Kardar section of the Shikak. In 1918 
Simko’s retinue included several hundred former soldiers of the Ottoman army, well-
armed and trained by German instructors. In 1921-22 Simko was said to have a large 
Turkish contingent which, the Iranians and British suspected, had been put at his 
disposal by the Ankara government. Suspicions were never confirmed. It is 
worthwhile to mention that there were Kurdish nationalists from Turkish Kurdistan 
among his retinue too. Even this central core, however, was not really permanent. 
Many of the Ottoman soldiers who had joined Simko surrendered when they were 
promised amnesty during the 1919 campaign by Intisar and Filipov and their 
surrender indicates that ethnicity among the Azaris and their Turkish brethern was 
more effective than private interests. Furthermore, retainers from Kurdish tribes also 
came and went according to Simko’s fortunes, motivated more by pay and booty than 
by nationalist sentiment. Whereas by July 1922 consistent success had swollen his 
forces to some 10, 000, but after the first reverses they dwindled, and within a few 
days no more than a thousand loyal followers remained45. 
A strong retinue appeared to be a necessary condition for any chieftain who had 
embarked upon an expansive political career. Once his strength was perceived, many 
others may have joined who were not, and would not become retainers. In Simko’s 
raids and battles against government troops not only his retainers but many other 
tribesmen took part. These were primarily Shikak, and especially from the Avdovi, 
Mamedi and Kardar component tribes. At times of Simko’s good fortune, chieftains 
of other tribes also joined, with their retainers and with common tribesmen. It was 
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especially the Herki tribe that contributed many men: the Herki and the Mamash 
proved to be Simko’s most loyal allies. Others joined later and deserted earlier. At 
times of adversity even the closest allies left Simko. Thus Amr Khan, the head of the 
Kardar Pisaqas and therefore Simko’s main  potential rival among the Shikak, who 
had on many occasions acted as Simko’s plenipotentiary in 1922 attempted to desert 
him. He contacted the government through a local sheykh as intermediary and 
demanded amnesty, in exchange for which he promised obedience to the government 
and willingness to fight against Simko. Amr Khans allegiance towards Raza Khan 
government seemed to have considerably weakened conviction and commitment 
among nationalist forces in general and in particular among the other components of 
the Shkak’s tribe46. 
Simko not only sought support among the tribes; he also attempted to ally himself 
with foreign powers. Repeatedly he tried to elicit British support, usually through 
chieftains who had better relations with the British than he had himself: for example, 
Sayyid Taha, or Babakr Agha of the Pizhdar. In this regard, he had little if any 
success. At the same time he was in communication with the Soviet authorities in the 
Caucasus and with the Kemalists at Van. Some of his letters to the former were 
apparently intercepted; British and Iranian authorities were convinced that the 
Kemalists had put troops at his disposal, as already mentioned. But the fact is that 
none of these foreign powers came to his support when he most needed them. In the 
early phases of his career, however, his association with state authorities (the Iranians, 
who made him a governor of Qotur; the Russians and Ottomans who recognised him 
during the occupation) had strengthened his position among the Kurds. Such relations 
with neighbouring states have — it has been said before — always been present in the 
politics of Kurdistan, and they continued to influence Kurdish nationalism in its later 
phases as well. They may well be considered part and parcel of Kurdish tribal 
politics47. 
The large confederacy of tribes that was Simko’s movement continued to exist as long 
as the tribes were kept mobilised. Although, one of the factors that did mobilise them 
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was nationalism, yet the rapidity with which Simko’s support dwindled in times of 
adversity, suggests that for the majority of his followers nationalism was at best an 
additional motive. As usual among tribes, mobilisation should have some more 
practical and immediate object, and there should be reasonable chances of attaining it, 
be it a military victory or over a rival tribe or government troops or simply plunder. 
The frequent raiding associated with Simko’s rebellion, which many contemporary 
and later nationalists held against him, was not simply accidental to it: it probably was 
a necessary condition for keeping the tribes mobilised and thus together. When 
mobilisation ended — in this case because most tribesmen judged the chances of 
further success very small and therefore gave up — the unity immediately broke 
down. The same happened to many large confederacies in the past: a combination of 
internal and external factors mobilised the tribes and made them confederate 
themselves. When these stimuli disappeared or when the costs of confederating 
became too high, the confederacy fell apart, and little remained beyond its name and 
sometimes a respected but not obeyed chiefly lineage. In the case of Simko’s rebellion 
against the central government, mobilisation was not sustained indefinitely. 
Maintaining the unity once achieved requires some definite form of organisation, 
which is, however, beyond tribal politics. Smko did not provide an organisational 
structure to institutionalise a measure of mobilisation of the tribes through their 
division into rival confederacies48. In initial phases of the rebellion, the tribal 
chieftains dominated the core leadership and the primary motive for them was their 
narrowly-defined tribal interests. In addition to that, the Sunni Muslim Kurds 
rigorously dominated the nationalist movement, which rendered the large component 
of the Shittes Kurds in southern part of Kurdistan increasingly disinterested in the 
rebellion. These sectarian fault lines between the Kurdish Shittes and Sunnis 
continued to be a main factor of the division of the nationalist movement. 
Furthermore, the domination of the leadership by Sunni tribal chieftains, in effect, 
made the rebellion into an extension of tribo-sect politics .This was a serious 
weakness that contributed to the rapid collapse of the Kurdish nationalist in Iran from 
1919-1929 in the spit of the initial success they achieved in liberating Kurdish lands49. 
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8.5 Conclusion 
This chapter indicated that the Kurds of Iran during  the  First World War, were intent 
on taking the advantage of the weakness of the central state in Persia during and after 
the Great War.  Persia was too fragile to be able to hold the country together. Despite 
the weakness of the central state, Persia mainly banked on diplomacy to use the 
country the country’s ethnics against one another: Azaris against the Kurds and 
Gilanis against the Baluchis and Rushidis. This diplomatic approach persisted during 
the whole course of the Great War and even after.  
The Kurds who are densely populated in large swaths of the country bordering  
Turkey and Iraq tended to establish their own independent state, but their weak 
organisation and the lack of a cohesive nationalist sentiment among the dominant 
Kurdish tribes resulted in undermining their endeavours. By the time Simko 
commenced his rebellion against Persia in 1919, the Great War had ended, and the 
Kurds almost lost their leverage over the allied powers which they had during the war 
years. In another word, the Kurdish rebellion started when the great powers lost their 
interest in the Kurds.  
The other factor that clearly contributed to the Kurdish failure is the fact that the 
Kurdish confronted the Aazaris bordering the Kurdistan in Azerbaijan area, and 
opening this front the Azaris were prompted to lean on the Kemalists in Turkey for 
support. Furthermore, the Kurdish confrontation with Azaris also created sympathy 
for Azaris on the part of their Shiite brothers in Persia50. It was obvious that for Persia 
the Kurds that are mostly Sunnis posed a greater danger for Persia than Azari 
nationalists sharing their Shiite beliefs with Persians. In addition to that, the Kurdish 
forces lacked a central structure to organise them. Their brute reputation as bandits 
and robbers more or less reduced support among the Kurds. The final factor 
diminishing the Kurdish prospects of success was the religious differences between 
the Sunni and the Shiite Kurds. During the entire course of the rebellion, the Kurdish 
Shiites that were predominantly inhabitants of the Southern of Iranian Kurdistan 
remained apprehensive of offering any support to the rebellion, the core of which was 
made up of the Sunni Kurds. In a more strict sense, they were more willing to lean to 
                                                 
50 ibid, 68  
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the central government than to the Kurdish movement. All factors explained above 
were among the chief reasons dooming the Kurdish rebellion against Persia to a 
complete failure.  
 
                     
 
Chapter Nine 
Syria 
9.1. Introduction 
After the treaty of Lusan was signed at between the Allies and Turkey in 1923 which 
in effect divided Kurdistan among the newly created nation states in the region, a 
comparatively small number of the Kurds became Syrians under the French mandate. 
It is noteworthy to mention that the Kurds under the French mandate were able to 
practice some of their cultural rights. The Kurds of the Syria speak Kurmanji 
language (Badini) and the majority are Sunnis Muslims. They adhere to distinctive 
Kurdish cultural practices and a shared national story, and they are greatly influenced 
by the Kurds in other neighbouring countries. They live in large numbers along the 
borders of Turkey and Iraq with large concentrations Jazira in the northeast, Kubani in 
the north and the Kurd Dagh in the northeast. Living in large numbers may have been 
a helpful factor in maintaining their distinctive character from that of the mainstream 
Arabs1.  
Syria's Kurds mostly live in a geocultural region located in present-day north-eastern 
Syria. This region covers greater part of the province of Al Hasakah. The main cities 
in this region are Al-Qamishli (or "Qamişlû" in Kurdish) and Al Hasakah (or 
"Hesaka" in Kurdish) and Ra al Aynn. Another region with a significant Kurdish 
population is in the northen part of Syria. Many Kurds live in metropolian areas and 
large cities of the country (see Map 10 bellow). Estimates of the number of Kurds in 
Syria vary widely, but they are believed to compose about 9 percent of the population. 
Although some Kurdish tribal groups have lived in the country for generations, many 
arrived from Turkey between 1924 and 1938, when Mustapha Kemal attempted to 
force his reform programs on the Kurds there2. Those Kurds who left Turkey which  
found Syria more tolerant to their social conservative outlook than Turkey engaged in 
an aggressive transformation of society.  
                                                 
1 Entessar, Nader, Kurdish Ethno nationalism, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992:p 12  
2 The Silenced Kurds, Human Rights Watch, Vol.8, No. 4, October 1996, Available at 
www.hrw.org/reports/1996/syria   
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                               Map 10 shows the Kurdish inhabitant area in Syria3  
 
The Kurds are fiercely independent tribal formations speaking their own language, 
Kirmanji. The Kurds in Syria like their ethnic brothern in Turkey, Iran and Iraq are a 
cohesive people with intricate inter-tribal ties and a deep pride in their own history 
and traditions. Most Kurds in Syria are farmers; some are city dwellers; and others are 
nomads who drive their flocks far into the mountains in the summer and graze them 
on the lowlands in the winter. Roughly 35 to 40 percent of the Kurds live in the 
foothills of the Taurus Mountains north of Aleppo. An equal number live in the 
Jazirah; about 10 percent in the vicinity of Jarabulus northeast of Aleppo; and from 10 
to 15 percent in the Hayy al Akrad (Quarter of the Kurds) on the outskirts of 
Damascus4.  
This chapter will examine the policies of Damascus towards the Kurds. Because the 
Kurds in Syria under the French mandate enjoyed certain aspects of their cultural 
rights, this chapter will attempt to explain the post-French mandate which marked a 
remarkable shift in government policy towards Kurds. In the context of the Arab 
nationalist-oriented policy practised without reservations in the Kurdish area, this 
chapter will analyse  the Arabisation policy initiated by the Asad regime.  
                         
                                                 
3 www.geographic.org/maps/new2/syria_maps 
4 Interview with Marwan Othman, International Viewpoint, autumn 2004.  
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9.2 Kurds During the French Mandate 
During the French mandate period in Syria (1920-1946), Kurds were allowed to 
organize politically and permitted to publish books and periodicals in their own 
language. Distrustful of the majority Arab Sunni population, the French authorities 
recruited disproportionate numbers of Kurds (as well as Christians and heterodox 
Muslims) into the police and military5. A Kurdish nationalist movement, 
Khoybun(Freedom Party), emerged in the 1920s and vigorously lobbied for greater 
cultural and political autonomy, but most of its demands (e.g. the establishment of 
Kurdish language schools, recognition of Kurdish as an official language, and the 
appointment of Kurdish administrators in Kurdish areas) were rejected by the French 
and one of its leading figures, the poet Osman Sabri, was sent into exile to 
Madagascar. While French relations with the Kurds soured, Arab and Kurdish Syrians 
maintained relatively peaceful relations during this period and the two communities 
joined together in agitating for Syrian independence. Beginning in 1956, however, a 
succession of Arab nationalist regimes came to power in Damascus and began 
suppressing the Kurdish minority. Teaching of the Kurdish language was outlawed 
and Kurdish media outlets were closed. The discovery of major oil fields in the 
Kurdish heartland (Qarah Shuk, 1956; Suwaydiyah, 1959) contributed to government 
paranoia about Kurdish separatism6. Tensions worsened after Syria joined Egypt in 
forming the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958. The UAR regime fired hundreds 
of Kurdish military officers, including the army chief of staff, Gen. Tawfiq 
Nizamaddin, and closed police and military academies to Kurdish applicants. The end 
of the French mandate clearly marked the start of suppressing the Kurds7.  
9.3 The Syrian Arab Nationalism: An Exclusive Identity 
 
 
From the begining of its independence years, the question of the Syrian national 
identity was a contentious issue. Like other neighbouring countries, where the Kurds 
live, the Syrian multi-ethnic and religious composition made identity a complicated 
dilemma. Robert Lowe believes that the struggle for Syrian independence from 
                                                 
5 Salah Badradin, The Kurdish National Movement in Syria (Beirut: The Kurdish Kawa Cultural 
Society, 2003, p 6  
6 Ibid, p 7  
7 Ibid, p 8 
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France was primarily fought in terms of not a Syrian Nationalist discourse, but of 
Arab nationalism. This made the question of identity more complex after the 
proclamation of the United Arab Republic between Egypt and Syrian in 1958. In 
addition to that, in1961 the official name of the country was called the ‘Syrian Arab 
Republic’. Pan-Arab Nationalism continued to be the official ideology of the state and 
placed Syria at the broader Arab nation. This exclusive nationalist discourse the State 
promoted had severe implications for the non-Arab minorities of the Syria, and the 
Kurds in particular who make up the largest minority group in the country8. Since the 
Kurds together with Arabs struggled for independence, they tended to shape an 
identity that could encompass all minorities in the country. The Arab nationalists 
enjoying the support from other nationalists in Egypt and Iraqi mainly place Pan-
Arabism at the heart of the state ideology.  
 
Syrian Arab attitudes towards the Syrian Kurds can be clearly seen within the context 
of the perceived threat posed by all Kurds to the Arab nation. This is the case 
especially given the bloody struggle between the Kurds and consecutive Arab 
governments in Iraq, a majority Arab speaking country. The state perceived the Kurds 
a far greater threat than that of other Syrian minorities. This was demonstrated in the 
implementation of special restrictions on the Kurds which had not been applied to 
other groups such as Armenians or Assyrians9. From the Syrian government 
perspective, the Kurds had little cause to complain and comfortably identify with the 
notion of the Syrian nation because they had been included as full Syrian citizens with 
equal rights and opportunities to other ethnic and religious groups. The state argument 
was true of a tiny fraction of the Kurds who became Arabicised but most Kurds 
refused to identify themselves with the notion of state nationalism dominated by 
ethnic Arabism. In the post-independence period, the state nationalism excluded the 
Kurds from the state ideology and also from individual social and economic 
advancement unless they became effectively Arabs in all but ethnic origin. This 
required abandoning Kurmanji in favour of Arabic and accepting cultural and political 
values and goals of Pan-Arab nationalism10. Although there had been many Kurds in 
positions of power or influence in Syria and the state often cited them as evidence of 
                                                 
8 Ibid, p 14  
9 Ibid, p 20  
10 Kreyenbroek, Philip G. and Allison C., Kurdish Culture and Identity, London, Zed Books, 1996: p 
56  
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Kurdish equality and immersion in the state. These Kurds tended to be urban and 
affluent, and they spoke Arabic rather than Kurmanji and had been reconciled to the 
Arabness of their identity. Those Arabicised Kurds commanded little influence and 
respect among the Kurds in the north who were largely resisting the official ideology 
of the state. Hence, the national identity of Syria became problematic and less 
cohesive in relation to the Kurds whose main ethnic features are largely distinct and 
distinguishable from that of Arabs. Syrian national identity with the balk of ethno-
centric Arab nationalism has remained an obstacle in the eyes of the average Kurds 
identifying themselves with Syrian nationalism11.  
 
9.4 Policy of Arabisation of the Kurds 
 
Official discrimination against the Kurds in Syria dates back to the 1930s and 
increased greatly in 1950s and 1960s during the height of Arab nationalism. The 
Kurds suffered from a lack of political representation, poor economic development 
and excessive restrictions on social and cultural expression. Kurdish customs and 
symbols were attacked, the Kurmanji (Kurdish dialectic spoken by Syrian Kurds) was 
banned from public use and the Kurdish music publications were forbidden. Any 
opposition activity has been always difficult and the nascent Kurdish political 
movement was shattered as Kurdish Parties were banned and it’s leaders and 
members  arrested and imprisoned. The state conducted a campaign of Arabisation in 
the late 1960s and 1970s under the government of Hafiz Al Asad, whose Bathist party 
came to power in 196312. The Arab Belt was a plan for a cordon sanitaire between 
Syrian and neighbouring Kurds around the Northern and North eastern rim of Jazira 
along the borders with Turkey and Iraq. The Kurdish land was confiscated and Kurds 
were forced out to resettle in the Syria interior to make way for Arabs. In effect, the 
Syrian state tended to de-territorialize the Kurds and dismantle their ethnic markings 
in Kurdistan. To back up the policy of Arabisation, the state deployed a strong 
military presence in this cordon and Arab settlements were provided with superior 
facilities and state benefits to encourage greater economic prosperity13. The Syrian 
                                                 
11 Kerim Yaldiz, ‘ The Kurds in Syria: Forgotten People’, Michigan, Michigan University Press, 2001, 
p 20  
12 Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked: The Suppression of Human Rights by the Asad Regime, (New 
Haven and London: Human Rights Watch Books/Yale University Press, 1991), pp. 96-97 
13 Ibid, p 98  
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government, furthermore, has changed Kurdish place names to Arabic, banned shop 
signs in Kurdish and prevented parents from registering their children with Kurdish 
names. In addition to that, the celebration of the Kurdish New Year, New Roz, was 
curtailed as the Kurds used their Kurdish new year to express their nationalist 
grievances14. Despite the minority Allawi status of the Asad regime, the state has 
pursued an aggressive policy of Arabisation throughout 1960s and 1970s in order to 
create a pure Arab nation in Syria. Although Arabisation was no longer vigorously 
pursued 1980s and 1990s, the regime remained inseparable from the old Arab 
nationalist rhetoric which expects aggressive cultural assimilation. Kurdish still 
remain banned from use in education, the public sector or business, in marked 
contrast to other minorities or foreign languages.  
 
9.5   Denial of Nationality 
 
The most pressing issue is the plight of the Kurds denied citizenship as a result of an 
extraordinary census carried out in 1962 in Al-Hasaka province in the north east of 
Syria, the most densely Kurdish-populated area of the century. The census arbitrarily 
stripped 120,000-150,000 citizens of Syrian citizenship, leaving them, and 
subsequently their children, denied of basic civil rights and condemned to poverty and 
discrimination15. The official justification was that these Kurds were alien infiltrators 
from Turkey who had recently crossed into Syria and hence had no entitlement to 
citizenship. These stateless people became known as the ajanib (foreigners). It is 
certain that a considerable number of Kurds did cross from Turkey in the 1920s and 
1930s but others were long present in the area. Those who failed to take part in the 
1962 census or who were born of unions between Ajanib and Syrians citizens could 
not have been officially registered. These unregistered persons (who are called 
‘maktomeen’ or muted ) do not exist in official records. These muted persons suffer 
even greater hardship and discrimination than the ajanibs. In Syria, there are 
approximately 200,000 registered ajanibs and 80,000-100,000 maktomeen. These 
Kurds whether ajanbis or maktomeen, are not allowed passports, can not vote or own 
property and are forbidden as foreigners from working in the public sector and in 
                                                 
14 Amnesty International Report, 1981, p 7-9 
15 Syria:for many Kurds, statelessness remains away of life, IRIN, 20 November 2005, 
www.irinnews.org/ME.asp  
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many professions. Their lack of the standard Syrian identity means they can not 
receive state benefits, travel internally or stay in a hotel. In brief, their freedom of 
movement was denied and this policy has been in place since the 1960s and has 
continued until today16. 
 
9.6 The Difficulties of the Kurdish Political Movement 
 
The Kurdish community initially responded to steadily growing government 
repression with a show of political unity. In 1957, the Kurdish Democratic Party of 
Syria (KDPS) was founded by a broad coalition of prominent Kurdish intellectuals 
calling for recognition of Kurdish national rights and an end to the marginalization of 
Kurds in the administration. Over the next few years, the KDPS recruited thousands 
of members and began developing a sophisticated political organization. In 1960, 
however, the government launched a massive crackdown, arresting KDPS Secretary-
General Nurredin Zaza and other key leaders of the group. Under the weight of severe 
government repression, the party quickly fragmented. The situation worsened after a 
1963 coup brought to power the Baath Party, which had been militantly anti-Kurdish 
since its inception in Syria in the mid-1940s17. The Baathist regime's paranoia about 
the Kurds was inflated by events next door in Iraq, where Mustafa Barzani's Kurdish 
Democratic Party (KDP) was rebelling against the central government. Because of 
Barzani's close ties with many KDPS leaders, Syria's new government feared that the 
Iraqi insurrection would spread18. Baathist land reform programs in the 1960s were 
designed to politically weaken the Kurdish community by destroying the economic 
power of its traditional elite. According to one source, 43% of all land seized under 
Syria's agrarian reform laws was in the governorate of JazeeraIn the early 1970s, the 
government began replacing Kurdish place names with Arabic names (e.g., the town 
of Kobani became "Ain al-Arab") and resettled thousands of Arabs in Kurdish areas 
bordering Turkey and Iraq. Although Syrian President Hafez Assad officially ended 
the so-called "Arab Belt" (al-hizam al-arabi) project in 1976, he allowed Arab settlers 
to remain on confiscated land and provided them with top-notch clinics, schools, and 
other facilities, fuelling resentment among their Kurdish neighbours. While the 
                                                 
16 Flynt Leverent, Inheritting Syria:Bashar’s Trial, Brookings, Washington D.C, 2005: p 54  
17 Ibid, p 55  
18 Ibid, 57  
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construction of hydroelectric dams on the Euphrates brought electricity to most 
Kurdish villages during the 1970s, Kurdish areas remained woefully underdeveloped 
in comparison to the rest of Syria19. 
 
Compared to the Kurdish political movement in Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, the Kurdish 
political movement in Syria has been remarkable ineffective and weak. Generally 
speaking, the opposition in Syria has been very weak since the Muslim Brotherhood 
was crushed in Homma in 1982. The government has cowed, controlled and tempted 
figures from opposition groups through patron-client system that made the 
individual’s place within the system very valuable but insecure20. The government of 
Assad after coming to power in the early 1960s established a cohesive intelligence 
apparatus which was highly adept at buying off, infiltrating and coercing opposition 
groups, making sustained and meaningful political opposition extremely difficult and 
hazardous. The suppression of Kurdish political activity was part of the government 
effort to crush the opposition and civil society groups21. 
 
Like political movement in Iraq, Iran and Turkey, there has been disunity among the 
Syrian Kurds as the traditional ties of loyalty and tribe have interplayed with political 
and ethnic affiliations. Main Kurdish political parties advocated a careful and modest 
approach, focusing on cultural and educational issues and carefully avoiding radical 
approaches. One of the main divisions among the Syrian Kurds is a complex sense of 
identity. Most Kurds are proud of their Kurdishness and a considerable number fought 
in the Kurdish uprisings in Iraq and Turkey22. But significant number of the Syrian 
Kurds also see themselves as part of the broad multi-ethnic Syrian nation. Many live 
in, study in and rely on incomes from the major cities. This interaction has, to an 
extent, produced some of the Kurdish attachment to the wider Syrian community23. 
While some Kurds are wholly wedded to Syria, others are wholly disaffected. The 
political parties have been attempting to balance the competing identities of being 
                                                 
19 Gary C. Gamill, “ The Kurdish Awakening in Syria”, The Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Vol.6, 
No. 4, April 2004, p 5  
  
 
20 Cited in 20 Kerim Yaldiz, ‘ The Kurds in Syria, p 7 
21 Ibid, P 8   
22 Ibid, P 67  
23 Ibid, P 68  
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‘Syrian’  and ‘Kurdish’ or specifically ‘Syrian Kurdish’24. The Kurdish movement in 
Syria has been hindered by the activities of the Kurds from neighbouring countries- a 
dynamic common to the all Kurdish movement. The Iraqi Kurdish parties and the 
Kurdistan Workers Party known as PKK in Turkey have distracted Syrian Kurds from 
the struggle in Syria. These better organised, stronger, and more numerous have 
attracted the Syrian Kurds in their respective causes with tacit consent of Syria. 
Neither movement (Turkey’s Kurds and Iraqi Kurds) has supported the Kurds in Syria 
and both have avoided the issue for fear of damaging good relations with Syrian 
government25.  
 
The Kurdish movement in Syria has been plagued by divisions since soon after the 
founding of the first party, the Kurdistan Democratic Party- Syria in 1957. Despite 
efforts at unification, there are thirteen Kurdish parties active in Syria. The Kurdish 
parties command considerable support in the Kurdish predominantly populated 
Kurdish cities in the Jazira around Qamishli regarded as hotbed of Kurdish 
nationalism in Syria. But their illegality means they can not stand for election26. 
Provided the parties remain quiet, do not mention any form of self-government or 
regime change, confine themselves to cultural matters and offer no unified threat, the 
Syrian government tolerates their existence27. As a result of the government harsh 
measures in the Kurdish areas, no party has been calling for independence or even 
dares make mention of a common cause among all Kurds. It is worthwhile to mention 
that none of the parties used the sensitive name ‘Kurdistan’ in their title for fear of 
official reaction to any suggestion of suggestion. Instead, the term used since 1960s 
has been ‘Kurdish’.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 Ibid, p 69  
25 Ibid, p 70  
26 Political program submitted to the third convention of the Yakiti Party in Syria, Article 4, and 
November 1999. English translation available online at 
http://.www.users.skynet.be/Yakiti/ingilizi/aboutYakiti.htm, p 1  
27 Ibid, p 2  
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9.7  The Raising the Voice 
 
Since the country’s independence from France, there have been periodic 
confrontations. There were physical confrontations and arrests in the 1980s and the 
1990s, often on significant days such as New Ruz, or the anniversary of Al-Hasaka. 
The restrictions on the celebration of New Ruz, led to a bloody confrontation in 
1986 when crowds gathered in Damascus and Afrin demanding the freedom to 
observe the festival and were fired on by police in which a number of protestors 
were killed and injured28. In 1990, a demonstration by ‘Ajanib’ and ‘Makhtumeen’ 
was violently repressed after protestors attempted to present their complaints to the 
President. These incidents have increased in frequency and scale in recent years 
with notably large and bold human rights demonstrations in Damascus and Aleppo 
in 2002 and 2003. The death of Hafez Al asad gave further impetus to Kurdish 
activity. Kurdish political organisations were able to meet more openly and increase 
their activity and support. With Asad’s son, Bashar, in power, the regime relaxed its 
attitude towards the Kurdish publications and music and the burgeoning number of 
illegal private ‘Kurmanji’ language classes29. Despite the slight softening of the 
Government in 2000, it has also maintained and even increased its repression of the 
Kurdish political movement. Kurdish activists have been repeatedly intimidated 
while anti-Kurdish rhetoric and restrictions on Kurdish activity remain firmly in 
place. It seems the regime makes some conciliatory statements in an attempt to 
subdue the Kurds and ease international pressure while in practise it is 
unwillingness to countenance any real change. For example, two leaders of the 
Kurdish Union Party in Syria Marwan Othman and Hasan Salih became prominent 
political prisoners after being arrested in 2002. They were detained for 15 months 
for organising a human rights demonstration in Damascus30.  
 
The official expulsion of the Kurdistan Workers Party, PKK, from Syrian territory 
in 1998, to a large degree, freed the Syrian Kurds from the complication of the PKK 
presence. The PKK‘s presence in Syria since the early 1980s complicated political 
                                                 
28 Washington urges tolerance on Damascus," Agence France Presse, 15 March 2004. 
29 Amnesty International, Press Release, 6 April 2004 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGMDE240292004 
30 Syrian Arab TV (Damascus), 15 March 2004. Translation by BBC World Service 
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activities of the Syrian Kurds. International intervention in the war of 1991 (Gulf 
War) and the subsequent autonomy gained by the Iraqi Kurds were closely watched 
by the Syrian Kurds, who felt more emboldened to articulate their demands. 
Furthermore, the fall of the Baathist regime in Iraq and gains made by the Iraqi 
Kurds at both regional and national level have provided massive encouragement. 
Also, international pressure increased on the isolated Syrian regime on issues of 
terrorism, the Iraqi border and interference in Lebanon, left the Syrian Government 
weakened and aware that internal repression of dissent would attract further 
international condemnation31.  
  
9.8   Conclusion 
 
Kurdish official exclusion from Syria’s definition in shaping its national identity dates 
back to 1940s and became more apparent in 1950s and 1960s. Syria’s Kurds are well 
aware of Syria’s current isolation and are less fearful of the regime than in the past. 
According to Machal Tammo, a Kurdish leader:‘We have exceeded the culture of fear 
that the regime planted in us in the last over half a century”32. There can be no 
doubting the depth of exasperation felt by many at the continued failure to end years 
of discrimination and hardship, and Kurdish nationalism is strengthening. The 
increased pressure on Syria during the UN investigation has further encouraged 
Kurdish activism and the continuing development of the autonomous government of 
the Kurdistan Region in Iraq will remain an inspiring influence. Despite this, the 
Syrian government retains tight control over internal dissent, and no relaxation of the 
restrictions on all opposition parties is in prospect33. From the state perspective, 
government harsh policies against the Kurds in the Kurdish areas might decrease 
Kurdish activism and in the process tame their nationalist aspirations, but the reaction 
to the official policies of government ranging from Arabisation of 1960s and 1970s to 
intimidation and harassing Kurdish political movement at the hands of the formidable 
Syrian intelligence agencies shows that the Kurds have not been cowed.  
 
                                                 
31 Al-Hayat (London), 16 March 2004, www.alhayat.com  
32 Interview with Kurdish media avaialbe at www.kurdishmedia.com, archive, March 21,2004  
33 Cited in Badrandin’s Book on ‘The Kurdish National Movement in Syria’, 2003, p 9 
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The Kurdish issue is crucial to Syrian domestic stability and reforms are required; 
otherwise this increased level of Kurdish unrest is likely to continue. The Syrian 
government is in no position to make substantial economic improvements, but there 
are some signs of willingness to be slightly more conciliatory on cultural issues and to 
grant citizenship to at least some of the stateless Kurds. However, any real mood for 
change seems unlikely within a regime whose entire legitimacy is based upon Arab 
nationalist rhetoric. To grant meaningful concessions to the Kurds would be to 
endanger the foundations of the state ideology. It is likely, therefore, that Kurdish 
national sentiment in Syria will continue to increase in depth and expression. Granting 
citizenship will not satisfy all Kurdish demands, which include a wish to be 
recognized as a second nationality and cultural and linguistic freedom. There’s a kind 
of anxiety and restlessness now. We are disappointed with all the unfulfilled 
promises,’ according to Hasan Salih, secretary general of the Kurdish Union Party in 
Syria. The great unknown is how far the Syrian Kurds will be prepared to press their 
demands. Currently there is no open discussion, nor perhaps even desire, for 
independence or Kurdish unification, regardless of whether either would be feasible. 
Circumstances may change in Syria and in neighbouring countries, but the full extent 
of Kurdish aims is at present for some measure of autonomy similar to that gained in 
Iraq. This stands a long way behind more pressing goals – citizenship for the stateless, 
the lifting of restrictions on Kurmanji and Kurdish culture, and, common to all 
Syrians, improved economic opportunities. How far the Kurds are willing to fight will 
to a great extent depend on the nebulous question of how Kurdish they actually feel 
and whether a natural urge to maintain identity, language and culture develops into a 
more political nationalist struggle. 
 
 
 
Chapter Ten 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis has examined the chief factors and reasons behind the delayed national 
consciousness of the Kurds and their failure in creating a nation-state of their own like so 
many other national movements during and after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. 
The Kurds constituting the largest ethnic bloc after Arabs, Persians, and Turks in the 
Middle East have been relatively late in developing a modern nationalist movement. 
Different peoples, of course, experience differing patterns of nationalist growth, 
consistent with their geography and historical circumstances. Overall, the Kurdish failure 
in developing a cohesive national consciousness which by definition span all other social 
loyalties results from several factors. The geography of Kurdistan heads the list. As a 
people inhabiting a primary mountainous region, the Kurds have been scattered and 
isolated from each other. This as a pre-requisite to link the people of various social 
backgrounds prevented the immense communication among the Kurds of the different 
regions to develop a sustained communication network. This was the case during all  
nineteenth century Kurdish uprisings against the Ottoman encroachment. With no strong 
central structure like those developed in the great plains of the Tigris and Euphrates or in 
the Nile valley. Geography and a nomadic way of life over the past centuries have 
strengthened the divergence of the various Kurdish dialects, many of them not mutually 
comprehensible today. In political terms, for at least the past five centuries the Kurds 
have been divided between Persian and Ottoman empires. The divisions of the Kurds 
between these two powerful empires was first a major blow to the Kurds, and these 
political divisions seriously constrained the opportunities to develop a more cohesive 
national vision. A the same time, after the first world war, those political divisions 
widened following the division of the Kurds among the newly created national states in 
the region. The states involved in the division of the Kurds have been clearly intent upon 
inhibiting Kurdish nationalism within their borders.  
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Nationalism as defined by Arnold must be integrative and coherent to help succeed the 
national movement1. Kurdish nationalism due to its tribal social structure and lack of 
clear  political awareness among Kurdish people would not become a dynamic force 
which could bind all social groups together under one framework. The fault lines which 
divide a nation along religion, sects and dialectics can be overcome by a coherent 
nationalism. In this sense, Kurdish nationalism failed to overcome those fault lines which 
divide the members of nation. Obviously, Kurdish national movement emerged at a time 
when other national movements within the Ottoman Empire emerged and sough more 
autonomy from Constanipole. The only thing which made other national movements 
succeed, aside from support of the major powers, was their nationalism were more 
integrative which bound all social groups together against the authority of the Ottoman 
Empire. In the case of  the Kurds, the Kurdish clerics remained loyal to the Sultanat until 
the final stage of collapse of the Empire. The Kurdish masses leaned more to the clergy 
than to secular figures, whose loyalty to their nation was paramount.  
 
Geography of Kurdistan was a fundamental obstacle which undermined the Kurdish 
national movement during the First World War period. The Kurds have generally lived in 
the more isolated regions of the two Empires: Ottomans and Persia. Isolation and an often 
pastoral way of life in many areas contributed to the development of a strong clan and 
tribal structures that perpetuated political and regional divisions. During the time of the 
Ottoman Empire, the Kurds along with other Muslims were part of a broader Sunni 
Muslim population within a multi-ethnic Empire. The empire was fully cognizant of its 
minorities, but it defined them in religious, not ethnic terms. This proved to be a 
cornerstone in helping the integrity of the Empire for centuries. The existence of the 
Christian and Jewish minorities was legally recognized. For the Muslim groups, however, 
the concept of minority status in legal sense did not really exist. The Muslim social and 
religious core of the Empire was made up of Turks, Arabs, and Kurds. Even if their 
language and culture differed, their religion basically did not. Sunnis were all equally 
Muslims and believers; ethnic and linguistic differences among them were of no legal 
consequence. As the research indicates, Kurds as part of the Sunni community of the 
                                                 
1 Edward Arnold, Nationalisms, Contemporary History Series, London, 1994, p 5 
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Ottoman Empire were already treated as a distinct group by the Sultan in the sixteen 
century, when a number of independent principalities or emirates were established. Used 
by the Sultan to ensure the stability of the borders, these emirates, to large degree, were 
autonomous in their internal affairs. In exchange for their autonomy, they provided 
Sultan taxes and soldiers. Although, the relationship between these Kurdish emirs and the 
Sultan was not always free of trouble, the system survived into nineteen century. 
Certainly Kurdish tribes and clans were well aware of their cultural and linguistic 
distinctiveness, but this was not an age in which national concepts were formed. The 
autonomous Kurdish leaders were not particularly kind to their own population either. 
Overall, Kurds identified with the larger group Ottoman society but far more important at 
the local level they identified with various religious orders or tribal groupings. These 
tribal groupings were often in conflict with each other, shifting patterns of alliance. 
Indeed, the primary social cleavage was between the tribal fighter and sedentary 
cultivator.  
 
By the nineteenth century, new factors induced gradual political change in the 
relationship between the Kurds and the Ottoman administration. Increased imperial 
intervention in the Kurdish regions, levies for troops, and warfare between Russia, Iran 
and the Ottoman Empire that touched Kurdish areas, increased the challenges to the 
privileges of Kurdish emirs and a broader of rebellion against Turkish rule throughout the 
empire. The empire’s attempt at centralization was met with increased unrest in the 
Kurdish areas, some of which was the result of recklessness by Kurdish chieftain’s intent 
on pursuing their own aggrandizement. Among these rebellious emirs, Baban, Mir 
Mohammad of Rawanduz, and emir of Bottan are the most famous. The revolts were 
suppressed at the cost of many lives. There were, in total, fifty various Kurdish rebellions 
against the Ottoman state. These revolts, however, were not nationalistic in character and 
their suppression led to strengthening pf Sheikhs and ‘Tariqats’ (religious orders) leaders, 
who would play later a significant role in fomenting new rebellions. By and large, the 
traditional feudal Kurdish lords in the areas perceived themselves as the ‘Sunni Muslim’ 
subjects of a fundamentally Muslim empire and had no interest in an unpredictable 
Kurdish entity in which their own status may change for the worse. Ottomans throughout 
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the course of nineteenth century rebellions skillfully maneuvered between emirs who 
encouraged the rebellions only when their feudal interest were in jeopardy and the 
religious section of people who by and large happy with the Ottoman’s Sunni core make 
up.  
 
Changing fortunes of the empire at the end of nineteenth century together with nationalist 
stirrings of Armenians in the regions also inhabited by Kurds provided some of the other 
reasons for Kurdish disenchantment. With his ascension to the throne in 1876, Sultan 
Abul Hamid 11 sought to solidify the base of the Ottoman state by emphasizing the 
Islamic character of the empire.  Among those to be co-opted were Kurdish leaders and 
elites. Yet, at the same time the seeds of differentiation were also sown by the state. 
Among the first instances of direct intervention and differentiation in the Kurdish region 
by the imperial state is Constanipole was the creation in 1891 of Kurdish officered and 
soldiered Hamidiya regiments. Designed to maintain order in eastern provinces, these 
battalions were eventually used by the Ottoman state in its campaign against the 
Armenians and also Kurds who were not obedient to the Ottomans. In the interim, the 
armed and tribally organized battalions became the source of a state-sponsored division 
within the Kurdish community as those benefiting from state patronage and arms would 
antagonize and oppress those who did not.  
 
The Hamidyia just like the village guard system a century later, further strengthened 
tribal links among the Kurds. While there is a debate over the degree of the Kurdish 
political consciousness exhibited by the Kurds during the later part of century, from 
increased political activities in Istanbul and elsewhere, it is evident that something was 
afoot. The empire was experiencing turmoil at the centre. The Committee of Union and 
Progress had begun to agitate and conspire for a return to constitutional rule that the 
Sultan had abrogated. According to some experts, Young Turks Committee intentionally 
established a close relationship with the Kurdish intellectual elite and encouraged them to 
pressure Sultan to return to constitutional rule. It is obvious that the Young Turks were  
fully cognizant of the fact that Kurdish support is essential to pressure Sultanate. That is 
why, when Attaturk came to Kurdistan, his first statement was to confirm the formation 
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of bi-national state. In addition to that, in order to earn Kurdish support, he largely played 
a religious card which was effective in gaining Kurdish support. To those Kurds who 
were loyal to the Sunni Sultanat of the Empire, religion came before nationalism. In this 
regard, Attaturk got it well.  
 
With the Young Turks Revolution in 1908, two contradictory tendencies appeared. On 
one hand emphasis on Islam was replaced with secularism and constitutionalism. In the 
ensuing atmosphere of liberalism, the Kurdish national activities increased when many 
intellectuals who abandoned hope in the efficacy of nationalist revolt looked to Ottoman 
liberal movements and constitutional reform as the best means to achieve greater national 
rights. With the growing of liberal and constitutional movement in coherence, Kurdish 
political and cultural activities burgeoned in the large towns of Kurdistan. The first 
Nationalist organization, the Kurdish society for the Rise and Progress was formed in 
1908. The irony was that while return to constitutionalism served the more modern 
elements of the Kurdish elite, it did lead to a negative reaction among the Sheikhs 
(religious figures). Some of them engaged in open rebellion against the both Young 
Turks and the nationalist elements of Kurdish national movement. The Young Turks 
movement, finding itself besieged domestically and internationally, increasingly turned to 
pan-Turkism as a means of consolidating its power. In the end, when the Young Turks 
were dragged into the First World War, the Kurds proved to be loyal subjects. They 
fought in and alongside the Ottoman armies. It is obvious that the national element of the 
Kurdish movement found itself isolated in the face of an alliance between Young Turks, 
who also supported the Sultanate against the allies, and the Kurdish religious element 
which was made up of a Sunni core leaning towards to the Sultanate. This division within 
the Kurdish movement, furthermore, hindered any effort to articulate a national agenda 
during and the years of the war and after.  
 
The defeat of the Ottomans in 1918 and the signing of the 1920 Treaty of Sevres 
provided a turning point for the Kurds. The Ottomans found themselves in a weak 
position and agreed to the Sevres articles in which a promise was vaguely made in 
support of the creation of a national state for the Kurds. That did not materialize because 
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the nationalist movement under the leadership of charismatic leader, Kemal Attaturk, was 
fully cognizant of the dividing line within the Kurdish National Movement across 
religious and nationalist elements. Attaturk’s strategy contained two contradictory 
tendencies. On the one hand, he and his movement largely tended to transform Turkish 
Islamic characteristics whereas on other hand he invoked Islamism in Kurdistan which 
attracted the more popular religious elements among the Kurdish society. The centrality 
of Attaturk’s rhetorics focused on the creation of a bi-national state with equal Turkish 
and Kurdish status in it. The Young Turks did not recognize the treaty of Sevres signed 
by the Sultan in 1920, and that nationalists after achieving staunch victories in the 
military field placed allies in a shaky position. It was not a surprise in 1923 when 
nationalists Turks asked for revision of Sevres. Indeed, the developments taking place 
between 1920 and 1923 worked in Turkey’s favor. These developments naturally placed 
Turkey in a position to negotiate the terms of Sevres, and in the process of heated give 
and take Turkey removed the phrases of Sevres dealing with a possible Kurdish national 
state.  
 
The international and regional order that had been established in the aftermath of Lusan 
which in effect resulted in the creation and recognition of the new states in the region, 
furthermore divided the already divided Kurdish society. As a result, the Kurdish 
question became more complex. The Shitte and Sunni fault lines that had been used by 
the Empires to divide the Kurds between themselves weakened Kurdish nationalism. 
Hence, Kurdish nationalism did not emerge as an integrative ideology capable of 
integrating the significant social and sectarian groups within the Kurdish society.  This 
factor played a pivotal role in dividing the Kurdish rebellions that emerged in Iran, 
Turkey, and Iraq in the post-Ottoman political environment. In the case of Simko’s 
rebellion against Persia, the core rebellion was made up of the Sunni Kurds that alienated 
the Shittes in Iranian Kurdistan. This undermined the cohesion of rebellion and as a result 
the Shittes leaned on the central Government in Tehran. This was also true of Shiekh Said 
rebellion which was not supported by the Kurdish Zazaz, an offshoot of the Shiite Islam, 
in Northern Kurdistan. Likewise, the Kurdish Shiites in Iraq did not support the rebellion 
of Shiekh Mahmud who was a Sunni Shiekh. As Arnold says any national movement is 
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deemed to failure without a coherent national consciousness that could transcend tribal, 
sectarian and regional loyalties. It has been argued that for the course of a hundred years, 
the lack of a coherent national consciousness is the chief factor in failing Kurdish 
nationalism for the creation of a national state. The Other factor that failed the Kurdish 
national movement in establishing a nation-state in post-First World War is the lack of 
external support when needed. Despite the poor coherence of nationalism within Kurdish 
society, the Kurdish national movement in the initial phases made remarkable success in 
liberating Kurdish land, and the central states has been vulnerable in the face of the 
Kurdish rebellions. This was the case in Turkey, Iraq and Iran. When Kurdish revolts 
reached a decisive stage, the external powers simply withdrew their support. It must be 
noted that the nation-states that had been created in the post-Ottoman era in the Middle 
Eastern region were not the outcome of their national movements. Rather, those states 
were created simply to retain the strategic interests of the major powers dominating the 
international relations in post-Ottoman regional and international order. It is obvious that 
despite the poor coherence of the Kurdish nationalist movement, it would been possible 
to establish a state for the Kurds had external powers supported them.  
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